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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis uses the case study of Australian superannuation to examine the conditions 
for systemic policy change. It tells the history of a modern reform. Long-running 
debates about superannuation policy have led to the system that Australians know 
today. A narrative of superannuation emerges, showing that it was a product of long-
term institutional continuities, more than existing narratives would suggest.  
The theory of historical institutionalism is brought to bear to argue that the 
introduction of Australia’s national superannuation system was the evolution of a 
welfare system whose architecture was established around the time of Australian 
Federation. Occupational superannuation had existed in Australia since the 1840s, old 
age pension schemes were introduced in NSW, Victoria and Queensland in the 1890s, 
and the Commonwealth Old Age Pension was introduced in 1908.1  
The thesis traces the history of debates about public pension financing and the 
eventual pivot towards Australia’s unique state-mandated, private superannuation 
system based on defined contributions. Throughout this history, the thesis considers 
the cross-cutting themes of gender coverage, influences on policy makers and risk. The 
thesis is arranged around the points in time when the introduction of a national 
superannuation system was considered and legislated by Australian governments. It 
moves through the 1890s during the old age pension debates; the 1920s and the Royal 
Commission on National Insurance and National Insurance legislation introduced by 
the Bruce government; the 1930s and the National Health and Pensions Insurance 
Act, passed but never implemented by the Lyons government; the 1970s and the 
Whitlam government’s proposal for national superannuation, and then, finally, the 
introduction of the modern system in 1992 under the Keating government’s 
“Superannuation Guarantee.”   
After years of opposition, following World War II the Australian Labor Party changed 
its policy to support contributory pensions. The policy rhetoric towards this change 
began after World War II. Occupational superannuation was radically reconceived and 
remodelled by labour reformers between the 1970s and the early 1990s, creating a new 
pathway of policy development and “layering” new elements so that the institution 
                                                             
1 Invalid and Old-Age Pensions Act 1908 (Cth).  
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would serve a broad working constituency. During the term of the Hawke and Keating 
governments, there was a “critical juncture” in superannuation policy but incremental 
change was occurring too. This points to the limits of institutional theory, in which 
different modes of change are said to occur at different points in time. 
The history of superannuation policy is drawn into the present by looking at the period 
between the introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee in 1992 and 2019. It 
focuses on the changes in respect of “choice of fund,” arguing that heavily politicised 
debates over choice over superannuation fund were the result of the decision to create 
a private system of superannuation. The Choice of Fund legislation in 2005 and the 
MySuper reforms in 2013 that deal with the choice of superannuation fund are 
examples of policy “layering” and “displacement,” reflecting the power struggle 
between the Labor Party and the conservative parties to control financial flows in the 
system. This struggle was one which labour actors set themselves up for by establishing 
superannuation within an industrial framework debate rather than as a government 
scheme. 
Why does systemic policy change happen when it happens? Why does reform go in one 
direction rather than another? Why do political parties introduce policies that their 
predecessors opposed in the past?  These are the fundamental questions with which 
this thesis grapples.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
In industrialised societies today, no new pension plan starts with a clean slate. 
Decades of accumulated rights, expectations, anomalies and inequities are 
inherited.  
– Richard Titmuss, 19693 
 
Depending on who you speak to, superannuation is one of the great Australian social 
reforms, a colossal swindle of workers’ wages, or somewhere in the vast space in 
between. The system of compulsory retirement savings that was introduced by the 
Keating Labor Government in 1992 has produced a national savings pool of $2.9 
trillion.4 With this amount of money comes a multiplicity of issues and interest groups. 
How much is enough superannuation? Should people be allowed to take their 
superannuation as a lump sum? What is the best type of fund? How should 
superannuation be taxed? Is superannuation good for women? These are a just a few 
of the issues concerning superannuation that exercise the minds of those in 
government, academia and the media. Industry lobbyists have loud voices in the policy 
arena too. It is little wonder that most Australians have only a superficial 
understanding of the system that they are compulsorily brought into when they enter 
employment.5 It is also little wonder that many choose to tune out. 
This thesis argues that the “reform moment” of the 1980s and early 1990s is properly 
understood only in the context of previous, unsuccessful forays into national 
superannuation. A longer historical lens shows that modern superannuation was the 
evolution of long-term welfare structures, radically reconceived. The development of 
superannuation since the introduction of the “Superannuation Guarantee” in 19926 
                                                             
3 “Superannuation for All: A Broader View,” New Society, February 1969, p.315. 
4 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), “Quarterly Superannuation Performance 
Statistics,” June 2019, available from 
https://www.apra.gov.au/sites/default/files/quarterly_superannuation_performance_statistics_june
_2019_0.pdf. 
5 In its recent review of the superannuation system, the Productivity Commission (PC) found that 
“many Australians have a good broad knowledge of the superannuation system” but that “many lack 
the detailed understanding necessary for effective decision making. Low financial literacy is observed 
among a sizeable minority (about 30 per cent) of members”: PC, Superannuation: Assessing 
Efficiency and Competitiveness, Report No.91 (Canberra: Productivity Commission: 2018), p.56.  
6 The Superannuation Guarantee, or “SG” is a compulsory percentage of an employee’s ordinary 
earnings which their employer must pay to a complying superannuation fund. The Superannuation 
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has been a process of incremental change concerning who has power over a huge, 
financialised system.   
Superannuation introduced a second “pillar” to the retirement income system, and it 
took until a very late point in the development of the Australian welfare state for this 
to occur. Until 1992 there was remarkable stability in the institutions of old age welfare 
in Australia. Income in retirement was derived from private savings and a need-based 
age pension, introduced in 1908 and funded from general revenue. Some workers were 
members of private occupational pension schemes run by their employers or, in the 
first half of the 20th century, had some welfare provision through their membership of 
a Friendly Society. From the introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee in 1992, 
this changed so that nearly all Australian employees would have a pot of funds, their 
own savings, to augment the Age Pension. Such a fundamental change to the pension 
system makes the case study of superannuation a fertile ground from which to 
understand the conditions for change, and the particular course change has taken.  
In contrast to other systemic reforms in Australian social and economic policy, there 
is scant historical analysis of the development of national superannuation policy. This 
is despite there being a sizeable literature on the operation of modern superannuation 
policy and some histories of superannuation from political and industrial 
perspectives.7 The Goods and Services Tax (GST), introduced in 2000, and the 
Medicare health system, introduced in 1984,8 are examples of systemic policy change 
that have been studied to provide lessons about the conditions for policy reform.9 
Scholars have begun to write the history of the National Disability Insurance Scheme 
(NDIS), introduced in 2013, from an institutional perspective.10 Looking at the 
development of superannuation policy is a means to understand not only why 
                                                             
Guarantee was introduced by the Superannuation Guarantee (Charge) Act 1992 (Cth) and the 
Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth). 
7 See, for example, Mary Easson, Keating and Kelty’s Super Legacy: the Birth and Relentless Threats 
to the Australian Superannuation System (Redland Bay: Connor Court, 2017); Bernard Mees & Cathy 
Brigden, Workers’ Capital: Industry Funds and the Fight for Universal Superannuation in Australia 
(Melbourne: Allen & Unwin 2017). 
8 Originally introduced as Medibank in 1975 under the Whitlam Government. 
9 See, for example, Richard Ecclestone’s study of the introduction of the GST in The Thirty Year 
Problem: The Politics of Australian Tax Reform (Sydney: The Australian Tax Research Foundation, 
2004). On the introduction of Medicare, see Anne-Marie Boxall and James A. Gillespie, Making 
Medicare: the Politics of Universal Health Care in Australia (Sydney: New South Publishing, 2013). 
10 Gemma Carey, Adrian Kay and Ann Nevile, “Institutional Legacies and ‘Sticky Layers’: What 
Happens in Cases of Transformative Policy Change?” Administration and Society 51, vol.3 (2019): 
pp.491-509. 
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superannuation itself came to exist, but also to draw some conclusions about the 
nature of policy change and stasis in Australia.11 
This thesis engages with a significant reform introduced by the Australian Labor Party 
but it is a wider study than the machinations of Labor politics alone. As the literature 
review in the next chapter discusses, the history of superannuation is conventionally 
located within Labor history and the reforms of the Hawke (1983–1991) and Keating 
(1991–1996) governments. There is a natural tendency to want to study the actors most 
proximate to a reform in time, but historical support for national superannuation was 
found elsewhere too. In fact, until the post-World War II period, Labor opposed 
contributory pensions. Prior to that, “Labor’s notion of the welfare state focused on 
the principle of income redistribution from general taxation revenue and a rejection 
of the ‘contributory principle’ for pensions.”12 The post-war rhetoric of contributory 
pension financing by the Labor Party was followed by its proposed introduction of a 
national contributory scheme in the 1970s. The thesis argues that Labor’s support for 
a broad-based, occupational pension system would have been unlikely without the 
party’s earlier adoption of contributory pension financing.13  
Research Questions 
 
This is a thesis in public policy that uses history to understand a major policy reform. 
A distinguishing feature of the study lies in this approach, lacking in much analysis of 
the Australian superannuation system. It asks: why does Australia have its 
superannuation system? Undertaking an analysis of the history of Australian 
superannuation means considering why Australia has its system of superannuation 
and why it did not adopt superannuation in another form: a public contributory 
pension, or social insurance, so common in other developed countries. Like 
Australia, eight other members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
                                                             
11 In recent years there has been an ongoing public discussion about the capacity of Australia’s 
institutions to produce policy reform, particularly in the area of taxation. See, for example, John 
Daley, “If We Can’t Legislate Superannuation Changes Let’s Forget About Reform,” Australian 
Financial Review, 5 September 2016; John Hewson, “If Politicians can’t Reform the Tax System, We 
Need an Authority That Can,” Sydney Morning Herald, 28 February 2018. 
12 Boxhall and Gillespie, Making Medicare, p.24. 
13 Creighton has described the Labor Party’s introduction of a privately managed superannuation 
scheme as a “great irony of Australian history.” He asks, “[H]ow could a party that once spurned 
contributory insurance have so heartily endorsed a new privatised version?” Adam Creighton, “We All 
Must be Capitalists Now: the Strange Story of Compulsory Superannuation in Australia,” in William 
Coleman, ed. Only in Australia: the History, Politics and Economics of Australian Exceptionalism, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), p.194.  
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Development (OECD) have mandatory defined contribution pensions, managed 
privately. 14 However only in Australia and Chile is this combined with a means-
tested public pension. Australia’s retirement income system is not internationally 
typical.  
Consequently, from the central thesis question there are three sub-questions: 
1. Why didn’t Australia adopt a national (public) superannuation system? 
2. Why was a private, occupational superannuation system introduced in 1992? 
3. What are the consequences of the decision to introduce a private, occupational 
superannuation system? 
The story of Australian superannuation is bound up with the history of social 
insurance in Australia and why it failed, continually. This is a complex history, and it 
has been necessary to “select and simplify…rationally guided by the purposes of the 
investigation.”15 The thesis answers its questions through considering the occasions 
when Australian federal governments debated or introduced national superannuation 
schemes – firstly, during the age pension debates at the turn of the twentieth century; 
secondly, at the time of the first contributory social insurance proposals in 1913, 1928 
and 1938; thirdly, the scheme of superannuation proposed by the Hancock Committee 
of Inquiry in 1976; fourth, the period when state-mandated, occupational 
superannuation was introduced, 1983 to 1992; and fifth, the period of modern 
superannuation 1992 to present. The bulk of the thesis is devoted to the first two sub-
questions, covering the period up to the introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee 
in 1992. The third sub-question is dealt with in a final chapter that covers the period 
between 1992 and the present. 
Concepts used in this thesis   
 
This thesis is concerned with the development of Australia’s national superannuation 
policy, its evolution towards a national system of superannuation. The concept of 
“superannuation” itself has changed over time, and now means something quite 
different from what it did when the first superannuation schemes commenced in the 
mid-19th century. This section discusses the use of the term “superannuation” in the 
thesis and the related concepts of “pensions” and “retirement.” It also outlines the 
                                                             
14 OECD, Pensions at a Glance 2017 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2017), p.102.  
15 Hugh Stretton, Australia Fair (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2005), p.61. 
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meaning of “policy” as it is used in the study.  
Superannuation 
 
The shifting meaning of “superannuation” reflects its transition from a policy of 
social security to one of industrial welfare. Accordingly, the thesis uses the term 
“national superannuation” to refer to a government scheme of superannuation, and 
“occupational superannuation” to refer to private, employment-based 
superannuation schemes. A fuller explanation of terminology is used when there may 
be ambiguity about the form of superannuation being described. 
The occupational form of superannuation that commenced in Australia in the mid-
19th century is the basis of superannuation policy today. But up until the 1970s, the 
idea of a national superannuation scheme was understood as a policy of government 
social insurance. The proposals for a “national superannuation scheme” during the 
first part of the 20th century that are charted in this thesis were proposals for a 
government scheme of contributory social insurance that included provision for the 
aged. For example, introducing the National Insurance Bill in 1928, Treasurer Earle 
Page argued that  
the practice of insurance should be applied not only in respect of such 
casualties as death, fire, ship-wreck, and accident, but also to those other 
more insidious, but no less serious, casualties of sickness, invalidity, and 
senility, which affect our social organization and, in the absence of due 
provision, cause untold suffering.16 
The Lyons government’s National Health and Pensions Insurance Act of 1938 
contemplated old age pensions being paid to insured men aged 65 and over, and 
insured women aged 60 and over, and who had made the requisite number of 
contributions.17 The Chifley government’s National Welfare Fund, established in 
1945, explicitly referred to a “superannuation scheme,” but it was to be financed by 
an income tax increase rather than employee contributions.18 Tax increases were a 
way to contain inflation, just as the government-union Accord in the 1980s used the 
                                                             
16 Earle Page, Treasurer, Second Reading Speech, National Insurance Bill 1928, Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Debates (CPD), House of Representatives, 14 September 1928, p.6746. 
17 Section 74, National Health and Pensions Insurance Act 1938 (Cth). 
18 The tax increase was achieved by lowering the tax-free threshold from £156 to £104: Parliamentary 
Library, The National Welfare Fund (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1985), p.1. 
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promise of superannuation as deferred wages to contain wage-driven spending and 
price inflation.  
The re-categorisation of superannuation policy from a policy of social security to one 
of industrial welfare began in the 1970s and was cemented during the 1980s. During 
the 1970s, several factors coalesced to change the meaning of superannuation in 
public policy. These were the failure of the Whitlam government’s national 
superannuation scheme; industrial disputes over the right to workplace 
superannuation; and the growth of industry-wide occupational superannuation 
funds. As Melanie Nolan has argued, “In the absence of a national superannuation 
scheme in Australia, occupational superannuation schemes…flourished, setting a 
future pathway that was difficult to alter.”19 This process of re-categorisation is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 5.  
From 1984 onwards, the Labor Party adopted a position of explicitly supporting 
occupational superannuation in its platform. References to superannuation in the 
ALP’s policy platform sections on old age welfare gradually disappeared during the 
course of the 1980s. The ALP then introduced a national scheme of state-mandated, 
occupational superannuation through the Superannuation Guarantee legislation in 
1992. This model of superannuation is still the system Australia has today. While the 
form is the same as early superannuation schemes, the difference is that Australia’s 
occupational superannuation system is now mandatorily payable by employers on 
behalf of their employees and it applies to workers not previously covered by private 
occupational superannuation. The percentage of superannuation payable was also 
mandated at the introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee, starting at 3 per 
cent of wages and legislated to rise to 9 per cent by 2002–03.20 
  
                                                             
19 Melanie Nolan, “‘Super’ Debates within the Antipodes? Explaining Differing New Zealand and 
Australian Retirement Policies in the late Twentieth Century,” Australian Journal of Politics and 
History 62, no.3 (2016): p.447. 
20 Section 20, Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992. In 2012, the Gillard Labor 
Government legislated to increase the rate of the Superannuation Guarantee from 9 per cent to 12 per 
cent by 2019. It is currently 9.5 per cent, however, after having been frozen by the Abbott Liberal–
National Government in 2014. The Superannuation Guarantee is currently scheduled to increase to 12 
per cent in 2025: section 19(2) Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 
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Pensions 
 
The concept of a “pension” refers to a regular income payment to provide support in 
circumstances where a person is not earning income. There are public and private 
pensions in the area of retirement income. Since 1908, Australia has had a public 
pension for old age that provides a basic level of income to prevent poverty. In 1947 
the “Old Age Pension” was renamed the “Age Pension.” Accordingly, the “Old Age 
Pension” is used for references to the pension up to 1947, and the “Age Pension” for 
references to the pension after. The Age Pension is the “first pillar” of Australia’s 
retirement income system. 
There are various types of pension in the private sphere, including employer 
pensions, industry-wide pensions and self-managed pensions. Although heavily 
regulated and subsidised by tax concessions, superannuation in Australia is a private 
benefit, capable of being taken as a lump sum or a pension. The tax treatment of 
superannuation has changed from encouraging lump sum payments, through a very 
low concessional rate of tax introduced in 1915, to the concessional treatment of 
pensions, encouraging the use of pensions to promote “income smoothing” over a 
person’s lifetime. Since 2007 superannuation pensions taken after a person turns 60 
have been tax - free.21  
To further complicate matters, pensions in both public and private spheres may be 
on the basis of “defined benefits” or “defined contributions.” In Australia, the public 
Age Pension has always been a defined benefit, that is, the government guarantees a 
level of pension benefit, payable for life. As a consequence, government bears the risk 
of providing retirement income. Private superannuation schemes were historically 
based on a defined benefit model, with the employer bearing the actuarial risk of 
funding an employee’s pension for life. Most superannuation funds are now funded 
on a defined contribution model, where the amount of superannuation contributed is 
stipulated through legislation and through which the individual bears the investment 
and “longevity” risk of outliving their savings. 
Finally, pensions may be universal, means-tested or provided through social 
insurance. Universal pensions are paid to all citizens irrespective of their own means, 
                                                             
21 Tax Laws Amendment (Simplified Superannuation) Act 2007 (Cth), section 280-30. 
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such as the case of New Zealand. Means-tested pensions like Australia’s Age Pension 
target public spending by assessing the individual’s income and/or assets and 
reducing payments, the more means a person has. Pensions may also be paid under a 
social insurance model. Social insurance is a model of pensions based on individual 
contributions. It is for this reason that social insurance is a “contributory” model of 
pensions. The German old age pension, introduced through the Old Age and 
Disability Insurance Law of 1889, was the first earnings-based social insurance 
system to insure “substantial numbers of workers.”22 Social insurance is based on 
proportional payroll tax from which the government pays individual benefits.23 
Social insurance schemes can cover many areas of incapacity, such as sickness, 
unemployment and old age. National superannuation is a public contributory 
pension that falls within the social insurance model.24  
Retirement 
 
Retirement and income have always been indissolubly linked.25 Prior to the 
commencement of the first government pension systems in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries, those with means were able to work less, and indeed they could elect 
whether to work at all. People who did have to work for a living would often rely on 
family, particularly younger relatives, for support as they aged. The late 19th century 
saw the emergence of ideas concerning poverty and charity which were influential in 
the development of the age pension. According to Pat Thane, the idea that the state 
owed a responsibility to people in the period of life after they ceased paid work was 
initiated in the 1870s by English clergyman, Canon William Blackley. He had become 
concerned about the numbers of old people who were in poverty because they could 
no longer work for a living.26 Blackley was followed in the 1890s by English social 
researchers such as Charles Booth and Seebohm Rowntree, who examined the social 
construction of poverty. They showed that men’s wages were too low to save for old 
                                                             
22 David M. Cutler and Richard Johnson, “The Birth and Growth of the Social Insurance State: 
Explaining Old Age and Medical Insurance Across Countries,” Public Choice 120 (2004): p.97. 
23 Georges Casamatta, Helmuth Cremer and Pierre Pestieau, “Political Sustainability and the Design of 
Social Insurance,” Journal of Public Economics 75 (2000): p.343. 
24 T.H. Kewley, “Superannuation or Selective Benefits?” The Australian Quarterly 44 no.2 (1972): 
pp.79-80. 
25 Pat Thane, “The History of Retirement,” in Gordon L. Clark, Alicia H. Munnell and J. Michael 
Orszag, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Pensions and Retirement Income (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), p.36. 
26 Ibid., p.41. 
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age, but women had even less opportunity to provide for themselves or pay into a 
contributory scheme due to lives spent attending to the needs of others.27  
Government provision for the aged in Australia has always been an anti-destitution 
measure rather than a form of income maintenance. Australia’s Commonwealth 
constitution in 1901 contained the power to legislate for “invalid and old age 
pensions.”28 The Invalid and Old Age Pensions Act passed by the federal parliament 
in 1908 was non-contributory, means tested and funded out of general revenue. 
Eligibility for the pension was based on a number of qualifying factors, including 
having reached the age of 65. The eligibility age was reduced to 60 years for women 
in 1910, on the grounds that they tended to become “incapacitated for regular work at 
an earlier age than men.”29 Again, the language describing eligibility demonstrated 
the intent of the Old Age Pension as a post-work anti-poverty measure. However 
much there had been a shift towards state acceptance of its responsibility for the 
aged, it was intended to be very limited.  
It would not be until the post-World War II era, influenced by rising affluence and 
the development of the British welfare state, that income maintenance and 
retirement became connected in Australian public policy. The idea that retirement 
income should bear some relationship to a person’s pre-retirement income grew, and 
with it the perceived need to supplement the existing Age Pension. With public 
finances having taken a battering during the war, the Chifley Labor government 
advocated a contributory superannuation scheme rather than an increased Age 
Pension so as to improve retirement income adequacy. A national superannuation 
scheme was not introduced during the post-war decades, but from this time onwards, 
superannuation came to be recognised among policy makers as a mechanism to lift 
retirement incomes.  
Since the introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee there has been continued 
debate about its role in old age welfare, and the degree of state versus private 
provision for income in retirement. Former Prime Minister Paul Keating, often 
described as the “architect” of superannuation, argues that superannuation should 
                                                             
27 Marian Sawer, “Andrew Fisher and the Era of Liberal Reform,” Labour History 102 (2012): p. 76. 
28 Section 51xxiii. 
29 T.H Kewley, Social Security in Australia, 1900-64 (Sydney: Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1973), 
p.75. 
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supplement the Age Pension.30 The Liberal – National Turnbull government in 2016 
sought – unsuccessfully – to introduce an objective for superannuation as being “to 
supplement or substitute the Age Pension.”31 As the superannuation system matures, 
and more Australian workers have superannuation savings accumulated from the 
start of their working lives, private savings will increase and the role of 
superannuation in retirement incomes will gain greater significance. That said, there 
is a debate at present about the degree to which superannuation is reducing reliance 
on the public Age Pension and, consequently, the merit of increasing the rate of 
compulsory contributions.32  
Public Policy 
 
The thesis examines the development of Australian superannuation policy. The 
Oxford Dictionary defines public policy as “the principles, often unwritten, on which 
social laws are based.” The thesis looks specifically at the principles reflected in 
national superannuation policy which the major political parties have introduced, or 
sought to introduce, in parliament. In this regard, the thesis is a political study of a 
major public policy as well as being an historical one.  
The thesis uses public policy as a lens through which to study changing ideas about 
old age welfare, as an indicator of political and philosophical views held within the 
major parties about the role of the state. Public policy contains ideas, but it does not 
refer to an expression of ideas alone. So, in public policy there is a connection 
between ideas and power, how ideas gain currency in political debate and, in the 
setting of this thesis, how they assume national significance. Daniel Béland’s work on 
ideas and policy change has argued for a focus on ideas that have political currency 
                                                             
30 Keating commented in a 2016 interview with the ABC that, “the system was built for the vast 
majority of people needing to rely on the age pension – with superannuation savings augmenting the 
pension”: ABC Fact Check, “Was Superannuation Designed to Get People off the Pension?,” 3 March 
2016, available from https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-11-18/fact-check-was-super-designed-to-
get-people-off-the-pension/6923582. 
31 Superannuation (Objective) Bill 2016, emphasis added. 
32 Modelling by the independent national think tank, the Grattan Institute, has found that the average 
Australian worker retiring today can expect a combined superannuation and Age Pension of at least 91 
per cent of their pre-retirement income: John Daley, Brendan Coates, Trent Wilshire, Owain Elmslie, 
Jonathan Nolan and Tony Chen, Money in Retirement: More than Enough (Melbourne: Grattan 
Institute, 2018). The Grattan Institute’s findings have been contested: see, for example, David Knox, A 
Review of Grattan’s Work on Super. Verdict: Very Misleading (Melbourne: Mercer, 2019); Michael 
Rice & Nathan Bonarius, What is the Right Level of Superannuation Guarantee?, Rice Warner 
Presentation to the Actuaries Summit, 2-4 June 2019.  
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and the proponents of those ideas.33 A further discussion of the theoretical approach 
to public policy is in Chapter 2. 
Methodology  
 
The thesis uses a single historical case study of Australian superannuation policy 
between 1842 and 1992 to answer its central question and first two sub-questions, and 
between 1992 and 2019 to answer the third sub-question. The periodisation of the 
thesis gives a bird’s eye view of superannuation policy development over a long sweep 
of time. This is a unique approach to Australian superannuation and to the broad 
subject of policy change, often studied by taking discrete case studies and looking at 
them in close detail.34 It gestures to this history of the “longue durée”35 by stepping 
back to consider policy and the ideational shifts governing it over a long period of time. 
What are the long-run forces that stimulate policy change, and in one direction over 
another? How do these long-run forces interact with more immediate considerations 
and conditions?  
The primary reason for adopting a single case study, historical thesis is because the 
central thesis question and its sub-questions are “why” questions that merit an 
explanatory methodology. The thesis evaluates the historical evidence in a single case 
study in order to develop a credible account of why Australia has the superannuation 
system it does. The case study of this thesis is messier, more complex than “large n” 
studies because it is the single case study of a large policy. As a result, the thesis does 
not take a scientific or mechanical approach to its research questions. Over such a 
long expanse of time it is virtually impossible to separate out different influencing 
factors, especially when they overlap. Recent institutionalist literature has stressed 
                                                             
33 Daniel Béland, “Ideas and Institutions in Social Policy Research,” Social Policy and Administration 
50, no.6 (2016): pp.734-750. 
34 In both history and political science there has been a move away from considering small periods of 
time in minute detail and towards a consideration of longer time periods, and connections between 
historical phases. In political science, historical institutionalists have argued for a greater attention to 
long-term processes: Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004); Theda Skocpol & Paul Pierson, “Historical 
Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science,” in I. Katznelson & H.V Milner, eds. Political 
Science: State of the Discipline (New York: W.W. Norton), pp.693-721. 
35 The approach associated with the Annales school of history, which looks beyond more “traditional” 
timespans, for example of crises or economic cycles, and instead looks at change over a long horizon: 
David Armitage and Jo Guldi, The History Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 
p.16. The history of the longue durée often takes in many hundreds of years or even millennia, and in 
this sense the timespan of this PhD is a short version of it.  
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the “complexity, ambiguity and multiple effects of institutions over time.”36 The 
thesis deals in what Heclo describes as “that difficult but perhaps rewarding middle 
zone – between the large questions with no determinate answers and the small 
questions of tiresome and often insignificant conclusiveness.”37 
The long time frame of the thesis necessitates a relatively more superficial examination 
of each point in time. There are events, points of view and perhaps most importantly, 
nuances which this type of history cannot hope properly to capture. This is why the 
thesis is limited to the development of a single policy. A comparative study over such 
an expanse of time would have been a much larger task, beyond the confines of a PhD. 
It would not have permitted the same depth of analysis of superannuation policy in 
relation to other institutions of old age welfare over time, critical to one of the key 
arguments of the thesis: that a national superannuation scheme was not successfully 
introduced because of existing institutions of old age welfare. The thesis does, 
however, provide the basis for fruitful comparative studies of national 
superannuation, occupational superannuation and public pension policy.  
The specific unit of study is Australian superannuation policy through its history and 
three cross-cutting themes are addressed. These themes are gender coverage, 
influences on policy makers, and risk. By including these themes, the approach taken 
has produced insights that feed into a wider discussion about the changing shape of 
the Australian welfare state. Contributory pension financing was a feature of early 
national superannuation proposals, and it was the Labor Party that primarily 
opposed it. Its acceptance of contributory financing would become central to the 
success of the modern system. The gender implications of a contributory pension 
system based on wages have been raised at every juncture since national 
superannuation was first proposed. What is different to the proposal in the 1970s is 
that there is no progressive redistribution of taxation that might benefit women; the 
flat tax on superannuation has a regressive effect on those with lower incomes, the 
majority of whom are women. The theme of risk is traced through each period – the 
judgments about who should bear risk for income in retirement, as reflected in 
national policy. 
                                                             
36 Daniel Béland, How Ideas and Institutions Shape the Politics of Public Policy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2019), p.10. 
37 Hugh Heclo, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden: From Relief to Income Maintenance 
(Yale: Yale University Press, 1975), p.16. 
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When history is used as an explanatory tool in public policy there can be a sense that 
it explains everything and it explains nothing. Every act, every omission, every 
relationship or economic event, indeed every policy reform, is capable of being 
explained by the sequence of events that went before. As political scientist James 
Mahoney has noted about the concept of historical path dependence, it is often defined 
as  “little more than the vague notion that ‘history matters’ or that ‘the past influences 
the future.’”38 Where history is most powerful in answering this charge is in its 
engagement with contingency, with pathways that are taken because of particular 
historical circumstances and an exploration of counterfactuals.39 Hugh Stretton 
observed that there are particular qualities that historians bring to analysis of public 
policy: their capacity to weigh hard and soft data, to see wholes as well as parts, to 
acknowledge the contingent as well as the predictable in human affairs, and to be 
critical of the values which influence the making of policy, including their own.40 This 
thesis is itself an argument for the role of history of public policy, not confined to 
narrow questions of “necessary” and “sufficient” causes.    
The narrative of this thesis shows the importance of sequencing for the evolution of 
superannuation policy.41 With the Age Pension and private savings forming the basis 
of retirement income policy, it became very complex to try to introduce a social 
insurance pension which would be layered on top of it. When national superannuation 
was rejected in 1979 by the Fraser Government, there was a conscious move by leaders 
of the union movement to pursue industrially what could not be achieved politically.42 
In dealing with these questions of contingency, of what led to changes in the course of 
superannuation policy, the narrative approach is distinguishable from description, or 
mere storytelling. The latter would document the evolution of superannuation policy, 
but without the same emphasis on “why change?”. Narrative analysis has “the obvious 
                                                             
38 James Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” Theory and Society 29, no.4 (2000): 
p.507. 
39 As Mahoney argues, “…path dependence characterizes specifically those historical sequences in 
which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic 
qualities”: Ibid., p.507. 
40 Hugh Stretton, “The Botany Bay Project: Historians and the Study of Cities,” Historical Studies 19, 
no.76 (1981): pp.430-9 cited in Graeme Davison, “Paradigms of Public History,” Australian Historical 
Studies 24, vol.96 (1991): p.15. 
41 Sequencing is a foundational element of historical institutionalism: Skocpol & Pierson, “Historical 
Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science,” p.700. This is discussed further in Chapter 2 in 
setting out the theoretical framework of the thesis. 
42 Christine St Anne, A Super History. How Australia’s $1 Trillion+ Superannuation Industry was 
Made (Melbourne: Major Street, 2012), p.17. 
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strength of allowing the analyst to show sensitivity to detail, process, conjecture and 
causal complexity.”43 
The following Chapter 2 sets out the bodies of literature used in this thesis to grapple 
with this challenge. The theoretical framework it sets out is historical institutionalism 
and within this body of theory, path dependence. In its use of the concepts of “critical 
junctures” and “path dependence,” contingency is also paramount in historical 
institutionalism.44 The thesis focuses on long-term institutional features and short-
term factors that precluded national superannuation being introduced until the 
Superannuation Guarantee. It also acknowledges the role of pragmatism in the policy 
process, that superannuation policy was often not the result of a consistent 
development of principles but a political response to circumstance.  
While this is not a comparative thesis, international influences over pension policy are 
woven into the narrative because they were woven into the process of policy 
development itself. International ideas about pension adequacy, living standards and 
principles of economic management have all featured in the development of Australian 
superannuation. So too, the campaigns by international movements such as the 
corporate model of pension fund management advocated by Swedish trade unions. 
Comparative studies are very useful for drawing out similarities and differences across 
systems, but are less capable of drawing out the same level of detail about the unique 
processes of change as a single case study does. Comparative studies about Australian 
superannuation have also been undertaken, a substantial amount of which compares 
the retirement income systems of Australia and New Zealand.45 A large body of 
literature considers the Australian pension system from a broader comparative 
                                                             
43 James Mahoney, “Nominal, Ordinal and Narrative Appraisal in Macrocausal Analysis,” American 
Journal of Sociology 104, no.4 (1999): p.1168. 
44 Giovanni Capoccia & R. Daniel Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and 
Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics 59, no3 (2007): p.343. 
45 The Politics of Retirement Savings Taxation: a Trans-Tasman Comparison (Sydney: CCH, 2010). 
See also Lisa Marriott, “Innovation in Retirement Savings Policy: The New Zealand Experience,” 
Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis 12, no.2 (2010): pp.197 – 212; Helen Hodgson and Lisa 
Marriott, “Retirement Savings and Gender: An Australasian Comparison,” Australian Tax Forum 28, 
no.4 (2013): pp.725-752; and Nolan, “‘Super’ Debates within the Antipodes?,” pp.435-451. 
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perspective.46 Driven largely by Esping-Andersen’s work, a subset of the comparative 
welfare literature examines Australia’s welfare state “typology” comparatively.47 
The thesis is not a scientific causal account of why the Australian superannuation 
system is the way it is. What the design foregoes in terms of scientific rigour, the thesis 
gains in terms of rich historical detail about Australian superannuation policy and 
more broadly about the nature of policy change. As Collier and Mahoney observe, 
studies of cases selected on the dependent variable, in this case national 
superannuation policy, are “ideal for digging into the details of how phenomena come 
about for developing insights. They identify plausible causal variables.”48 
Furthermore, while there is a risk of overestimating the importance of explanations 
discovered in this case study, the complexity which a single case study allows can lead 
to invaluable insights that may serve as the basis for investigation into a broader set of 
observations.49 
Sources 
 
The primary sources used in the thesis are archival material, legislative and 
parliamentary primary material and a set of 45 semi-structured elite interviews. The 
thesis also drew on a large body of secondary literature. These are outlined here in 
turn.  
The archives used for the thesis were the Australian Council of Trade Unions and the 
Michael Easson collection at the Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Australian National 
University; the National Archives of Australia; the Records of the Australian Labor 
Party Federal Secretariat and Records of the Australian Labor Party Parliamentary 
Caucus at the National Library of Australia; Records of the Australian Labor Party 
Victorian Branch at the State Library of Victoria; Records of the Liberal Party of 
                                                             
46 See, for example, Peter Saunders, Welfare and Inequality: National and International Perspectives 
on the Australian Welfare State (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Francis Castles and 
Christopher Pierson, “A New Convergence? Recent Policy Developments in the United Kingdom, 
Australia and New Zealand,” Policy & Politics 24, no.3 (1996): pp.233-245; Peter Whiteford, “The 
Australian Tax-Transfer System: Architecture and Outcomes,” Economic Record 86 (2010): pp.528- 
544.  
47 Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (London: Princeton University Press, 
1990) and critiques such as Francis Castles and Deborah Mitchell, “Worlds of Welfare and Families of 
Nations,” in Francis Castles, ed. Families of Nations: Patterns of Public Policy in Western 
Democracies (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1993), pp.93-128. 
48 Barbara Geddes, “How the Cases you Choose Affect the Answers you Get: Selection Bias in 
Comparative Politics,” Political Analysis 2 (1990), p.149. 
49 David Collier and James Mahoney, “Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research,” 
World Politics 49, no.1 (1996), p.88. 
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Australia Federal Secretariat at the National Library of Australia; the Keith Hancock 
Collection at Flinders University; Records of the Federated Storemen and Packers’ 
Union and the William Landeryou Collection at the Baillieu Library, University of 
Melbourne. The archival material used in these archives included policy platforms, 
internal correspondence, committee papers, minutes of meetings and speeches. The 
sources of this material included political parties, government, the media, civil society 
organisations and personal collections. I was very fortunate to be given access to the 
private papers of former Prime Minister Paul Keating; Michael Rice; Race Mathews; 
Julian Disney; Eva Cox and George Megalogenis. 
 
Being concerned with an issue of national policy, the thesis naturally refers to a 
substantial amount of legislative and parliamentary primary material. This includes 
bills and legislation, Hansard, case law, press releases and media coverage of 
legislation.  
 
The 45 interviews conducted for the thesis were with current and former senior 
politicians, political advisers, union leaders, business leaders, civil society leaders, 
public servants, academics and journalists. It was particularly useful to interview the 
Prime Minister who introduced the Superannuation Guarantee, Paul Keating. Prior to 
his death in May 2019, an approach was made to former Prime Minister Bob Hawke 
for his role in the development of superannuation policy through the government-
union “Accord” process. Approaches were also made to former Prime Minister John 
Howard, for his role as Treasurer in the Fraser Government that ultimately rejected 
the national superannuation scheme proposed by the Whitlam Government; to former 
Treasurer Peter Costello; and to former Labor Senator Nick Sherry who was closely 
involved in the “choice of fund” debates.  Unfortunately, neither Mr Howard, Mr 
Hawke, Mr Costello nor Mr Sherry were available for interview. An approach was also 
made to Gough Whitlam’s speechwriter, Graham Freudenberg, for his recollection of 
Whitlam-era superannuation, but Mr Freudenberg’s ill health at the time prevented 
the interview taking place. 
 
Finally, the thesis draws on a broad secondary literature, both in terms of time and 
breadth of subject matter. One of the challenges was to engage with secondary 
literature across a very long period of time. This has meant taking a bird’s eye view of 
the period from the middle of the 19th century through to 2019, while zooming in on 
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certain periods. The areas of secondary literature cover domestic, international and 
comparative pension policy literature; economic policy; taxation history; Australian 
politics; ALP and union history; and the specific literature on superannuation. Within 
these subject areas there was considerable diversity of sources, including academic 
literature; “grey” policy literature such as reports by governments and think tanks; 
policy reviews and submissions to government inquiries.  
 
Structure of the thesis  
 
The thesis contains seven chapters following this introduction.  
Chapter two performs two functions. First, the chapter examines the literature on 
Australian superannuation and the period of Labor politics in which the modern 
superannuation system was introduced. It shows that there is an acknowledgment of 
historical foundations for modern superannuation policy that extend back beyond the 
election of the Hawke Government in 1983, but little analysis of any earlier period. 
Likewise, the links between the earlier period and 1983 onward receive little attention. 
It therefore situates the thesis as filling this conceptual and empirical gap. Second, it 
outlines the theoretical framework of the thesis, historical institutionalism. The 
chapter sets out the theory and recent debates within historical institutionalism about 
the nature of policy change, particularly as it applies to pension policy. It then 
establishes how the theory will be used in the thesis: to argue that the development of 
superannuation policy up to 1992 owes much to the path dependency of the existing 
institutions of old age welfare in Australia, and that incremental changes to 
superannuation policy since 1992 reflect power struggles within the private system.  
Chapter three focuses on secondary and archival material to examine the principles 
of pension policy from the time of the first colonial age pensions up until the end of 
World War II. It examines the first, unsuccessful attempts to introduce a national 
superannuation scheme in 1913, 1928 and 1932. 
Chapter four explores the post-war move towards income maintenance in 
retirement income policy, and the rhetorical “contributory turn” of the Australian 
Labor Party in pension policy. It then examines the principles that underpinned the 
scheme of national superannuation proposed by the Hancock Inquiry, commissioned 
by the Whitlam Government. 
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Chapter five explores the treatment of the Hancock Inquiry by the Fraser 
Government and other institutions of state. It also examines the interrelationship 
between the rejection of the Hancock Inquiry and the upswing in industrial activity 
around occupational superannuation. 
Chapter six begins in 1983, when national superannuation was still a policy of the 
new Hawke Government. The chapter then examines the way that the idea of 
superannuation changed from being a policy of social insurance to an industrial policy. 
It shows that the fundamental elements of the modern superannuation system evolved 
out of existing occupational superannuation schemes, a fundamental difference from 
superannuation as social insurance. The chapter concludes in 1992 with the 
introduction of the modern superannuation system under the “Superannuation 
Guarantee.” 
Recalling the theoretical framework set out in chapter two on policy layering and drift, 
chapter seven then examines superannuation policy since the introduction of the 
Superannuation Guarantee since 1992. It argues that the Superannuation Guarantee 
established its own path dependency, from which modern debates about “choice of 
fund” stem. It examines these debates to highlight examples of policy “layering” and 
“drift” since 1992.  
Chapter eight is the conclusion. 
This is a thesis which seeks to contribute, in some small way, to our understanding of 
a significant social and economic reform. In its approach, this thesis is also an 
argument for the role of history in public policy. At a moment in local and international 
politics where so little seems to make sense, memory matters most. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
 
This chapter outlines the four bodies of literature which are used in the thesis. Firstly, 
it examines the existing literature on the history of Australian superannuation. 
Secondly, and connected with the first body of literature, the chapter looks at the 
treatment of economic reforms by the Hawke (1983 – 1991) and Keating (1991 – 1996) 
governments and considers the arguments about the way those reforms relate to Labor 
tradition. Third, the chapter introduces historical institutionalism as the theoretical 
framework of the thesis, and within it the concepts of path dependency, critical 
junctures and incremental change. Finally, the chapter locates the formation of 
Australian superannuation within the literature on welfare state change, applying the 
theoretical concepts introduced in section three and presenting a visual depiction of 
the theoretical argument taken up in subsequent chapters. 
Australian superannuation 
 
For one of the most significant social policy reforms in Australia’s history, there are 
few studies of the formation of Australian superannuation. There are even fewer 
studies that place Australian superannuation in its long-term historical context. The 
basic point made by this thesis it that Australian superannuation has a longer history 
than is commonly understood, with roots in long-standing welfare state institutions. 
By way of contrast, there is a large body of academic and public policy literature 
concerning superannuation policy and directions for reform.50 The focus on 
superannuation since the Superannuation Guarantee was introduced is to be 
expected but only affirms the importance of historical studies that ask how and why 
the scheme came into being. In recent years, superannuation has featured regularly 
in the national media as the subject of tax and regulatory change. Moreover, as the 
pool of savings has grown, questions have arisen over its objective.51 It is not 
uncommon to read stories about the “ever shifting goalposts” that legislators impose 
                                                             
50 See, for example, Hazel Bateman, “Regulation of Australian Superannuation,” Australian Economic 
Review 36, no.1 (2003): pp.118-127; Jim Minifie, Tim Cameron & Jim Savage, Super Savings, Grattan 
Institute Report, No. 2015-1, April; and Rafal Chomik & John Piggott, “Australian Superannuation: 
The Current State of Play,” The Australian Economic Review 49, no.4 (2016): pp.483-493. 
51 In March 2016 the conservative coalition government under Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull 
introduced a bill to legislate an objective of superannuation as being “[T]o provide income in 
retirement to substitute or supplement the Age Pension”: see Treasury Discussion Paper, 9 March 
2016. This legislation was blocked in the Senate. 
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on the sector.52 Superannuation has also been a political battleground. Most recently, 
the Morrison Coalition government announced after the May 2019 election that it 
will hold a review of the retirement income system during the term of the current 
parliament, including over the process of allocating members to funds.53 
Nicholas Morris has examined the implications of increasing complexity in the 
private superannuation system. As he argues, superannuation policy has suffered 
from “stop-go” effects of a short electoral cycle and the tendency of incoming 
governments to overturn policies initiated by their predecessors.” 54 This is evident in 
the discussion in Chapter 7 of this thesis. Morris has also noted, like this thesis does, 
that  
Australian superannuation policy reflected developments in Europe, the UK 
and the US, and in particular ideological struggles between those who believed 
in public control and administration, and those who believed in the primacy 
and efficiency of markets. 55 
Over the past decade there have been a handful of histories published on the creation 
of Australian superannuation. In Workers’ Capital (2017), Bernard Mees and Cathy 
Brigden have written a labour history of “industry” superannuation funds and the 
union campaigns for universal superannuation coverage.56 Their self-described focus 
is on “the industry-union superannuation movement, its origins, achievements and 
                                                             
52 See, for example, Noel Whittaker, “Super Goalposts Shift Again,” Newcastle Herald, 15 October 
2015, p.19; Fiona Reynolds, “Why shift goal posts on retirement?” ABC News, 29 May 2009; and Scott 
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present-day challenges.”57 They argue that union campaigns for occupational 
superannuation rights and the formation of the first industry funds in the late 1970s 
laid the foundations for industry-based superannuation and subsequently, the 
system that was legislated in 1992. Mees and Brigden devote some time to old age 
welfare policy and the “pre-history” of superannuation policy, as it existed prior to 
the 1980s. In their characterisation, Australia had a “lopsided welfarism” up to the 
introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee, with a means-tested Age Pension and 
superannuation coverage “largely restricted to the wealthiest employees.”58  
This thesis concurs with much of Workers’ Capital, but theirs is a labour history of 
superannuation, whereas this is a history of the development of national 
superannuation policy. The thesis is primarily concerned with explaining policy 
continuity and change and uses theoretical explanations to do this. As a result of its 
theoretical grounding, the thesis uses a longer time frame to engage with concepts of 
long-term stasis and change. It argues that the unsuccessful attempts to introduce 
national superannuation throughout the 20th century are critical to understanding 
why the system was introduced in 1992. In the context of a longer history in which 
national superannuation was continually rejected, the significance of the shift to 
occupational superannuation as the basis for national policy in the 1980s is only 
amplified.  
Keating and Kelty’s Super Legacy by Mary Easson (2017) is an oral history of 
superannuation policy under the Hawke and Keating governments. The study is 
based on her 2014 Master’s thesis and relies on interviews with union leaders and 
Labor parliamentarians. Easson places a large degree of emphasis on the roles of 
former Prime Minister Paul Keating and union leader Bill Kelty in the success of 
superannuation in 1992. The author is a former member of the Keating government 
herself, and her objective is to document the achievements of that government rather 
than to provide an empirical study of superannuation. As Chapter 6 of this thesis 
notes, Keating and Kelty were undoubtedly two of the critical actors – if not the 
critical actors – in the immediate period before the introduction of the 
Superannuation Guarantee, but Easson’s book does not consider the role of 
institutions. As Mees and Brigden note, neither Easson’s book nor Christine St 
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Anne’s A Super History (2012) are written as a history of industry superannuation, 
let alone the politics of superannuation policy more broadly.59   
St Anne’s A Super History: How Australia’s $1 trillion+ Superannuation Industry 
was Made also looks at the industrial and political origins of the Superannuation 
Guarantee.60 She uses interviews to record a narrative of the individuals and groups 
that made the modern superannuation system. The way St Anne periodises her study 
falls into the conventional focus on the Hawke and Keating governments and of 
Labor history – her timeline of Australian superannuation commences in 1983 when 
the “Hawke government commits in principle to occupational superannuation. 
Reform of Australia’s superannuation begins.”61  
In its evidence, A Super History gestures to the connections between national 
superannuation as a policy and later reforms, but these are gestures only. In Shaw’s 
interview with union leader and former federal Labor leader Simon Crean, he 
recalled that after the rejection of superannuation proposed by the Whitlam 
government (1972 – 1975), “[T]he unions, which I was part of, developed a strategy 
that if we can’t win it [a national superannuation scheme] legitimately through the 
political process we will pursue it industrially.”62 Similarly, Hawke government 
Treasurer and later Prime Minister Paul Keating stated that because the government 
“pursued superannuation occupationally” he did not propose a government fund. He 
also noted that in some industries, people already had superannuation, implying that 
this made a national fund a less attractive policy option.63 The rejection of national 
superannuation and the pursuit of broader occupational superannuation coverage 
were inextricably connected, and explain why Australia has a private system of 
superannuation and not a government scheme. 
Rhonda Sharp and Diana Olsberg’s approaches are closest to the one taken in this 
thesis. Sharp points to the “countervailing history of a system of employment-based, 
or occupational welfare in Australia” as one of the forces contributing to the demise of 
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national superannuation as an idea in the 1980s.64 As sections three and four of this 
chapter set out, this thesis focuses on the legacies of the institutions of old age welfare 
to make its argument that national superannuation became a more difficult 
proposition, the longer that the 20th century wore on and as occupational 
superannuation schemes proliferated. 
Olsberg’s doctoral dissertation, “Trade Union Participation in Public Policy-Making: 
the Rise and Demise of Australia’s National Retirement Income Regime” (1992), 
looks at union involvement in Australia’s retirement income policy during the term 
of the Hawke government (1983 – 1991).65 Retirement income policy during the 
period was, Shaw argues, a “neo-corporatist continuum” where policy was the result 
of “informal negotiations, factional deal-making and autocratic decision-making” 
which were hallmarks of Australia’s “managerial and post-industrial neo-
corporatism.”66 Given this argument, her analysis naturally focuses on the 
government-union agreements made from 1983 onwards, the “Accords.” Shaw 
argues that original union demands for superannuation arose when direct wage 
increases were not possible, in the context of high inflation and unemployment.67 As 
a result, superannuation as a form of deferred wages took hold as an idea, and this 
was reflected in the Accords. As this thesis will argue, there was a confluence 
between the economic conditions favouring a deferred wages model of 
superannuation and the recognition of labour leaders that national superannuation 
could not be pursued “politically,” but could be pursued “industrially.” This 
argument is taken up in Chapter 6 of this thesis.  
Olsberg draws on institutional theory to explain the development of Australia’s 
national retirement income policies. The period to which Olsberg applies this analysis 
is from the beginning of the 20th century until 1983. Drawing on the work of Castles, 
Shaver and others, she argues that institutional features ensured the continuity of 
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Australia’s national retirement income policies up until the 1980s. These institutional 
features included the centralised system of wage regulation; the system of compulsory 
conciliation and arbitration which mediated between capital and labour; a closed 
economic system based on trade tariffs; and a rigid labourist tradition where unions 
were reliant on the ALP for social wage benefits.68 While proposals for a national 
superannuation scheme were unsuccessful before World War II, the emergence of 
national superannuation as a post-war policy of the Whitlam government she 
attributes to a recognition of the inequities in occupational superannuation.69  
Finally, Lisa Marriott has carried out a comparative analysis of the retirement taxation 
regimes in Australia and New Zealand.70 Looking at the period between 1982 and 1992 
in both countries, Marriott argues that ideas were a “key dimension” in shaping the 
different pathways of retirement savings taxation. Melanie Nolan has used 
institutional theory for a comparison between the same countries, focusing specifically 
on superannuation policy and the different pathways of policy that commenced in the 
1970s.71 Both Marriott’s and Nolan’s work has been used at various points in this 
thesis. 
The “Hawke-Keating era” and Labor tradition 
 
It was ultimately the Hawke and Keating Labor governments of the 1980s and 1990s 
that would conclusively reject a national superannuation scheme and introduce a 
national occupational one. Australian superannuation is most commonly situated 
within the set of economic reforms introduced by these governments. Three strands 
of the “Hawke-Keating literature” have most bearing on the development of 
superannuation. Firstly, the literature shows that the Hawke and Keating 
governments were responding to economic conditions, self-consciously seeking to 
manage the economy differently from the Whitlam government by exercising public 
spending restraint. Secondly, key actors within the Hawke and Keating governments 
and in the union movement were acting with a high degree of pragmatism in 
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supporting an occupational superannuation model through the mechanism of 
superannuation as deferred wages. Thirdly, there is a question as to whether 
superannuation continued or departed from Labor tradition.  
The Hawke and Keating governments adopted a different economic orthodoxy to 
previous Labor governments. The Hawke government was elected at a time when 
monetarism dominated as an economic theory, having risen to prominence with the 
election of the Thatcher government in 1979 and the Reagan administration in 1980. 
A corollary of this was the deregulation of many areas of government. The economic 
agenda of the 1980s and 1990s was focused on reducing inflation, restraining wages, 
tariff cuts, micro-economic reforms to increase economic growth, the shift to an 
enterprise bargaining wages system and an associated campaign to reduce Australia’s 
consumption and increase its savings.72 Superannuation spoke to a number of these 
elements of the economic reform agenda – reducing inflation, restraining wages and 
increasing Australia’s savings, all through deferred wages. Former federal shadow 
treasurer Chris Bowen has written that the decision by the Keating government in 
1991 to introduce legislation for compulsory universal superannuation authorised the 
“political revolution building on Hawke government policy,” and, for the Labor Party, 
“involved an intellectual transition from retirement welfarism to compulsory self-
provision through the share market.”73  
Social security also departed from the universalism of the Whitlam period. In 1978 
the Fraser government began the retreat from a short-lived period of welfare 
universalism through freezing the rate of pension paid without an income test to 
those aged 70 or over. 74  The Hawke government then introduced an assets test in 
1985.75 In his book The Australian Moment (2012), George Megalogenis argued that 
Keating’s primary motivation in legislating the Superannuation Guarantee was to 
reduce dependence on the Age Pension by the time the baby boomer generation 
began to retire.76 In The End of Certainty (1992), fellow journalist Paul Kelly had 
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also made this point, noting that for Keating, the Age Pension would not suffice as 
the main “pillar” of retirement income, and that “historians will be shocked to realise 
that universal superannuation had its origins in centralised wage fixation.”77  
A body of literature has developed around the question of whether the Hawke and 
Keating governments built on a progressive tradition, adapted for changing economic 
conditions, or whether their reforms were part of a “neoliberal” or “economically 
rationalist” agenda.78 It is an uncontroversial observation that the reforms of the 
1980s and 1990s represented a shift by Labor governments to market-based policies. 
These governments have attracted characterisations of being “economically 
rationalist” or “neoliberal,” abandoning the post-war welfare state.79 On retirement 
income policy specifically, Karimi has argued that  
neoliberal pressures for welfare state restructuring steered Australian social 
policy on retirement income towards consolidating state-mandated, privately 
managed provision of retirement income and revising an intrusive, means-
tested retirement pension system.80  
The precise “neoliberal pressures” are not well articulated by Karimi; nor is there an 
acknowledgment of other more proximate reasons Australia adopted its state-
mandated employer scheme,81 including the pre-existence of Australian occupational 
schemes which provided a model for government policy.  
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Writing in 1983, at the start of the Hawke government, Adam Graycar saw 
occupational superannuation within the “privatizing mood of the 1980s.”82 Social 
security spending went from 7 per cent at the start of the Hawke government to a 
peak of 8.1 per cent of GDP in 1993 during the recession under the Keating 
government.83 On the other hand, the Hawke and Keating governments increased 
targeting of social payments such as the Age Pension and family allowances. Castles 
has written that the return to welfare targeting has certain characteristics of a “Third 
Way” reform, “being designed to reallocate the costs of increasing pension provision 
upon labour market actors, leaving the state to guarantee provision for those with 
low incomes.” Stebbing and Spies-Butcher describe it as the “neo-liberal approach of 
confining state action to assisting those most in need.”84  
Even among those whose interpretation is that the Hawke and Keating governments 
evinced, through their policies and rhetoric, a neoliberal or economic rationalist 
agenda, superannuation tends to be marked out, along with Medicare, as being a 
significant social reform in the Labor tradition.85 Schulman writes that Medicare and 
superannuation were the exceptions to the rule that national social policy in the 
1980s was “generally reactive rather than proactive.”86 Maddox observes that social 
advances made with the signing of the Accords, including superannuation, would “at 
least open up the possibility of more social reform and more political – flowing from 
the industrial – democracy.”87 
Some of the literature emphasises the considerable changes to the economy as a 
result of the reforms of the Hawke and Keating governments. These reforms were, in 
turn, responses to stagflation at the end of the 1970s. In The End of Certainty, Kelly 
argues that the 1980s was a decade in which the ideas and institutions by which 
Australia was governed were redefined. He observes that the origins of the union-
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government Accord lay in a reconsideration by the political and industrial wings of 
the labour movement after the Whitlam failure, writing that, “the Accord arose 
directly from the failures of Whitlamism…under Hawke the Accord harnessed the 
potential of the unions to help Labor’s economic management.”88  
What is far clearer than any “neoliberal” agenda is that occupational superannuation 
was a highly pragmatic policy. Rather than a dramatic shift in policy as a result of 
ideological change, it was more a question of what was deemed to be economically 
possible.89 Superannuation policy under these governments saw these 
administrations being adaptive to challenges and opportunities, something which 
Bongiorno sees as a longer-term Australian pattern.90  
Despite the absence of a “neoliberal” agenda, the intention was to shift risk for 
retirement on to individuals. This was, Elizabeth Humphrys notes, part of a global 
trend and institutionalised the role of the private sector in the retirement income 
system.91 The Australian unions did not, however, “appear to seriously consider the 
consequences of shifting retirement risk onto workers.”92 
Historical Institutionalism 
 
Historical institutionalism has guided the interpretation of the evidence, but also 
underpins the way the thesis is organised as an historical narrative. It is one of the 
three “new institutionalisms” which emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, placing 
institutions at the centre of explanations of continuity and change.93 At its highest 
level, historical institutionalism explores how historically contingent political 
institutions and policy legacies affect the policy-making process.94 Institutions are 
said to limit the range of possible political choices at any given time, and to have a 
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determinative role in shaping the contours of what comes next. Historical 
institutionalism is distinguishable from rational choice institutionalism, with its 
acceptance that individual decision-making can be observable in isolation from the 
context in which decisions are made. Historical institutionalism, with its focus on the 
role of time-contingent events, necessarily adopts a contextual approach. It also 
differs from sociological institutionalism in that the latter foregrounds the role of 
extra-institutional factors such as culture, class conflict or interest group power in 
influencing change.95  
Historical institutionalism has multiple implications for policy study, including by 
paying attention to long-term policy processes because of a conviction that existing 
explanations are inadequate.96 This thesis began from such a conviction. Through the 
lens of historical institutionalism, the introduction of superannuation in 1992 is the 
product both of institutions that were established in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, and the reforms of labour actors from the 1970s onwards.  
The theoretical framework of this thesis is set out in Figure 1. Before explaining that 
framework, the chapter presents a discussion of the concepts the framework uses.   
Institutions and time 
 
The non-negotiable elements of historical institutionalism are institutions and time, 
and how time changes institutions. So, what are institutions? Heclo observes that 
many, if not most, experts seem to agree that institutions “have to do with creating 
and enforcing rules.”97 There are different approaches to, and often a lack of clarity 
around,98 what qualifies as an “institution” within and between institutional schools. 
Historical institutionalists tend to define institutions as organisations and the rules 
or conventions of those organisations, such as the rules of a constitutional order or 
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conventions governing trade union behaviour.99  
Studying long-term policy development enables us to understand why it was that a 
particular form of superannuation became Australia’s modern system. Historical 
institutionalism emphasises developments over time in order to try and develop a 
general theory of change and stasis that overcomes period effects. Critically for this 
thesis, there was a long-standing assumption by governments and policy elites 
during one historical period that any national superannuation scheme would be a 
government one. This assumption was fundamentally challenged from the late 1970s, 
when it began to be accepted within the labour movement that superannuation was a 
means of receiving wages by other means. In this way, superannuation policy started 
its march towards being a state-mandated, private occupational scheme based on 
defined contributions.  Another changing effect is prevailing economic theory. Up 
until the 1980s, Keynesian economic theory created a focus on full employment. By 
the 1980s, the focus was on wage restraint in the context of double-digit inflation, 
which Pusey has situated within the rise of economic rationalism.100  
Critical junctures, path dependence and path reaction 
 
Historical institutionalists have tended to stress continuity over change through the 
interrelated concepts of “critical junctures” and “path dependence.” Critical junctures 
are instances where a set of conditions arise that permit significant institutional 
change, situations where “the structural (that is, economic, cultural, ideological, 
organizational) influences on political action are relaxed for a relatively short 
period,” where the range of options open to political actors expands and the import 
of their actions is greater.101 Wars, revolutions or economic crises are examples of 
exogenous occurrences that may act as trigger points for institutions to change. So, 
for example, Richard Eccleston has argued that “in the first half of the twentieth 
century when the cornerstones of Australia’s national tax system were laid, the state 
was responding to national crises – the Depression and the World Wars.”102 An 
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analytic narrative history such as this thesis is one of the ways to study critical 
junctures, those moments when change becomes possible.103 
Path dependence, by contrast, is focused on institutional stability. It posits that as 
time passes, an existing institution generates increasing returns that act to confirm 
its existence.104 In the sphere of public policy, path dependency suggests that policies 
which have been in place for long periods of time are unlikely to be radically altered. 
Path dependence focuses on the persistence of particular institutional patterns or 
outcomes.105 It has been used by Australian scholars as a means to explain the 
relative stability of the Australian welfare state, for example why the Age Pension has 
remained substantially the same since its introduction in 1908.106  
However as Myles and Pierson argue, there is a need to be alive to “naïve versions of 
institutionalism that stress inertia and stability” when big shifts have taken place, 
and continue to take place, in systems of retirement provision.107 The introduction of 
occupational superannuation in 1992 as Australia’s second pillar of retirement 
income policy was one such big shift. The existence of occupational superannuation 
schemes was a continued institutional impediment cited by policy makers to the 
introduction of a national superannuation scheme. It was, for example, cited by the 
dissenting member of the Whitlam government’s Inquiry into National 
Superannuation. A discussion of the intersection of path dependence and welfare 
state literature is set out in the next section of this chapter.  
Path reaction is a development of path dependency that stresses the importance of 
immediate push and pull factors in explaining change. While path dependency is 
characterised by self-reinforcing sequences, path reaction is characterised by 
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reactive sequences.108 Path reaction reveals that reforms may have taken particular 
turns as a direct response to, and a pull away from, the policies of the immediate 
past. Heclo has applied the concept of path reaction in his pioneering studies of 
comparative pension systems. As he describes it,  
[I]n modern social policy, the tie with the past was more profound. Here, 
perhaps to an exceptional degree, what reformers hoped for was a function of 
what they were reacting against.109  
Like path dependency, path reaction still works with the idea that there is a 
considerable impact of policy inheritances upon the substance of policy-making. 
Heclo describes the “moving, reacting, social process” of social policy.110 Similarly, 
this thesis examines the Australian superannuation system as the product of long- 
running, path-dependent forces but also the way that policy has taken particular 
turns as a direct response to political decisions of the immediate past.  
As part of this framework of considering more immediate factors in policy change, 
the thesis looks at influences on policy makers. Fiscal deficits, and conditions such as 
high inflation and wage growth, have all fed directly into decisions by policy makers 
on superannuation and pension policy. Prevailing economic ideas such as 
Keynesianism or monetarism have also featured in how policy has responded to 
economic conditions. The idea of a national government superannuation scheme 
during the Whitlam period was influenced by post-war welfare state ideas in Britain. 
By way of contrast, state-mandated, privatised superannuation emerged during a 
period when the Labor side of politics was recasting the role of the state in the 
provision of welfare, as well as making a broader move towards deregulation and 
privatisation of state industries. 
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Unsuccessful policy change 
 
Superannuation reform was successful in the 1980s and 1990s because it was a 
private, defined contribution occupational system of superannuation that was being 
proposed. Examining instances where superannuation policy was unsuccessfully 
implemented sheds light on why policy reform was successful. We need to consider 
those “near misses” where “change has not occurred and re-equilibrium is the order 
of the day, where permissive conditions allow for the possibility of change but the 
status quo reasserts itself and no change occurs.”111 So the thesis looks at the 
instances when proposals for the introduction of a federal superannuation system 
came up throughout history. Examining the cases where it was not successful, and 
where Australia’s pension pathway “returned to equilibrium” with only the Age 
Pension and limited occupational superannuation schemes, is important in 
understanding why change happened when it eventually did.112 
Incremental Change 
 
A final approach to policy change within historical institutionalism that is used in 
this thesis is gradual change. Modes of gradual change are a response to traditional 
historical institutionalism, with its focus on cases of abrupt, large-scale change 
referred to as “critical junctures” or “punctuated equilibria.” Change is not always 
radical. Often, change occurs by increments. Moreover, incremental change can lead 
to substantial change over time.113 Changes which may appear to be small, and 
sometimes imperceptible, can lead to substantial change over time.114 So, for 
example, a series of apparently minor changes to a piece of legislation over time can 
mean that a law applies quite differently to when it was first introduced. Likewise, a 
policy that was interpreted one way by one government can be interpreted and 
applied differently by a subsequent administration.  
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The argument of the “incrementalists” is not that critical junctures do not produce 
change, but rather that critical juncture theory has limits in its explanatory power. 
Still, there remain moments of substantial or systemic policy change for which the 
explanatory tool of critical juncture theory is useful. While incremental change and 
conventional historical institutionalism refer to different modes of change, they are 
unified in their attention to time, and the effect of timing on change. 
The incremental processes of “displacement” and “layering” are two concepts of 
change that assist in explaining changes to superannuation policy. Displacement 
refers to the removal of existing rules and the introduction of new ones; layering is 
the introduction of new rules on top of or alongside existing ones. Layering differs 
from displacement because it does not introduce wholly new institutions or rules but 
amends, revises or adds to existing ones.115 Displacement and layering are two of the 
four modes of gradual institutional change proposed by Mahoney and Thelen; the 
other two being drift and conversion.116 As Van der Heijden has observed, a key 
limitation of incremental change theory is the “lack of clarity and precision around 
the concepts and a tendency to describe institutional change rather than evaluate 
it.”117 This thesis uses the theory firstly to show how fundamentally incremental 
change reshaped occupational superannuation and, secondly, the effects of 
incremental change on superannuation since the modern system was introduced. 
Who is covered by superannuation and the risk that individuals bear are two of the 
recurring themes in this thesis that are used to evaluate the system over time. 
Structures and processes 
 
There has been what Farrell describes as a “conventional divide” within historical 
institutionalism between institutions as structures and institutions as processes. 118 
On the one hand, there are legal and political institutions that structure nation states 
and societies: constitutions, the judiciary or the parliament. On the other, there are 
changing sets of rules at many social levels. Kay has noted that the conceptual 
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distinction between a “policy” and an “institution” means that scholars may “proceed 
by analogy from institutions to policy” as the subject of theoretical interrogation. He 
cites several “levels” of policy, including a policy system.119 National superannuation 
policy is at the same level of policy, leading as it has to a national superannuation 
system. As Myles and Pierson put it, “[W]hile the discussion has often focused on 
formal institutions, extensive policy arrangements also become fundamental 
institutional frameworks, creating rules, constraints and incentives for future 
political action.”120  
This thesis is formed around an analysis of national superannuation policy analogous 
to an institution itself. Superannuation policy has been a “rule structure designed 
under particular historical circumstances,” which “shapes pathways for the 
subsequent development of ideas, interests, and interactions among state and 
societal actors.”121 As discussed in the Introduction, within the frame of 
“superannuation policy,” the particular focus is on the ideas contained within the 
policy, the philosophical approach behind it. The interplay between ideas and 
institutions, and its effect on political outcomes, is a fundamental approach of 
historical institutionalists.122 Béland argues that to study explanatory ideas 
rigorously, researchers must first provide clear definitions of the ideational factors 
they seek to explore while, simultaneously, distinguishing them from other types of 
explanation such as institutional ones. To do this, Béland suggests that scholars 
should study how ideas existing prior to the enactment of a reform shaped its actual 
content, instead of starting from the ideas embedded in the reform after its adoption, 
and simply assuming that they shaped its content beforehand.123  Indeed, ideational 
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forces can either favour significant policy change or reinforce existing institutional 
paths.124  The thesis takes up Béland’s call to look at ideas before and after reform 
periods, arguing that the changing meaning of “superannuation” contained in 
government policy had a determinative impact on policy reform.  
The changing idea of “superannuation” shows how time is critical in understanding 
directions of policy, that superannuation policy is what Heclo calls an institution 
capable of being studied as “time-factored phenomena.”125  The changed idea of 
superannuation was not, however, sufficient to create a new system of 
superannuation. Béland writes that  
narrative stories can play a key role in problem definition while failing to pave 
the way to the adoption of the particular policy solution they are associated 
with because existing institutional configurations and the powerful political 
actors they enable stand in the way.126 
“National superannuation” as an idea had currency, enough for it to be proposed by 
both sides of politics through the course of the 20th century. But the existing 
institutions of old age welfare and constituencies around them made it increasingly 
difficult to create a new government scheme of superannuation. It was because 
superannuation was recast as an occupational issue that the institution of 
occupational welfare could be used as the basis for the successful introduction of 
Australian superannuation. These are small, but important distinctions in explaining 
the reasons for policy change. 
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Actors and institutions 
 
Another area of debate within historical institutionalism is the influence of political 
actors versus the institutions they are embedded in: which one is more important in 
explaining change? This thesis traces the development of superannuation policy, but 
the role of policy actors along that timeline is central to its narrative. The basic 
reason for focusing on superannuation policy is that political behaviour “occurs in 
the context of institutions and can only be so understood.”127 The policy options 
which political actors regarded as being open to them were shaped by policies of the 
immediate past as well as long-standing institutions of welfare, and the distinct 
Australian approach to welfare established around Federation. 
The thesis also focuses on superannuation policy and its relation to other institutions 
of old age welfare because the role of political actors in its development has been 
foregrounded in the existing literature.128 The reforms which introduced a national 
system of occupational superannuation were, so the argument goes, the result of a 
political deal made by a small group of elite political actors in the 1980s and early 
1990s. Some of the literature that focuses on political leaders during that period has 
been critiqued for its tendency towards hyperbole.129  
How the thesis employs theory 
 
Having set out the relevant bodies of literature and the concepts within them, this 
section of the chapter explains how they are operationalised in the thesis.  
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The Development of Australian Superannuation Policy 
Figure 1 shows the development of superannuation policy as explained by the 
theoretical framework of the thesis. The discussion of the framework that follows 
here is chronological. 
Figure 1: theoretical framework 
 
 
Early beginnings: from pre-Federation to World War II 
 
The first institutions of old age welfare were established in the mid-19th and early 
20th centuries. These institutions were occupational superannuation, first established 
by the Bank of New South Wales in 1842, and the public Old Age Pension in 1908. 
Colonial old age and invalid pension schemes were also introduced in Victoria, New 
South Wales and Queensland, superseded by the Commonwealth legislation. 
Occupational superannuation and the old age pensions predated the first proposals 
for national superannuation, taking on a significance that would become evident 
when proposals for national superannuation arose. In 1913, 1923 and 1938 
conservative governments sought to introduce a government scheme of social 
insurance, the last two of these including an old age “superannuation” element. None 
of these schemes was successful but in 1938, a scheme of social insurance was in fact 
54 
 
passed by the parliament but later abandoned. At least at the level of official party 
policy, the ALP opposed these schemes of public superannuation, preferring to 
bolster the Old Age Pension financed from general revenue. 
The Post-War era of national superannuation  
 
On the face of it, the decades following World War II do not appear to have much 
significance in the narrative of Australian superannuation. However, it was during 
this period that the ALP accepted contributory pension financing, with the 
establishment of the Chifley government’s National Welfare Fund in 1945 based on a 
social security “contribution.” There was then one further attempt by government to 
introduce a national superannuation scheme: the Whitlam Labor government (1972–
1975). It was as a result of this “contributory turn” that the Labor Party looked at 
introducing a national superannuation scheme under the Whitlam government. The 
complexity of introducing a government scheme of superannuation on top of 
occupational superannuation schemes was one of the reasons why a government 
scheme was ultimately rejected in 1979 by the subsequent Fraser Coalition 
government. 
The late 1970s to the introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee in 1992: a 
critical juncture with antecedents of incremental change 
 
This thesis confirms recent critiques of the “overly static” nature of historical 
institutionalism, where change is either incremental or path-departing. 130 The way 
historical institutionalism has developed has seen the two modes of change develop 
with insufficient consideration of their relation to each other, overlooking 
incremental changes on either side of a critical juncture.131 It was in the period from 
the late 1970s that the institution of occupational superannuation became central to 
superannuation policy reform. Unions bargained for a right to occupational 
superannuation, reconceiving the way that this old institution of old age welfare 
operated. As well as the union campaigns, it was because of the failure of the 
Whitlam government to introduce a national superannuation scheme that the trade 
union movement encouraged the spread of occupational superannuation. At an 
institutional theoretical level, what was occurring during this period was incremental 
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change which would lead to a critical juncture of superannuation policy in the 1980s: 
incremental change and “big bang” change were interconnected. 
Certain permissive conditions existed for a radical reconception of old age welfare, 
including economic conditions and new approaches to economic management. At the 
same time, incremental changes were occurring, including the displacement of rules 
that held that occupational superannuation was the defined benefit “promise,” 
restricted to a certain class of employee. The Old Age pension constituted the sole 
“pillar” of old age welfare up until the introduction of the second “pillar” of private, 
occupational superannuation in 1992. 
The post-Superannuation Guarantee Era: incremental change  
 
The period since 1992 has seen various examples of incremental change to Australian 
superannuation. Stebbing and Spies-Butcher have studied displacement and layering 
in the taxation of superannuation, where changes have made superannuation highly 
concessional for high income earners, mainly men.132 This thesis uses the example of 
superannuation fund choice to operationalise policy “displacement” and “layering,” 
arguing that fund choice is a debate concerning power in the superannuation system. 
Fund choice is also the product of the ALP having introduced a private system of 
superannuation – individuals would not have to choose their own superannuation 
fund if that fund was one government fund. 
The Welfare State  
 
This section sets out the literature on welfare state formation and change as it is 
brought to bear in the thesis. As this chapter has already discussed, this is not a 
comparative thesis but especially in the area of pensions, of welfare state formation 
and change, the international literature is highly relevant.  The thesis draws on 
Australian and international welfare state literature to argue that superannuation, 
properly understood, should be situated in the broader context of old age welfare and 
pension policy. As a result, path dependence is a framework that assists in explaining 
why occupational superannuation and the Age Pension remained the institutions of 
old age welfare for so long, and why national superannuation was an idea competing 
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with those institutions for a role in old age welfare. The unique features of Australia’s 
“wage earners’ welfare state”133 are discussed as part of this argument.  
Superannuation as part of the welfare state 
 
Although superannuation in both its public and private occupational forms is funded 
through some proportion of workers’ wages, it is a component of retirement income 
and, therefore, the welfare of the aged. There are precedents in the institutional 
literature for considering private and public forms of welfare together and for 
workplace benefits to be considered social welfare. Superannuation is a form of social 
welfare and, just as much as superannuation made through private provision by 
individual funds, it is a public concern. Writing in 1958, Richard Titmuss argued that 
workplace benefits – or occupational welfare – were a category of social policy, just 
as much as public spending and provision.134  
Drawing on Titmuss in his seminal work on social benefits in the United States in 
2012, Jacob Hacker has argued that private pension benefits ought to be brought 
within policy debates about social security benefits. Hacker contends that private 
benefits, called “401(k) accounts” in the United States, are “critical to the overall 
welfare of those who enjoy them, and should be considered together with 
government benefits.”135 Although 401(k) accounts are private savings, in the private 
realm of welfare, they are taxed concessionally so are effectively encouraged by the 
state. These savings, together with any social security benefits provide the fullest 
picture of the social welfare of citizens, more accurate than government benefits 
alone.   
The operational parts of the Hacker thesis are the US social security payment and 
private pension schemes. These translate to Australia’s age pension and universal 
occupational superannuation, respectively. Each pillar of the retirement income 
system has its own “policy path,” but they are each part of the system which delivers 
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overall welfare benefits of the aged. In addition, private pensions are very much 
dependent on the state, in the sense that they are regulated by it and often subject to 
tax concessions. Recent contributions to the theoretical literature have highlighted 
the importance of considering “social policy by other means.”136 
These observations about the interrelationship between state and private welfare 
apply in the case of superannuation in Australia. The public Age Pension, together 
with superannuation and any other private savings, provides the total level of income 
for an individual in retirement. While the pension is clearly a form of government 
welfare, superannuation is within the realm of social welfare too, despite not being a 
government payment. As well as providing retirement income in old age, 
superannuation is a government-subsidised industry, subject to heavy government 
regulation. Superannuation tax concessions, the subject of much concern and debate 
in public policy and the media, are the second-largest area of Treasury’s tax 
expenditure, representing $37.3 billion in 2019.137 Superannuation funds are also 
high regulated, with strict duties around conduct being in members’ “best interests.” 
Developments in one part of the age welfare system have often directly led to 
developments in another. For example, the proposed abolition of the pension means 
test was a critical factor in the decision by the Whitlam Government also to propose a 
national superannuation scheme: it was a way to finance pension universalism. Much 
more recently, changes to the Age Pension means test which increased the “taper 
rate” at which payments are reduced after reaching certain asset limits have had the 
perverse outcome of providing an incentive to retirees to draw-down on their 
superannuation more quickly to retain their pension eligibility.138 Where this thesis 
makes its unique contribution is to show how national superannuation and universal 
occupational superannuation are part of the one story.  
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Universal occupational superannuation directly followed the most recent attempt by 
government to introduce national superannuation. Importantly, one directly 
followed the other not merely in terms of time, but the introduction of universal 
occupational superannuation was contingent on national superannuation being 
rejected. As a result, (public) national superannuation and (private) occupational 
superannuation followed distinct policy paths, intersecting in the 1980s when 
superannuation became a wages issue. Andrew Scott has observed that the transition 
to a wages policy, and the provision of superannuation by privately run funds, 
including industry-based schemes involving unions, was an innovative approach 
which led to better, more lasting outcomes than were achieved by the Whitlam 
government.139  
Australia’s industrial model of welfare 
 
The industrial model of welfare in Australia is critical to the explanation for policy 
change in this thesis. The institutions of the Australian welfare state established 
around the start of the twentieth century are based on minimal pensions to alleviate 
poverty, augmented by industrial welfare. More important than the extent of 
Australia’s welfare measures established around the start of the twentieth century, 
according to economist Ted Wheelwright, was  
the form they took, which set the pattern for at least the next half-century. The 
aim was to provide only a safety-net for those outside the labour market. 
Thus, benefits were non-contributory but subject to a means test. The main 
thrust of policy was to provide mechanisms for employment such as 
protection, providing a living wage through the arbitration system.140  
Frank Castles, in his pioneering work on industrial welfare in Australia, has observed 
that European social democratic parties believed that market inequalities could not 
be fundamentally altered at the source, but could only be transformed by state 
redistribution via taxation and transfers. By way of contrast, he argues, the 
Australian labour movement at the beginning of the twentieth century was “more 
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sanguine that the state could be brought to bear directly on the wage mechanism.”141 
As a result, the early Australian welfare state assumed a more confined role in 
society. John Murphy writes that “the age pension and state arbitration of the 
minimum wage, initiated first in New Zealand and then taken up in Australia, have 
been said to owe much to influential liberal ideas about the ethical role of the 
state.”142 Another reason both Castles and Ian McLean cite for Australian welfare 
exceptionalism is that in the late nineteenth century, even during the 1890s 
depression, Australia was probably the richest country in the world in terms of per 
capita income.143  
Australia has a long history of mandating that employers pay citizen benefits 
including, for example, sick pay,144 and later at the national level, long service leave 
and paid holidays.145 The 1907 Harvester Judgment set the standards for a “living” 
wage. Prior to this, in 1904, the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration 
was created to settle disputes between unions and employers over wage disputes. At 
the same time that Australia had set a minimum wage as a method of determining an 
acceptable standard of living, European countries were opting for a welfare system 
that replaced wages when necessary.146 As a result of Australia’s industrial welfare 
institutions, Castles has argued that  
overseas criticism of Australian social policy was substantially 
misplaced…Australia had created a welfare state ‘by other means’ than those 
utilised in Europe, and that it was far from obvious that Australian welfare 
outcomes were inferior to those in most European countries.147  
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Those “other means” that Castles refers to were the wages system comprising wage 
arbitration and the minimum wage.  
Taking the elements of industrial welfare into account, Castles argues that the 
categorisation of the Australian welfare state as being a “liberal” welfare state, 
providing a small degree of public benefit, is not accurate.148 Australia’s “traditional 
approach” to welfare was based primarily on a guaranteed minimum wage, with 
wage levels seen as the key to successful social policy.149 Accordingly, Australia’s 
social expenditure levels have been “doubly residual” as a result of focusing on the 
minimum wage: residual in being focused on the needs of the less well-off, and 
residual in being ancillary to the wages system.150 Interestingly, it was Esping-
Andersen himself who categorised Australia as a liberal welfare state, yet who also 
argued that assessing the adequacy of welfare requires a broader “integrated 
approach” to determining pension adequacy. There is a need, he argued, to consider 
different forms of welfare and different strands of provision within pension types – 
for example, corporate, public and private superannuation schemes.151 
Why welfare states change, and how 
 
There is a substantial body of international theory on the formation of welfare states 
and different modes of welfare state change. Pension systems, once installed, create 
what Pierson calls “policy feedbacks” that have an impact on future action.152 Pension 
policy is regarded as one of the areas most prone to “path dependence.” Myles and 
Pierson, for example, argue that pension policy is a “locus classicus” for the study of 
path-dependent change.153 Castles has written that for those who see social security 
development as largely shaped by institutional inertia or path dependency, Australia 
constitutes arguably the best example.154 The Old Age Pension, introduced in 1908, 
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was means tested and funded from general revenue, establishing a different policy 
trajectory from the social insurance models that would become the norm in Britain, 
the United States and much of Europe.155 The logic of path dependency holds that with 
these foundations in place, and fundamentally unchanged over the course of the 
twentieth century, it was increasingly unlikely over time that any substantial change 
to the system, such as the introduction of contributory social insurance, would be 
successful.  
The thesis argues that occupational superannuation introduced a seismic shift in 
Australia’s age welfare system, but it did so through continuing welfare structures 
that had existed in Australia since the 19th century. While national superannuation 
has followed its own “policy path” as a road not followed, it also laid certain 
foundations for the state-mandated occupational scheme that was introduced in 
1992. So, rather than a dismantling of the Australian welfare state, a national system 
of occupational superannuation was a “refurbishment” of it.156 The failure of national 
superannuation is bound up with the success of universal occupational 
superannuation. The introduction of a national system of occupational 
superannuation extended the existing wages system to provide another employer-
provided benefit under the concept of the “social wage.” It also affirmed the critical 
importance of decent wages, with superannuation contributions, and therefore a 
retiree’s lump sum, being calculated as a percentage of one’s pay.  
Occupational welfare acted as an institutional impediment to the adoption of 
national superannuation and as the basis for the system legislated in 1992. It was this 
“neighbouring institution” which acted to block change in the early decades of the 
                                                             
155 John Murphy, “Path Dependence and the Stagnation of Australian Social Policy Between the 
Wars,” The Journal of Policy History 22, no.4 (2010): pp.452-3). The exception to this is in Denmark, 
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twentieth century157 and would also be the domain which permitted its creation. As 
Castles has written 
[B]y itself, the growth of private superannuation in Australia is not a 
particularly interesting phenomenon, illustrating only that market alternatives 
emerge when public provision is weak. However, what happened is illustrative 
of a standard pattern of Australian policy development by which pressures 
from non-covered workers and from their organized representatives have led 
the State to mandate that what was once provided by some employers should 
be provided by all.158  
The thesis builds on these existing theoretical debates in its argument that the 
modern superannuation system became possible through the rejection of 
superannuation as a form of contributory social insurance. In so doing, it does not 
argue that institutions are the sole causal explanation of the adoption of 
superannuation in 1992, far from it. Occupational superannuation provided the 
institutional basis for the Australian superannuation system, but there were many 
factors operating to propel this development over time. As Esping-Andersen has 
cautioned, when analysing social policy regimes, we should “abandon the hope of 
finding one single powerful causal force for the direction of policy-making, and 
rather identify salient interaction effects of contextual factors.”159 In this regard, the 
thesis is alive to those more immediate push and pull factors influencing public 
policy, including the influence of key actors and economic conditions. 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter locates the thesis within four areas of literature which are germane to its 
concerns. These bodies of work suggest that rather than there being a “critical 
juncture” which radically altered superannuation policy in the 1980s and 1990s, 
there was a burst of policy development which hinged on a changing idea of 
“superannuation” and its location within wages policy. This changing idea, and the 
                                                             
157 Murphy, “Path Dependence and the Stagnation of Australian Social Policy Between the Wars,” 
2010, p.452. 
158 Castles “The Institutional Design of the Australian Welfare State,” pp.32-33). 
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reasons behind it, will be traced in the following chapters. The next chapter of the 
thesis examines the formation of early institutions of old age welfare in Australia and 
the initial unsuccessful attempts to introduce national superannuation. It covers the 
period 1840 to 1945. 
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Chapter Three: The Early History of Australian Old Age 
Welfare and the Initial, Abortive attempts at National 
Superannuation 
  
Thomas Kewley, in his landmark study of social security in Australia, devotes a 
section to “some abortive proposals” between 1913 and 1939.160 Among these were 
three early proposals for a national insurance scheme in 1913, 1928 and 1938. The 
era of what Kewley describes as “endeavour rather than achievement,” of which the 
initial proposals for national insurance were a part, had followed a particularly 
robust period of social policy development in Australia around federation, in which it 
was described as an antipodean “social laboratory,” along with New Zealand.161 The 
introduction of some of the world’s first old age pensions was part of the reason the 
two countries were regarded in this positive light.162 Why were Australia’s 
Commonwealth Old Age and Invalid Pension163 introduced in 1908, and efforts to 
introduce social insurance for old age, unsuccessful in the decades that followed? 
How did these forms of government welfare interact with existing and developing 
occupational superannuation schemes? And what did the newly established 
Australian ecosystem of old age welfare mean for future superannuation policy 
development?  
This chapter returns to the beginnings of old age welfare in Australia, arguing that 
these early institutions set the course for a dual system of old age welfare split along 
public and private lines. The dual system comprised a means-tested government old 
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163 Referred to in this chapter as the “Old Age Pension.” 
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age pension at a meagre level for most of the aged population, and occupational 
superannuation benefits for the fortunate few who were eligible for a workplace 
scheme. Occupational superannuation was first established by large firms in 
Australia in the mid-1840s, preceding the introduction of old age pensions by the 
colonies and subsequently the Commonwealth around the turn of the century.  
Firstly, the chapter examines the nature of, and reasons for, the development of 
occupational schemes. The purpose of sketching out the nature of these early 
schemes is to show the long roots of occupational welfare in Australia, however 
limited their coverage of the workforce was.164 This long history of occupational 
pensions itself does not tell us much about why the institution persisted or why it is 
the institution on which Australia’s modern system of superannuation is based. 
When the development of occupational superannuation is considered alongside 
national superannuation and the public age pension, however, it becomes evident 
that the institutions had a bearing on each other. In the second half of the twentieth 
century, occupational superannuation, together with other forms of private welfare, 
inhibited the development of national superannuation.  
The chapter then looks at the debates around the first old age pension schemes, and 
issues of contributory financing. New South Wales (1900)165, Victoria (1900)166 and 
Queensland (1908)167 all introduced old age pension schemes before the 
Commonwealth Old Age Pension scheme came into effect in 1909, replacing the 
colonial schemes. A national, fair age pension featured prominently in the federation 
debates of the 1890s and was incorporated in section 51 of the constitution as among 
the Commonwealth’s powers.  
Finally, the chapter looks at those three, abortive efforts to introduce a government 
social insurance scheme, the last two examples of which included provision for 
retirement income. It examines the reasons why those schemes were unsuccessful 
and how this set a difficult pathway for national superannuation in the future. As 
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John Murphy observes, had the attempts to introduce a contributory social insurance 
system succeeded, this would have constituted shifting from one “path” to another.168 
There was, however, nothing inevitable about the continued failure of national 
superannuation through the later stages of the twentieth century. Similarly, Murphy 
also notes that it was far from inevitable that the early adoption of aged pensions in 
the Australian colonies based on a means test and funded from general revenue 
would mean that this was still the model of welfare used by the middle of the 
twentieth century.169  
Evidence emerges during the period covered in this chapter that bears on the issue of 
path-dependent processes, demonstrating the usefulness of the concept and its 
limits. As Murphy observes, the mere fact of the Old Age Pension coming into 
existence did not preclude the adoption of a contributory pension scheme. Nor did 
the rejection of contributory social insurance of itself make its adoption harder at 
later points in time. Indeed, as the last section of this chapter shows, such a scheme 
was introduced into the parliament in 1928 and passed by it ten years later. Russel 
Ward, in his history of Australia, argues that the early legislative achievements of the 
Commonwealth parliament “fixed the broad lines of developments along which 
Australian society has moved ever since.”170 In the longer history of superannuation 
that this thesis deals with, it was also the public and private division of old age 
welfare established during this early period that would remain fixed. What would 
change is that superannuation policy shifted from being a concern of public welfare 
to an industrial matter. 
The chapter examines the positions of the major political parties on pension 
financing. Traditionally, the Labor Party showed an allegiance to general revenue 
financing, which acted as a strong force in favour of retaining the Old Age Pension 
rather than replacing it with a contributory superannuation scheme. The 
conservative parties tended to favour contributory pension financing. This position 
was, however, not without complexity, as discussed in the third section of this 
chapter concerning the three failed proposals for national insurance.  
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The chapter draws attention to who was and who was not covered by occupational 
superannuation, by the newly established old age pension schemes, and by the 
proposed schemes of national superannuation. Aboriginal people and “Asiatics” were 
explicitly excluded from the first old age pension schemes. In the early part of the 
twentieth century, legislative means of excluding non-whites from particular forms of 
employment were adopted at state and federal levels, such as the restriction of 
Commonwealth mail contracts to “white labour.”171 However, labour force 
participation in transport industries may have provided some coverage under 
occupational superannuation schemes for a few Aboriginal men and women. 
Likewise, women were often explicitly excluded from occupational superannuation 
schemes, or excluded by virtue of their not holding senior positions or regular work 
upon which these schemes were conditional. This also applied to the working classes, 
the self-employed and those with patchy employment patterns, a significant 
proportion of the workforce due to the seasonal character of much labour.172 
Contributory pension schemes discriminated against women, the low-paid, the self-
employed and casual workers because of the wage-benefit nexus that favoured men 
with highly-paid, regular work. As the chapter discusses, these issues of coverage 
were identified in early pension debates and around the initial proposals for 
contributory social insurance. The same issues of coverage persisted throughout the 
twentieth century, and into the operation of the modern system of superannuation 
despite its “universal” character.   
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The first occupational superannuation schemes 
 
Only very limited social security was provided by the colonial governments of the 
nineteenth century. Rather, welfare centred upon labour conditions of the male 
working population.173 The dominant mode of support for people unable to provide 
for themselves was through benevolent societies and charitable asylums, sometimes 
with the support of the colonial authorities.174 A degree of welfare was provided 
through occupational provident funds or superannuation schemes, though their 
coverage was not broad. Directed at wealthier classes, Australian life houses such as 
AMP employed “insurance canvassers” to sell life insurance and superannuation 
packages.175 The purpose here is to describe the existence of private welfare in the 
pre-federation era that became the institutional basis for superannuation policy in 
later years.  
Australian banks and large private companies were early providers of occupational 
welfare. The Bank of Australasia established an occupational pension scheme in 
1842.176 The Fund was created for those officers of the Bank incapacitated from 
further duty. Widows and children of officers were expressly excluded from the 
benefits of the Fund.177 The Bank financed the Fund, deducting one thousand pounds 
from its profits each year.178 However the scheme was to be short-lived, with the 
Court of Directors of the Bank abolishing it in 1847 “as the full measure of depression 
losses emerged.”179 The next major Australian scheme to emerge was the Bank of 
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New South Wales’ provident fund in 1862, which was opened with a grant of 5,000 
pounds from the bank.180  
In March 1874 the Bank of Australasia established a “Guarantee and Provident 
Fund.”181 The Fund had similar terms to the original Pension Fund, the object being 
to give officers “the advantage of a mutual assurance of fidelity, and to provide 
pensions on retirement owing to age and infirmity.”182 The bank supplied the Fund 
with an initial sum of £6,000.”183 Thereafter, the Fund was financed by officers’ 
contributions. These kinds of private schemes became common among Australian 
banks and other large private institutions. Other companies to establish provident 
and/or superannuation funds during this period include the Australian Mutual and 
Provident Fund (AMP) (1890), the National Bank and the Colonial Sugar Refinery 
(CSR) (1890).184 
In the wake of these early private schemes, the first public sector occupational 
superannuation scheme was established in 1854 in South Australia,185 followed by 
the New South Wales (NSW) Police Superannuation and Reward Fund in 1862.186 
Some superannuation schemes existed for blue-collar government employees such as 
the scheme for NSW railway and tramway officials established in 1910,187 but these 
were non-compulsory and the benefits were lower than the other, more privileged 
white-collar schemes like those of the banks.188 The NSW State Superannuation 
Fund was formed in 1919189 after the agitation of a group of public servants about the 
need for a government-funded and guaranteed pension scheme, in addition to the 
Old Age Pension.190 Benefits in the NSW scheme were related to level of salary but 
not length of service.191 The scheme was compulsory for all officers, with yearly 
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contributions calculated on “units” that increased as salary increased. The maximum 
pension from the scheme was £312 per annum.192 The Commonwealth public service 
superannuation scheme was introduced in 1922, a unit-based scheme that paid 
participants a pension for life.193  
Blue-collar workers outside of government were commonly excluded from 
occupational pension benefits, stimulating industrial activity around the issue. Mees 
and Brigden document the way that this exclusion led to some unions establishing 
their own self-funded superannuation schemes and organising around the issue of 
superannuation as industrial right.194 These self-funded schemes preceded the Old 
Age Pension; for example the Ballarat fund of the Amalgamated Miners’ Association 
was established in 1895.195 Mees and Brigden show that the right to superannuation 
remained a live issue for blue-collar workers in the early 20th century, but it would 
not be until 1941 that the right was won by coal mine workers in NSW, with the 
passage of the Coal and Oil Shale Mine Workers’ (Superannuation) Act.196 They 
rightly note that the fight for superannuation as an industrial right would be the 
same approach taken by unions much later in the 1970s (taken up in Chapter 5 of 
this thesis).197  
Employer-run occupational superannuation schemes provided a way for employers 
to manage the early industrial workforce. Despite variability in the terms of schemes, 
a common feature was that employees qualified for pension  benefits through 
continued and faithful service to one employer – a reward for loyalty. On the one 
hand, pensions demonstrated employer benevolence but on the other, they were  a 
means of minimising staff turnover and limiting labour mobility. 198 As Geoffrey 
Blainey has written in his history of AMP, the establishment of its scheme in 1890 
was “to offer social security to those employees who, caring for a young wife and 
family, were easily tempted by offers of a higher salary from other insurance firms,” 
and the long debate about pension schemes was really a debate about “finding a way 
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to retain the AMP’s talented young executives in the face of attractive offers.”199 
During the period before old age pensions, superannuation was also used to signal 
the age at which a person should retire.200  
Another feature of most occupational schemes that encouraged loyal service was that 
the amount of pension to which an employee became entitled was commonly 
calculated as a percentage of their final wages. Therefore, the more senior an 
employee became, the more pay they earned and the better pension they received. 
This encouraged workers to stay with the one employer and rise through their ranks, 
a prospect which in reality was open almost exclusively to male employees who did 
not have to leave the workforce when they married, as women so often did. It was 
also a way to discourage industrial action – for example, the CSR Provident Fund, 
established in 1890, contained a clause that any subscriber who was absent from 
employment for one week without leave was “deemed to have resigned.”201 In 
another case in 1917, the NSW Railway Superannuation Board decided that strike 
action by employees constituted “serious misconduct” and that they therefore had 
forfeited their superannuation contributions.202 The abolition of police pensions in 
1906 was one of the factors leading to the 1923 police strike in Melbourne, the Argus 
characterising it is a “bolshevist orgy.”203 
Occupational superannuation schemes took many different forms: funded or 
unfunded; private, public, or semi-public; firm-level or industry-wide.204 Indeed, this 
variability remains true of pension schemes today. Early occupational 
superannuation schemes in Australia were both public and private, and funded by a 
combination of employer and employee contributions. Overwhelmingly, the schemes 
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were defined benefit or “defined promise” pensions,205 paying a regular pension for 
life. Financing these pensions constituted a considerable impost on the revenue of 
employers. As a result, firms would employ actuaries, whose job it was to calculate 
the cost of pension liabilities. If there were insufficient funds, the actuary would 
commonly recommend that the employer contribute more to the fund, so that the 
defined benefit was guaranteed.206 Actuaries derived a substantial amount of 
business from occupational pensions, and at various times were voices of opposition 
to a government system of superannuation.207 In the case of the AMP, policyholders 
became agitated about the original 1884 scheme because it would risk becoming a 
“bottomless pit” for the company.208 A new superannuation scheme which was less 
generous to employees was formed in 1888. 
The introduction of federal income taxation under the Income Tax Assessment Act 
1915 (ITAA) established government intervention in what was, until then, a private 
employment matter and made superannuation a national policy issue.209 The ITAA 
created a highly concessional means of taxing superannuation. It followed the 
principles of John Stuart Mill and other 19th century political economists who 
argued that savings, especially for retirement, should be taxed concessionally.210 
Employer contributions to superannuation schemes were tax deductible to the 
employer, and fund earnings exempt from taxation for the fund.211 For the 
beneficiary, only 5 per cent of superannuation lump sums were included in 
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assessable income, taxed at marginal rates, whereas all pension income was taxed. 
These tax settings acted against superannuation being used for continuing 
retirement income. Together with the absence of any preservation requirements, the 
taxation of superannuation meant that a benefit “intended to cover workers against 
the risk of a loss of earned income due to retirement actually functioned as 
something more akin to a concessionally taxed severance pay device.”212  
The tax concession for occupational superannuation was essentially the same 
between 1915 and 1983, when the Hawke government increased the tax on lump 
sums to 15 per cent for less than $50,000 and 30 per cent for lump sums in excess of 
$50,000.213 The tax changes were brought about primarily because of the need for 
government revenue (discussed further in Chapter 6). As a practical budget matter, 
superannuation could not remain so concessional, especially given the growth in 
occupational superannuation coverage during the 1970s and 1980s. Though the level 
of tax concessions was reduced, superannuation remained concessionally taxed 
because the Hawke government, and especially Paul Keating as Treasurer, 
considered that the government was entering into a “bargain” with workers: foregone 
wages for future retirement income.214 The concessional taxation of occupational 
superannuation would remain one of its defining, and contentious, features. 
Despite the apparent early popularity of occupational funds in larger firms, evidence 
from the first part of the twentieth century suggests that such schemes were not 
widespread. Nikola Balnave, for example, points to a 1931 survey conducted by 
Mauldon which found that, “from the 76 private establishments with organised 
welfare schemes, 11 had provident and/or distress funds and 14 had life insurance, 
pensions and superannuation funds.”215 A very limited number of Australian 
provident and superannuation schemes covered female employees and few included 
manual workers, usually only those earning full adult wages and with a certain length 
of service.216  
                                                             
212 Allan Borowski, “Risky by Design,” p.751. 
213 These amounts were indexed: Treasury, Australia’s Future Tax System Consultation Paper 
Summary, Appendix B: A History of Superannuation (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2010), 
n.p.  
214 Interview, Paul Keating, Sydney, 21 June 2018. 
215 Balnave, “Industrial Welfarism in Australia,” p.91. 
216 Ibid., p.101. 
74 
 
The distribution of superannuation coverage within the workforce was concentrated 
among salaried male members of white-collar professions. It was common for funds 
only to be open to salaried “officers” or “staff,” as was the case in the Bank of 
Australasia’s pension fund, and not “waged” employees.217 In addition, employees 
who left a workplace before reaching retirement age were forced to surrender their 
accumulated pension, meaning that they subsidised the pensions of those who did 
get to retirement age, arrangements that favoured senior management.218 This 
feature of occupational pensions meant that not only did women who left the 
workforce when they married miss out on pensions themselves, but they subsidised 
the pensions of men.  
Another feature of 19th century private welfare were the mutual benefit “Friendly 
Societies” that provided some level of insurance for those not covered by 
occupational superannuation.”219 These organisations were established to insure 
against the risks attendant with work and other life events. In practice, the friendly 
societies only provided a limited range of benefits – longer-term illness, invalidity, 
old age and unemployment were never adequately covered.220 As discussed earlier, 
some workplaces set up their own self-funded schemes, combining union and 
friendly society activity.221 Australia’s friendly societies were modelled on those 
established in Britain, financed by the contributions of their members, providing 
collective self-provision, cultural association and modest insurance against fate.222 At 
the turn of the 20th century, the friendly societies covered approximately 7 per cent of 
the population and 18 per cent of the workforce.223 However, being based on 
subscriptions of members they could provide little assistance for instances of long- 
term unemployment, illness or old age.224  
Mutual benefit associations did not provide for the whole range of benefits which 
would come within a comprehensive national insurance scheme, being mainly aimed 
at partial relief during temporary incapacity and, to a limited extent, towards 
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assistance during extended periods of invalidity and funeral benefits.225 As Earle 
Page, Treasurer in the Bruce-Page Government (1923-29), would later say, the 
friendly societies covered  
 
practically only the thrifty, or the better-off section of the community who 
have some surplus earnings. The thriftless, and those whose present 
necessities are so great that, notwithstanding a desire to make provision for 
the future, they have not been able to cover themselves, are not provided 
for.226 
From colonial times, trade unions had provided some welfare benefits to their 
members. In his study of early worker organisation methods between 1788 and 1850, 
Michael Quinlan has estimated that around 1.3 per cent of worker organisations were 
involved in mutual insurance. He notes that such activity gave unions “a sustaining 
activity that would, unlike strikes, attract approbation in colonial society.”227 
That Australia had developed these institutions of occupational welfare was largely 
on account of their influence having been established overseas, especially in Great 
Britain. As discussed above, the AMP’s first pension fund was modelled on a scheme 
in Scotland. The development of early pensions in Britain has a close resemblance to 
Australia’s. As Hannah observes, the early decades of the twentieth century in Britain 
saw two parallel systems of pensions developing: the first was organised by the state, 
covering the poorest two-thirds of the population, the second by employers, covering 
a much smaller and more diverse group of employees of “core” firms with internal 
labour markets and bureaucratic employment features.228 As in Australia, the British 
schemes preceded the public pension and Blackburn argues, “have never been 
entirely eclipsed by it.”229 In Australia occupational pensions and the age pension 
would develop along separate policy paths, and would have the effect of “crowding 
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out” the policy area of old age welfare, to the exclusion of national superannuation in 
the future.230  
The intersection of industrialisation and occupational pensions in Britain is evident, 
with large employers being more likely to cover their employees with benefits like 
pensions. The British civil service plan was established in 1859, providing a template 
for other large employers both public and private. Participation in such plans was 
limited to white-collar workers; the plans often required employee contributions; 
and the pension was based on the worker’s salary and years of service. Pensions 
proved valuable in developing a second employment relationship, this time with 
blue-collar workers. In industries such as railroads, urban transit and 
manufacturing, firms employed large numbers of blue-collar workers to operate their 
capital-intensive, high-throughput operations. In a bid to attract better workers, 
these employers already paid above-market wages. But this strategy had its limits. 
Beyond a certain point, employers found they could better achieve their personnel 
management objectives by providing “industrial insurance” rather than even higher 
wages.231 As pension schemes spread to other sectors – banking, insurance, 
manufacturing, retailing and shipping – in the later nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, they were also concentrated on the large firms.232 
Collective initiatives by workers for explicit provision for old age in Britain were 
confined to relatively affluent groups such as miners and railwaymen, and were very 
much the exception rather than the rule.233 According to Pat Thane, “[T]he largest 
exclusively working-class organizations of the period were the friendly societies, 
which had about 5.6 million members in Great Britain in 1900, when trade unions 
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totalled about 1.2 million.”234 For the mass of workers without such coverage (and 
indeed for many in these collective schemes providing only low levels of benefits), 
staying on the job was normal, accepted practice in old age until incapacity 
intervened to force retirement.235  
The first old age pensions 
 
By 1890 the affluence of the long boom that followed the coming of the gold rushes 
had passed into depression. This led to acute unemployment and major strikes 
among maritime, pastoral and mining workers between 1890 and 1894.236 
Demographically, the Australian colonies were growing older and poverty among the 
aged was becoming more visible. Between 1891 and 1901 there was a 60 per cent 
increase in the number of people living in the colonies aged over 65, a rate of growth 
twice as fast as that of the general population.237 It was during this time, as a result of 
the depression, that the incidence of “aged destitution” increased.238 The poor aged 
were placed in government-supported asylums, institutions run to give the ill, the 
destitute and the aged poor places of accommodation. Reflecting the gender 
imbalance in the population, the majority of aged and infirm asylum inmates were 
men: while the data is scattered and incomplete, “in the 1870s and 1880s there were 
more than twice as many male inmates as female at the Melbourne Benevolent 
Asylum, Dunwich Asylum in Moreton Bay and the Sydney Government Asylums.”239 
The unique factor of Australia’s ageing convict population, most of whom were not 
deemed deserving of charity, added to the groundswell of calls for state 
intervention.240   
Economic conditions meant that there was greater visibility of poverty among the 
aged. As a consequence, there was increased acceptance of the notion that support 
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for the aged was a collective responsibility for the whole community, rather than of 
individual employers, mutual societies or the help of friends and family.241 In 
Australia during the last quarter of the nineteenth century and especially during the 
1890s, “voices were raised with increasing stridency asserting that it was the duty of 
the State to undertake more positive measures for the welfare of its members.”242 The 
rise of the trade union movement in the second half of the 19th century and the 
formation of labour politics in the 1890s “added to the movement for reform.”243  
The limited coverage of occupational pension schemes was also a factor that led to 
growing calls for a state-provided age pension. As Graeme Davison writes, only when 
the “rickety fabric of charitable institutions collapsed did the colonies, and later the 
Commonwealth, offer a niggardly allowance to support the most indigent of the 
‘worn-out wealth-creating machines.’”244 Anne O’Brien writes that in the absence of a 
“poor law” like in the United Kingdom, the colonial charities were “in the anomalous 
position of having to discern the ‘deserving’ and the ‘undeserving,’ while knowing 
there was no other institutional assistance for those rejected.”245 
The introduction of public pension schemes in Victoria, NSW and Queensland did 
not extend further across other colonies and this was part of the background to the 
drive for a national old age pension scheme. The Commonwealth of Australia was 
inaugurated in 1901, with rudimentary powers in social services but the authority to 
legislate for old age pensions.246 National taxes were introduced at this time, namely 
the land tax introduced by the Fisher Labor government in 1910 and, later, with the 
onset of war, the national income tax by the Hughes government in 1915.247 
At each of the junctures when old age pensions were debated and introduced by the 
Australian colonies and then the Commonwealth, there was debate over and 
subsequent rejection of contributory financing. Different arguments were advanced 
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for its undesirability. The inadequacies of contributory schemes in terms of coverage 
has been a consistent theme of superannuation debates ever since.248 Although the 
split of opinion was not wholly on party lines, mostly it was the Labor Party which 
opposed contributory pension financing, because it was thought to be “burdensome 
to the workers.”249 The Labor preference for general revenue financing sought to 
ensure that the maximum redistributive effect of the social services could be 
secured.250 Senator for NSW, pensions campaigner John Cash Neild, argued that in 
any scheme involving voluntary or compulsory contributions, and subsequent 
investment, “merely the better class of the aged secure help…the overwhelmingly 
large number of the toilers, the unfortunate, and the decrepit, derive no comfort, no 
benefit.”251 By way of contrast, Anti-Socialist parliamentarian and later Prime 
Minister, Joseph Cook, supported the Old Age Pensions Bill but with the 
qualification that,  
I rather look upon an old age pension system in the light of a national scheme 
of insurance in which the insurers are all men who contribute to the 
upbuilding of the country, and the insured those who need money and take it 
in the shape of pensions…I regard old-age pensions very much as a form of 
national annuity given to men who are entitled to demand it as a right, and 
not as an act of mercy or charity.252 
Rather than an incidental use of gendered language, Cook’s statement tells us 
something about contributory pension schemes: while given to both men and 
women, they were a reward for male labour and thrift. His position on national 
insurance would be same one that Cook later promoted when he became Prime 
Minister in 1913, discussed further below. 
Contributory pensions had been debated and rejected in the colonies of New South 
Wales and Victoria. New South Wales rejected a contributory pension system, noting 
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concerns that it would leave the unskilled, casual workers, the sick, unemployed and 
non-working women without coverage.253 The 1896 New South Wales Select 
Committee on pensions that preceded the legislation in 1900 found that a 
compulsory contributory approach to pensions would be politically unacceptable 
because it would infringe on personal liberties, which would be “objectionable to 
people of British origin.”254 The 1898 Victorian Royal Commission into Old Age 
Pensions also recommended a pension scheme financed by general revenue.255 
Echoing the New South Wales Select Committee’s emphasis on work, the Victorian 
Commission recommended that pensions should be paid to the aged poor, and those 
no longer able to earn a livelihood. In taking evidence the Commission noted that 
although the matter of government social insurance had been discussed in “every 
civilized community,” no one had been able to discover a means of collecting it 
because “as long as men are employed it is easy enough,” but without paid 
employment the means of collecting was removed.256  
The Victorian Commission also recommended a universal age pension which would 
not be financed by contributions but from one or a combination of a state monopoly 
on the manufacture of tobacco, an income tax, a land tax and a tax on house rents. 
The Commission also recommended that every registered friendly society include in 
its rules provision for a superannuation allowance or pension, to commence after age 
60, of at least 5 shillings per week for life.257 
To qualify for the pension in Victoria, an individual had to be aged 65; with means 
below a specified limit;258 be a resident of the colony for not less than 20 years; of 
good character; and not convicted for drunkenness any more than three times.  In 
New South Wales, an individual likewise had to be aged at least 65; with means 
below a specified limit;259 a resident of the colony for not less than 25 years; and of 
good character and a sober and reputable life. Although superseded shortly after its 
enactment by the Commonwealth legislation, the Queensland Act required pension 
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claimants to be aged 65 or over; with means below a specified limit;260 a resident of 
the colony for not less than 25 years; of good character; leading a “temperate and 
reputable” life for the five years preceding the application; and have not deserted 
their wife or husband and children (as applicable). All of the colonies specified that 
people must not have purposefully deprived themselves of income or property in 
order to qualify for the pension. Victoria also required that the person had made 
reasonable efforts to provide for themselves, or had brought up a family in “decency 
and comfort.”261 
Following Australian Federation in 1901, the new Commonwealth government 
initiated its own Royal Commission on Old Age Pensions, leading to the introduction 
of the Old Age Pension in 1908. Payments commenced on 1 July 1909. The 
introduction of the pension was part of an early suite of national reforms that 
included tariff protection, wage arbitration, the “living wage” and restrictions on 
immigration under the White Australia Policy. The NSW model of pensions provided 
the basis for the Commonwealth scheme, in part because of the “political 
impossibility” of reducing benefits to Victorian levels for New South Wales pension 
recipients.262 The means test was more stringent in Victoria than in New South 
Wales and officials there had wider discretion to determine the amount paid to 
pensioners.263 The Commonwealth pension was paid to men aged over 65 and 
women aged over 60,264 financed out of general revenue and set at a maximum of 10s 
per week, or £26 per annum.265 In today’s dollars, this pension rate equates to 
around $3,500 per year.266 
For the most part, private occupational pensions were supplementary to public social 
security because they were excluded from pension means tests. The Commonwealth 
Old Age Pension legislation excluded private occupational pension income from its 
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means test,267 meaning that recipients were not disqualified from claiming the Old 
Age Pension. Victoria and Queensland also had liberal means tests with respect to 
private pension income, excluding benefit payments from any registered friendly 
society, or during illness, infirmity, or old age from any trade union, provident 
society, or other society or association.268 Only in NSW was the legislation limited, 
expressly excluding from the means test only sick allowances or funeral benefits from 
a friendly society, but not private superannuation pension income.269   
Such was the drive to have an age pension that it was introduced before the 
Commonwealth had the necessary tax base to finance it. The Commonwealth scheme 
enjoyed bipartisan support and was “only held up by lack of Commonwealth finances 
and the inadequacy of proposals to pay for it.”270 The first-ever federal budget deficit 
in 1909 was because of the lack of revenue to cover its costs. The introduction of a 
land tax by the Fisher Labor government in 1910 was in response to this deficit.271 As 
historians such as Macintyre and Ward have warned, it is a mistake to attribute the 
social security and industrial welfare institutions established at this time to Labor – 
and the labour movement – alone, but there is also little doubt about the role of 
Labor in establishing the first institutions of welfare in Australia and the first general 
taxes to finance them.272 That general revenue financing became the method on 
which Australia’s federal Old Age pension was financed has much to do with the 
power of the labour movement at the time. As Ian W. McLean writes, the  
strikes and unemployment associated with the depression greatly influenced 
the agenda and world view of the labour movement in its search for improved 
working conditions and economic security, a search pursued through 
enhanced political representation and the creation of new labour-market 
institutions, especially at federal level.273  
These early institutions of welfare were also based on clear exclusions and a single 
(male) breadwinner model of household income. The pension schemes in Victoria, 
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Queensland and NSW contained express exclusions based on ethnicity, and 
prevented Indigenous Australians from applying. Queensland was the most 
exclusionary, denying the pension to “aliens, Chinese or other Asiatics, Aboriginal 
natives of Australia, Africa, New Zealand or the Pacific.”274 Victoria excluded “aliens, 
Chinese or other Asiatics, Aboriginal natives of Australia or New Zealand,”275 and 
New South Wales excluded “aliens, Chinese or other Asiatics, Aboriginal natives of 
Australia.”276 
As the majority of the poor and destitute aged, women would become the main 
beneficiaries of the means-tested Old Age Pension. In 1918, the first year the ABS 
reported the genders of Old Age Pension recipients, 60 per cent of recipients were 
women, and the majority of those were widowed and single women.277 As Marian 
Sawer argues, the early gender impact of the Old Age Pension is an important aspect 
of the masculine “wage earners’ welfare state” which should not be overlooked.278 But 
the welfare system also centred on the employment of white working men, with the 
basic wage established on the basis of a sole breadwinner model. Macintyre notes 
that the political economy of federation-era Australia “systematised and consolidated 
the privileges of (white) male workers,” and in doing so, it closed off the options for 
social insurance adopted in other capitalist countries where living standards were 
enhanced by welfare rather than employment.279 Being based on contributions from 
wages, schemes of social insurance did, however, replicate differences in income 
unless there was some element of redistribution.  
Some of the evidence presented to the committees of inquiry and royal commissions 
held on old age pensions during the 1890s and early 1900s demonstrates that there 
was an early appreciation among policy makers of the gender impact of contributory 
pension schemes.280 This was derived from British criticisms of the contributory 
German pension system, that workmen’s wages (on whom the rate of the pension 
was based) were insufficient to provide for old age and that this was even more the 
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case for women, the majority of the aged poor.281 Neild made the case against a 
contributory pension system because it discriminated against (married) women, 
arguing that 
there is still another and very numerous class for whom personal contribution 
schemes are not only impossible, but a mockery; and yet this class is the most 
self-denying and thrifty in the community. I refer to married women. From 
what source is the wife and mother to derive an income sufficient to meet the 
personal contribution requisite to enable her to claim an old-age pension?282  
By comparison, evidence taken from Thomas Rhodes, President of the South 
Australian State Children’s Council, warned about the deleterious effect of working 
women on the financial position of older men. He submitted that  
in commercial circles ‘cannibalistic’ competition provides no place for worn-
out or dull-witted men. The position is accentuated by the invasion of woman. 
She now fills positions which hitherto were largely occupied by elderly men, 
who, while not absolutely effective, were able to do their required work.283 
Women became eligible for the pension at the earlier age of 60 on the grounds that 
they tended to become, “incapacitated for regular work at an earlier age than 
men.”284 In addition, within the moral context of a means test that established a 
“deserving” and a “less deserving” poor, women were much less likely to be 
considered “undeserving,” across their lifetimes, than men.285 Following the 
Victorian approach, the Commonwealth legislation provided for the same rate of 
payment for married and single pensioners: differential rates were seen as penalising 
married couples for living together.286  
The development of institutions of industrial welfare during this early period 
undoubtedly influenced the development of national insurance. Murphy has argued 
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that it was less the path dependency of the existing institution of the Old Age Pension 
that made any effort to introduce national insurance unsuccessful, and more the 
“neighbouring” institution of wage arbitration, with employers objecting that they 
would pay both their own and their workers’ contributions through an increased 
basic wage.287 When this early period is taken in isolation, employer objections do 
feature as a factor militating against the introduction of national superannuation. 
However, over a longer timespan the growth of the institution of occupational 
superannuation would become a more important impediment. 
In international terms, Australia’s old age pension was closest to New Zealand’s, 
being non-contributory, means-tested and funded out of tax revenue. The New 
Zealand Old Age Pension Act of 1898 provided a pension equivalent to 
approximately 30 per cent of a working man’s wage, and entitlement was restricted 
as in Australia: to qualify, an individual had to be 65 years of age, a resident for 25 
years or more, engage in “sober and reputable living” and have limited assets.288 
Most Maori received less than the full rate of the pension, but were eligible, and until 
1936 individuals of Asian nationality were excluded.289 Despite early similarities, 
Australia’s retirement income system diverged from New Zealand’s, with New 
Zealand under a Labour government adopting a universal age pension in 1938.290 
In 1908, the same year as Australia’s Old Age Pension Act, the Asquith government 
in Britain introduced a means-tested, non-contributory old age pension. The British 
pension paid five shillings per week after age 70. The “clinching argument” against 
an insurance scheme, according to Thane, was that the majority of the neediest old 
people were women and no way could be found to include the great majority of them 
in a social insurance system. For this reason also, trade unions and friendly societies 
supported state non-contributory pensions for those unable to afford to join their 
own mutual funds, including their own wives.291 However by 1925 the contributory 
insurance principle was introduced to old age pensions for those aged 65 to 70 in the 
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United Kingdom through the Widows, Orphans and Old Age Contributory Pensions 
Act.292 But the contributory insurance principle was not taken up in Australia. 
The initial, abortive attempts at national insurance 
 
This section of the chapter examines the three early attempts to introduce a national 
insurance scheme with a superannuation element in the first half of the twentieth 
century: the Cook government’s 1913 national insurance proposal; the Bruce-Page 
government’s 1923 Royal Commission on National Insurance and the subsequent 
National Insurance Bill of 1928; and the Lyons government’s 1938 National Health 
and Pensions Insurance Act. The latter two examples are the focus of this third 
section, because they included a superannuation component; the first proposal 
contained no provision for old age. The latter examples were also far more 
developed, and the subject of greater debate, than the Cook government’s proposal, 
which was never drafted into legislation. 
The ageing population in the early part of the twentieth century became a concern for 
the sustainability of age pension financing, acting as a motivating force behind the 
early attempts to introduce national insurance schemes. As the federal Royal 
Commission on National Insurance would later note, in 1912, 34,897 males and 44, 
174 females, totalling 79,071 persons, were in receipt of the Old Age Pension, being 
equivalent to 33 per cent of the male population, 31 per cent of the female and 32 per 
cent of the total population eligible according to age. At the 30th June 1924, the 
numbers in receipt of the Old Age Pension had increased to 45,117 males and 67,937 
females, totalling 113,054 persons equivalent to 34 per cent of males and 32 per cent 
of females and approximately 33 per cent of the total population at the eligible 
ages.293 Life expectancy at birth was 59 for men and 63 for women; at 45 it was 71 for 
men and 74 for women.294 
The three attempts to introduce a national insurance scheme all revolved around one 
central issue: whether Australia should embrace a contributory social security system 
of a type that had been adopted in Germany and the United Kingdom. The 
international influences on policy development are discussed under each example, as 
are the issues of coverage that flow from contributory schemes. Superannuation was 
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understood as a social security issue, a responsibility of government, and the political 
positions on contributory financing flowed over from previous pension debates. The 
three proposals for national insurance were made by conservative parties – the Cook 
Liberal government; the Bruce-Page Nationalist-Country Party government and the 
Lyons United Australia Party-Country Party government.  
That the three initiatives came to nothing owes less to the path dependency of the 
existing institutions of old age welfare, and more to unique political and economic 
circumstances. However, the continued failure to introduce a scheme of national 
superannuation meant that the Old Age Pension and occupational pension schemes 
became embedded institutions, more difficult to displace in later decades.  
1913 
 
In 1913 the Cook government proposed a “comprehensive” social insurance scheme, 
but one that only covered the risks of sickness, accident, maternity, widowhood and 
unemployment. It was a proposal only, with no public inquiries held, nor any 
legislation developed. As such, the weight to be attached to this proposal, and the 
level of historical detail about it, are less than for the two proposals which followed. 
Cook’s proposal had followed the Liberal government’s initial commitment to social 
insurance under Prime Minister Alfred Deakin, “a commitment reinforced by the 
Lloyd George-Churchill success in Great Britain in 1911.”295 
According to Kewley, it was the debates around the Maternity Allowance Act 1912 
that provoked the major political parties to further develop their positions on the 
preferable method of financing social benefits. The maternity allowance was paid on 
a universal basis, to mothers on the birth of their child. Kewley argues that the 
Liberal Party was conscious that the allowance was electorally popular, and so 
supported maternity allowances but proposed to include them within a broader 
contributory insurance scheme.296 Accordingly, the Cook government came to office 
with a promise to introduce such a scheme. In the event, the government did not 
attempt to introduce any contributory social insurance scheme, which appears to 
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have been because of insufficient parliamentary numbers to proceed with any bill.297 
The government was elected with a single seat majority in the House of 
Representatives and with a Labor-dominated Senate.  
Mirroring the earlier old age pension debates, the Labor Party opposed the 
contributory scheme, but not all Labor members of parliament were hostile to it. 
Kewley notes that  
the general view of Labor members was expressed by J.E. Fenton, the member 
for Maribyrnong, who said that a contribution to an insurance fund would be 
‘all very well’ for a man who had money in his pocket, but while ‘four-fifths of 
the wealth resides with one-fifth of the population, it is wrong to ask the 
poorer classes of the community to contribute to any fund of that kind.’298 
It is clear that the Cook government was influenced by prior overseas moves to 
introduce contributory pension schemes.299 The main source of influence was 
Britain, with the National Insurance Act 1911 covering health and unemployment, 
introduced by the Asquith government.300 In September 1910, Australia had been 
represented by government officials at the international Conference on Social 
Insurance at the Hague, and was criticised along with British delegates for having 
introduced a (non-contributory) system of old age pensions, “stigmatized as 
revolutionary and destructive of the spirit of independence.”301 British officials 
communicated with members of the Cook government, outlining the “scope and 
machinery” of the British scheme on which the Australian scheme was to be based.302  
The medical fraternity and the friendly societies were prominent voices of opposition 
to the British legislation, which was fresh in the minds of Australian proponents of a 
scheme. The friendly societies in Australia also voiced their opposition to any such 
scheme, arguing that it was unnecessary given the existing benefits they provided.303 
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Meanwhile, the Worker endorsed Senator Mullan’s address in reply to parliament 
that it was “nothing short of a capitalistic device to fleece the workers of the little 
which they are already getting.”304  
1928 
 
The issue of contributory pensions for old age was taken up by the Bruce-Page 
Nationalist-Country Party government. In 1923 it convened a Royal Commission to 
look at the issue of national insurance for old age, sickness, invalidity and 
unemployment. The Royal Commission presented an initial progress report in 1925 
which covered, among other things, superannuation benefits, two further progress 
reports and a final report in 1927.305 In 1925 the government also raised the pension 
from 15s per week provided by the previous Labor government to 17s 6d per week.306   
The Royal Commission, chaired by the Nationalist Party Senator John Dunlop 
Millen, presented the view that existing private superannuation schemes were 
insufficient to provide for old age. While the Commission did not have official 
statistics on the numbers of workers covered, it estimated that approximately 
140,000 of them were in an occupational superannuation scheme, “the great 
majority of whom” were public servants.307 It observed that “very few” trade unions 
had superannuation schemes for their members, and “where such are available they 
generally provide for a small weekly benefit varying according to the number of years 
during which contributions have been paid by the member.”308 Finally, “numerous 
government, municipal, banking, financial and other institutions have established 
superannuation funds for their employees,” but benefits were highly variable and 
depended on the organisation the individual worked for.309 
Likewise, the Royal Commission took issue with the limited population coverage of 
friendly societies, and their limited benefits. Only 524,000 out of a total of 1,648,000 
wage and salary earners, or approximately one-third of workers, had made voluntary 
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efforts to provide for themselves through mutual associations.310 The friendly 
societies had failed “to make any adequate provision for permanent incapacity for 
work as the result of invalidity or old age.”311 This was because while the objects of 
some friendly societies included provision for the establishment of a superannuation 
fund for aged members, no society provided superannuation benefits aside from 
some instances of small relief for over-60s.312 Finally, the Commission observed that 
the instances of sickness and accident that the friendly societies did provide some 
insurance against would likely weigh less on the mind of a wage-earner than the risk 
of impecunious old age – and superannuation under National Insurance would assist 
the worker to provide against it.313 
The Royal Commission proposed a superannuation benefit of one pound per week, 
payable to men aged 65 and over, and to women aged 60. The superannuation 
pension was payable in addition to a person’s existing old age pension. A National 
Insurance Fund would be established by the government, into which compulsory 
contributions by all wage and salary-earners over the age of 16 would be made. Their 
contributions would be deducted from wages, and equal contributions on behalf of 
those workers would also be made by their employer and the government. Voluntary 
contributions could be made by the self-employed, and an exemption to compulsory 
contributions would apply to members of “mutual benefit associations which 
guarantee, and to those in employment which secures, equal benefits to those 
provided by the National Insurance Fund.”314  
The resulting National Insurance Bill was introduced into the federal parliament by 
Earle Page, the Treasurer, on 14 September 1928. Following the Royal Commission’s 
recommendation, employees would pay compulsory contributions into a National 
Insurance Fund. Contributions of one shilling per week in the case of males aged 16 
to 65 and sixpence a week until age 60 for females would be compulsorily levied on 
employed persons engaged under a contract of service, and whose income, unless 
                                                             
310 Ibid., p.7 
311 Ibid., p.21. 
312 Ibid., p.21. 
313 Ibid., p.22. 
314 Royal Commission on National Insurance, Final Report, p.6. 
91 
 
derived from manual labour, did not exceed £416 per annum. Employee 
contributions were to be matched by the employer.315   
The government referenced international moves towards national insurance and 
utilised the institutional framework of the British social insurance scheme of 1925. In 
the bill’s second reading speech, Page argued:  
[I]n all directions it is being recognized that the beneficent principles and 
practice of insurance should be applied not only in respect of such casualties 
as death, fire, ship-wreck, and accident, but also to those other more 
insidious, but no less serious, casualties of sickness, invalidity and senility, 
which affect our social organization and, in the absence of due provision, 
cause untold suffering.316  
The classic insurance principle of risk pooling would mean that “[T]he man who 
experiences a long life contributes to the needs of the dependants of another who 
dies early.”317 
Departing from the tripartite contributions proposed by the Royal Commission, the 
national insurance bill provided for equal contributions by employers and 
employees. Each year, men would contribute £4 16s, and women £2 8s.318 Whether 
or not a person was “employed” and therefore liable to make contributions was 
defined broadly by the regulations, but subject to several exceptions. The main 
exception was those earning above £416 per year, other than in manual work, 
outworkers, employment in service of husband or wife and where remoteness 
precluded effective working of the scheme.319 
The upshot of having employer and employee contributions was that the 
consolidated revenue was to bear none of the cost of the administration of the 
National Insurance Scheme. Employer and employee contributions were, according 
to Page, to cover the whole cost of the benefits and administration.320 Contributions 
were to be made by employees at a flat rate, with obvious discrimination by gender – 
                                                             
315 National Superannuation Committee of Inquiry (NSCI), National Superannuation in Australia – 
Interim Report of the Committee of Inquiry (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1974), p.38. 
316 CPD, House of Representatives, 14 September 1928, p.6746. 
317 Ibid., p.6747. 
318 CPD, House of Representatives, 19 September 1928, p.6889. 
319 National Insurance Bill 1928, Regulations Part II. 
320 CPD, House of Representatives, 18 September 1928, p.6771. 
92 
 
it was a regressive impost on workers with those on lower incomes bearing relatively 
more of the burden of contributions. However, the government argued that the rate 
of contributions was set so as not to “deprive the man on relatively low earnings of 
the measures of comfort that are necessary to a reasonable standard of living and 
health, and thus force the worker below a desirable social standard.”321 The Labor 
opposition leader, James Scullin, pointed out that the existing old age pension 
provided a benefit without the need for any such contribution, noting that 
“superannuation will be 20s. per week with a personal contribution, and the old-age 
pensions will be 20s. per week without a contribution.” Page responded that while 
the age pension was paid to old-age pensioners for “nothing,” it was an anti-
destitution measure and superannuation under a national insurance scheme was 
“independent of means.”322  
While all employed persons between the age of 16 and the superannuation age for 
their gender were to be insured, there were express and implicit exceptions to 
coverage. Aboriginal Australians were expressly excluded from the scheme.323 
Another express exemption was for those in remote localities and individuals – 
obviously including but not limited to Aboriginal Australians – rendering effective 
administration of the scheme impracticable.324 As Sawer observes, the mobility of the 
labour force was an additional argument as to why a contributory system would not 
work when it was considered in the Australian context.325 
The insured would only be paid the superannuation allowance if they had paid two 
years’ worth of weekly contributions and resided in Australia for 20 years before 
superannuation age.326 This requirement had obvious implications for women who 
left work when they married or did not engage in paid work, and for those who were 
contract workers. As Page pointed out, “[T]he great majority of women bearing 
children lead a domestic life.” The entitlements of mothers therefore included the 
maternity allowance and a wife’s superannuation entitlement.327  
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There is evidence, however, that the issue of broader insurance was a priority for 
women. At the time of the Royal Commission, the National Council of Women of 
Victoria urged that a woman should be appointed to the Royal Commission because 
the issue of national insurance was “a matter of vital importance to the women of 
Australia.”328 With insurance, and therefore superannuation, contingent on 
employment, the national insurance bill had not responded to the following 
observation of the Royal Commission that 
married women who are home-workers are stated not to be an insurable 
proposition, as there cannot be that necessary supervision which operates 
over women in other employment…special consideration is required with 
respect to the difficult questions arising in connexion with women who give up 
work on marriage, as the change in the economic circumstances of the woman 
which normally takes place at marriage introduces a complication into 
insurance administration, and often the status of the insured woman after 
marriage cannot be immediately determined. 329 
In 1927 the eleventh conference of the Australian Labor Party had resolved to 
increase the old age pension. The party during this period was still committed to 
general revenue financing of pensions, and in favour of its universal coverage as 
opposed to a national insurance scheme based on employment. As Scullin pointed 
out in parliamentary debate, the basis of the national insurance scheme was 
contributions by employees only, so that a person who had never been an employee 
would only receive an age pension.330 By way of contrast, Queensland Labor 
parliamentarian Frank Forde appears to have been an outlier in favouring a scheme 
of national insurance. In a hint of Labor’s position on the next iteration of national 
insurance in 1938, Forde favoured the broadest possible coverage, saying “I hope 
that the time will come when we shall have a scheme of insurance the benefits of 
which will be enjoyed by every worker in Australia, whether in the Government 
service or not.”331 
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Ultimately, the National Insurance Bill was abandoned, for reasons that have been 
given relatively short shrift in existing literature. Kewley cites the opposition of 
friendly societies, employers and insurance companies, the difficulty of imposing a 
system on top of existing state insurance schemes and the defeat of the Bruce-Page 
government in October 1929.332 Murphy likewise cites the opposition of the friendly 
societies, employers and other civil society groups, the defeat of the government, and 
the Great Depression.333 The friendly societies, as an existing institution of old age 
welfare, acted as a handbrake on the National Insurance bill and the superannuation 
benefits it proposed. A year before the bill was introduced, Bruce noted that whether 
or not it could be introduced into the parliament depended “to a large extent upon 
the result of negotiations at present being carried on by the Government with the 
friendly societies and the British Medical Association,” as the peak body governing 
Australia doctors at the time.334 Some friendly societies opposed the bill outright, 
and other organisations did too, often because they already had occupational 
superannuation schemes, and did not want their employees to have to pay twice – 
once into the private fund and once into a public scheme.335  
One of the main areas of contention was the national insurance scheme using 
“approved societies” for its administration. This formed the basis of institutional 
opposition by the friendly societies. Insured individuals would need to sign up to an 
“approved society” from which to make and receive contributions, and in the event 
they did not nominate any society, their contributions would be allocated to a 
government “General Approved Society.” Approved societies included existing 
friendly societies but also other insurance bodies and some unions. The Friendly 
Societies’ Interstate Conference in November 1928 resolved that the National 
Insurance Bill provided inadequate protection for friendly societies and that 
approved societies should eliminate any other body except Friendly Societies and the 
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General Approved Society controlled by the National Insurance Board.336 Friendly 
societies also wanted an allocated space on the Board, which the bill did not provide 
for.337 Finally, the friendly societies were worried about insurance companies moving 
into their field, for the ostensible reason that friendly societies were largely voluntary 
and run to benefit members whereas insurance companies existed to make a 
profit.338 
The opposition by the friendly societies was somewhat ironic given that the concept 
of “approved societies” in the bill followed the English precedent of utilising existing 
institutions to administer the scheme.339 The government wanted to give workers the 
option of choosing where their contributions would go. Page argued that the bill 
sought to retain “useful organizations combined with a marked degree of liberty 
available to the contributor in the matter of selecting the group with which he will be 
associated, and also to a large extent of selecting the type of control that he 
prefers.”340 
Issues of federalism also bedevilled the national insurance proposal, relevant because 
of overlapping social legislation of the states with benefits to be provided by the 
national insurance scheme.341 No resolution on the bill was reached at the May 1929 
meeting of premiers because of “divergent conditions existing in the various 
States.”342 Here was an existing institution of government insurance that would need 
to be substantially redesigned or dispensed with in the event of a national scheme of 
social insurance being implemented. A questionnaire on the subject was put to the 
states, but their responses were not received by October 1929, when a federal election 
ushered in the Scullin Labor government and the Great Depression began. 
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1938 
 
The issue of national insurance was not taken up again until the mid-1930s, with the 
Lyons government returning to the “unfinished business” of the Bruce-Page 
government’s proposed scheme.343 The National Health and Pensions Insurance Bill 
was enacted on 5 July 1938 and a National Insurance Commission established to 
administer the scheme.344 It seemed, Murphy argues, that  
the path of Australian welfare policy had been irrevocably altered and the 
opponents of the ‘mistake of 1908’ had finally achieved their aim of shifting 
from a regime based on means-tested benefits funding from consolidated 
revenue to a contributory insurance model.345  
This appearance of a point of “path departure” was deceptive, however, with the 
scheme being abandoned in 1939. What did this third iteration of national insurance-
based superannuation propose, and why was it another instalment in the story of the 
failure of the contributory model? As Watts notes, the 1938 scheme has become “a 
footnote to the history of the 1930s.”346 The consequence is that welfare changes in 
the post-war era have been decontextualised. 
The 1938 scheme was to cover old age, sickness, invalidity, and in an addition to the 
1928 legislation, medical insurance. Unlike the previous scheme, there was no 
provision for unemployment insurance. The basis of the scheme would again be 
contributions, made by employees and with the basic wage set as the basis for the 
level of contributions. 347 Contributions would be made in equal parts by employers, 
employees and the government – the introduction of government contributions 
being another change from the 1928 bill, reflecting the earlier Royal Commission 
recommendation.  
The superannuation element of the scheme paid 20s per week to men and 15s to 
women, with an option for women to make voluntary contributions of sixpence per 
week and for which they would receive an additional 5s per week (so that their total 
superannuation benefit was the same as for men). Insured men must have reached 
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the eligibility age of 65 and women 60. They also must have been continuously 
insured for not less than five years immediately preceding that date and have made 
minimum payments during the three years preceding.  
It is curious that for a scheme whose main rationale centred on the rising costs of the 
Old Age Pension,348 it was also one which required government support in addition 
to the contributions of employers and employees. Indeed, the requirement for 
additional government finance was used as a selling point. One government member 
John Lawson noted that the government would pay more for the scheme per capita 
in Australia than in Britain as if this was a positive thing – £5 for every insured 
person as against £3.349 According to Watts, Treasury clearly supported a 
contributory scheme of old age and invalid pensions, but “the political problem of 
how to do this without raising a political furore, however, remained the key 
problem.”350 
The 1938 scheme was based upon a report of government commerce minister Sir 
Frederick Stewart, following a 1935 study trip which he took to Britain.351 It was also 
noted by the government that “in other countries of Europe and in the United States 
the benefits of national insurance were becoming more and more realised and its 
scope being extended. Australia is one of the lagging countries.”352 The Australian 
government was also advised by the Controller of the British system, Sir Walter 
Kinnear.  
Following the British model, Australia’s scheme again made use of the British 
concept of “approved societies” to administer the scheme, this time including both 
friendly societies and the unions.  The legislation expressly excluded organisations 
carrying on life insurance business.353 Even after the scheme was abandoned in 1939, 
the administrative provisions in the legislation and the approved societies were kept 
in operation. One opposition senator mused that, “I have a shrewd suspicion that 
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there is only one reason why the approved societies are to be kept alive: it would cost 
the Government more to kill them and pay to them equitable compensation for the 
crime that has been committed against them, than to allow them to continue.”354 
Curtin argued that the bill, by overlapping the field of friendly society activity with 
that of social insurance, would tend to “discourage young men and women from 
joining those associations of self-help, thus threatening the continued strength of 
friendly societies.”355 
The Curtin Labor opposition made clear that it was opposed to the scheme on 
account of its contributory financing. Curtin argued that the bill was unacceptable 
because, among other things, it sought to “place on a contributory basis the payment 
of pensions for old-age, invalidity and widowhood, which should be provided as a 
matter of right without the exaction of individual contributions.” His argument was 
also based on the fact that the bill provided unequal benefits for men and women, 
and did not extend medical insurance to the wives and children of contributors.356 
Curtin also confirmed that as far as the ALP was concerned, the Old Age Pension was 
a social rather than an industrial obligation and that the cost of it should be borne 
entirely by the general taxpayer.357 Here, Labor demonstrated its traditional position 
in respect of pension financing, though this was not without some shades of 
complexity. The 1939 ALP platform contained a commitment to national insurance 
for sickness, accident, life and unemployment insurance though not in respect of old 
age.358 
Other members of the Labor opposition argued that the bill was introduced to shift 
the incidence of taxation for social services away from the general community to the 
workers.359 Labor favoured pensions financed from consolidated revenue because it 
would mean that “all would have paid into a common fund according to their ability 
to pay.”360 The 1936 progressive federal income tax law had also re-emphasised the 
principle of ability to pay.361 Other parliamentary members of the ALP noted that the 
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demands of industry meant that many workers became old well before the eligibility 
age for the pension benefit. This meant that for workers in industry, they would have 
to rely on the Old Age Pension alone.362 The Victorian paper Labor Call regularly 
voiced its disquiet about the proposed scheme, articulating the labour movement’s 
suspicion of the approved societies whose agents “pestered” workers and whose 
interests were “far from being identical with their likely ‘prospects’ among the trade 
unions.”363 Finally, Labor was also critical of the scheme’s main omission – 
unemployment insurance. One Labor MP argued that, “surely a scheme that did not 
provide for the most important feature in our social life – unemployment – was 
doomed before it was born.”364 He further argued that when Labor formed 
government, “we shall bring down an all-embracing scheme of national insurance, 
associated with which there will be no muddle.”365  
The government, for its part, queried how Labor, favouring non-contributory 
finance, was going to pay for a liberalised scheme that included unemployment 
insurance.366 Members also pointed to some of the logical inconsistencies of Labor’s 
arguments, with the member for Gippsland noting, “I found myself unable…to follow 
the arguments of the Leader of the Opposition…[W]hen he said that the Labor party 
favoured a non-contributory scheme and then added that it was nevertheless in 
favour of a system of national insurance he made contradictory statements.” Curtin 
replied that his opposition was to placing services already being paid for out of 
Consolidated Revenue on to a contributory footing.367 This position was still one step 
away from outright opposition to contributory financing for social security. 
Echoing the 1928 scheme, the 1938 legislation excluded a number of groups 
expressly and implicitly. Contributions were to be made by employees and excluded 
classes of worker like outworkers and the self-employed. Aboriginal and Pacific 
islanders were excluded classes of employees.368 Widows and the unemployed were 
excluded on account of being outside of the paid workforce. Labor MP Charles Frost 
argued that 
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The scheme submitted for our approval excludes a vast army of people who 
are in greater need of security than those who are in regular employment. 
Widows and unemployed persons are to be excluded from its benefits.369  
Casual workers were, however, included so long as there was “a degree of regularity 
in their employment,” and “[G]ardeners, and women who help with domestic work, 
will be included unless they do this work on irregular occasions only.”370  
Women’s organisations again mobilised to publicly criticise the gender 
discrimination in differential access ages and benefit levels between men and 
women. The Victorian Women Citizens Movement argued that  
even though the ideal of equal pay had not yet been achieved, and the wage 
standard on which the contributions were proportioned differed where 
woman workers were concerned, it was felt that it would be a retrograde step 
to have contributions and benefits in the insurance scheme on a different 
basis for women.371  
The National Insurance Commission argued that the scheme benefited women 
because their old age pensions commenced and their contributions ceased five years 
earlier than men, and they would receive pensions for longer because women lived to 
older ages. Moreover, it said that the scheme “attempts quite enough in its own field 
and cannot be expected to be an instrument for altering the relations between the 
sexes.”372 Members of the executive of the League of Women Electors voiced their 
disquiet about the scheme’s “unfairness to women.”373  
Among the women’s groups that supported the scheme, it is evident that there was 
an assumed domestic role for women, with the consequence that the scheme would 
support women primarily as domestic beneficiaries of their partner’s social 
insurance. The 1938 Conference of Australasian Women commended placing 
pensions on a contributory basis but said it “deeply regretted that no provision 
whatever was made for the great majority of Australian women – the wives and 
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mothers who were not in employment.”374 The Conference also took issue with the 
different rate of benefit payment to men and women. The government argued that 
women would benefit more from the scheme than they contributed to it, in part 
because they became entitled to superannuation benefits earlier, at age 60.375 Other 
government members noted that women could make voluntary contributions to the 
scheme, which would bring their contributions and pension rate up to the level of 
men’s.376  These arguments did little to address the way that the wage-based 
contributory scheme replicated gender differences in wages. 
In September 1939, war was declared by the United Kingdom and France and 
Australia’s involvement was announced. Budget constraints during World War II 
were a clear factor militating against the continuation of the national insurance 
scheme. The cost of the revised defence program “threw into focus budget shortfalls 
of some 3 million pounds and immediately put pressure on the government’s social 
programs such as the National Insurance scheme.”377 Speaking about estimated 
government expenditure in 1939 and 1940, the new Prime Minister Robert Menzies 
reflected that  
it would be mere folly for us to pretend that, spending as we are now 
spending, with all the possibilities that exist in relation to our economy, both 
external and internal, we can consider these problems in quite the same light 
as that in which we might have considered them before. The result is that I 
must introduce into the consideration of the matter an element of uncertainty 
which, as every honorable member will realize, may produce a postponement 
of ideas that otherwise, I am quite sure, would have been attractive to 
honorable members of this House.378 
It pained Menzies to make this statement, as one of the staunchest parliamentary 
advocates of national insurance. He regularly wrote about national insurance in 
various publications and resigned from Cabinet on 15 March 1939 over its decision 
not to proceed with contributory pensions.379 
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By the time of Menzies’ prime ministership, the scheme was electorally unpopular 
and there was opposition to national insurance from within the Country Party–UAP 
coalition.380 With the onset of war, 1939 was a time of national emergency but also 
one of “frigid relations” in Cabinet.381 The intensifying international situation had 
divided the UAP, and rural groups argued that the scheme was a burden on 
employers.”382 The WA Country Party voted against the bill because “the 
scheme…failed to give any advantages to self-employers,” which included 
“agriculturalists, pastoralists, graziers, dairymen and other farmers, orchardists and 
gardeners as well as small shop keepers, dressmakers and others conducting small 
businesses.”383 UAP supporters from among the finance groups in Melbourne were 
also opposed to National Insurance.384 Finally, the British Medical Association, a 
natural constituent of the coalition, provided one of the key forces of organised 
opposition to the scheme.  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has established the dual institutional setting with which the remainder 
of this thesis engages: private occupational superannuation and the public Old Age 
Pension. There was also the third, elusive institution of national superannuation as 
part of a social insurance scheme. The purpose of setting out an early history of these 
three branches of old age welfare is to show where the pathways for the institutions 
began and would come to influence the shape of superannuation policy in the 
subsequent, post-WWII period. The biggest continuing question in national 
superannuation policy in the decades following WWII would be whether to introduce 
a government-run, national superannuation scheme.  
With respect to policy issues, the chapter focused upon the thematic topics of 
pension financing, coverage of superannuation including with respect to gender and 
Aboriginal people, and international influences on policy. The chapter established 
the political differences over old age pension policy. Broadly speaking, there was a 
political divide in respect of contributory pension financing, with the Labor Party 
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being against it and the conservative UAP and Country Party in favour. As with 
nearly all policy issues, however, there were a variety of positions taken within the 
parties. What emerges from the period between the 1890s and the late 1930s is a 
more complex position on contributory financing by the ALP, with some evidence of 
support for the principle that would hint at the “contributory turn” by the party in 
the post-WWII era (discussed in detail in Chapter 4). 
The significance of this early period for the thesis is the different domains in which 
the institutions of old age welfare were established, and their sequencing. What 
remained unresolved after this early period was how to bring into existence a new 
institution of national superannuation on top of the Old Age Pension, occupational 
pensions and friendly society welfare. Would a national superannuation scheme 
replace private pension provision? If it was in addition to private pensions, how 
would workers afford the additional impost on their wages? Would those not in 
receipt of private pensions receive a higher amount of national superannuation as a 
redistributive measure? These were big questions, with complicated answers. In 
effect, national superannuation was a proposal to change the social security program 
of the Commonwealth Government. The research in the following chapters of this 
thesis shows that these interaction effects between the existing institutions of old age 
welfare and proposed national superannuation acted to reinforce existing 
institutions.  
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Chapter Four: Labor’s shift to contributory pensions 
 
Important developments in national superannuation policy took place during World 
War II and the subsequent decades. On the face of it, this was another period of stasis 
with respect to the development of national superannuation. The idea of national 
superannuation was debated during the war years and subsequent decades, and 
another public inquiry held in 1973. But it was the Labor Party now that held that 
inquiry, after introducing the rhetoric of social security “contributions” when it 
established the National Welfare Fund in 1945. The post-war period was also when 
taxation measures were used as an anti-inflationary measure, bearing strong 
resemblance to when superannuation was successfully introduced in the 1980s 
(discussed in Chapter 6). The foundations had been laid for the Labor Party to propose 
national superannuation.  
This chapter begins where the last chapter left off, with an examination of the 
debates over national superannuation from 1939 onwards. The focus is on the issue 
of contributory pension financing and bipartisan commitment to abolishing the 
pension means test. This is done to demonstrate the connections between the initial, 
“abortive” attempts at social insurance discussed in Chapter 3 and the subsequent 
decades. The chapter looks at the advocacy for social insurance by Nationalist and 
UAP advocates like Frederick Stewart and Robert Menzies. It then examines the shift 
towards universalism in social security and the bipartisan commitment to abolishing 
the pension means test, both of which were policy drivers of national 
superannuation. 
The chapter then turns to the international influences during the post-war era that 
provided intellectual momentum for a national superannuation scheme. The British 
Labour government had introduced national health insurance in 1945, based on a 
landmark report by William Beveridge in 1942, Social Insurance and Allied Services. 
The Beveridge report had proposed a system of contributory pensions to protect 
people against the “predictable crises of their lives,” providing “guaranteed income 
when illness, disability, unemployment, old age or death deprived a family of the 
breadwinner’s wages.”385 Two unsuccessful attempts were made at introducing 
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national superannuation by British Labour, the first in 1959. Hugh Pemberton notes 
that the 1959 election “came to be dominated by the issue of nationalization, with 
which superannuation had become indelibly linked in the minds of voters.”386 A 
revised proposal was introduced in 1969, but it lapsed with the defeat of the Wilson 
government in 1970.  
A cross-pollination of thinking occurred during this period, with intellectual exchange 
occurring between British and Australian academics and politicians including 
Australian economist Richard Downing and British Labour MP Anthony Crosland. 
There was a perception among these thinkers, and by Australian political parties, that 
a prosperous post-war country would have higher expectations about standards of 
living in retirement. Andrew Scott has observed that there was an “ideological 
revision” by British Labour and Australian Labor in the post-War era, seeking to 
appeal to a broader constituency than the working class alone.387 Australians would 
expect something more than the standard of living offered by the poverty-alleviating 
Age Pension, the real value of which had been eaten away by high levels of inflation. 
This acted as an intellectual driver for a national superannuation scheme.  
Thirdly, the chapter examines the Whitlam Labor Government’s National 
Superannuation Committee of Inquiry (“NSCI” or the “Hancock Inquiry”). The 
Hancock Inquiry was the first public inquiry on national superannuation since the 
Royal Commission in 1928 and it demonstrated the ALP’s acceptance of contributory 
pension financing. The Labor Party was committed to national superannuation as a 
device to abolish the pension means test and thereby expand old age welfare. The idea 
of social insurance was “in the air,”388 with contributory pension schemes introduced 
in the United Kingdom and New Zealand. But the proposal for national 
superannuation was never implemented. Again, superannuation remained elusive in 
Australia. This is in part explained by the existing model of old age welfare, what 
Castles refers to as “a clash of principle” between an earnings-related scheme and “the 
traditional Australian practice of flat-rate benefits according to need.”389 The other 
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factors acting against the proposed scheme were its cost and the change of government 
in 1975. 
After the Whitlam government’s dismissal in November 1975, the Age Pension would 
remain the only government provision for the aged, albeit on a more liberalised basis. 
Whitlam removed the means test for pensioners aged over 75 in 1973, and for those 
aged 70 and over in 1975. This section of the chapter explores the coverage of the 
national superannuation scheme proposed under the Hancock Inquiry, in particular 
the implications of a redistributive pension model for women.  
The National Welfare Fund and pension universalism 
 
World War II and its aftermath provided the impetus for both sides of Australian 
politics to consider the role of the national government in ensuring the welfare of its 
citizens. As we have seen in Chapter 3, the major political parties were divided over 
the means of pension financing, with conservative parties proposing contributory 
social insurance schemes and the ALP favouring welfare financed from general 
revenue. The establishment of the Chifley government’s post-war welfare state saw 
the ALP adopt a new rhetoric around social welfare financing, setting a pathway for 
national superannuation policy in the 1960s and 1970s.  
The Menzies UAP-Country Party government convened a Joint Parliamentary 
Committee on Social Services that ran from 1941 to 1946. At the instigation of 
Frederick Stewart, the bipartisan Committee was tasked with examining the proposal 
for contributory old age pensions. Sheila Shaver notes that there was an impasse on 
the Committee between Labor and UAP members in respect of contributory finance, 
with political circumstances favouring stasis on the issue. She writes that “Menzies’ 
hold on office was slipping, and Labor members had little incentive to compromise a 
principle central to the Opposition stance.”390 The work of the Committee continued 
after Labor formed government in October 1941, and again it came down against 
contributory pension financing. Rather, the Committee favoured a system of 
progressive taxation to finance social security, reiterating its opinion that “the 
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income tax finance it had recommended for wartime should be continued after the 
war also.”391  
Wartime economic conditions produced the impetus for progressive income taxation 
on a national scale, which in turn provided the financial basis for national welfare. 
Uniform national income taxes were introduced by the Curtin government in 1942 as 
a means of increasing government revenue for defence spending. The extension of 
Commonwealth taxation was also, as Watts and Kewley argue, an anti-inflation 
device because it reduced the current spending capacity of taxpayers, in conditions of 
high employment.392 Chifley, as Minister for Post-War Reconstruction, published a 
pamphlet in 1943 entitled Social Security and Reconstruction, invoking Beveridge’s 
language to propose a “cradle to grave” social insurance program.393 The same year, a 
wartime tax levy was introduced, increasing the rate of income tax and lowering the 
threshold from £156 to £104 per annum.394  
In its first post-war budget in 1945, the Chifley Labor government introduced a self-
described “new financial approach” to social services, with the income tax split into 
two levies, one of which was specifically for social services.395 The “Social Services 
Contribution” and payroll tax financed the new National Welfare Fund that was 
established in 1943, from which welfare benefits would be paid.396 Although the 
National Welfare Fund had an air of contributory social insurance about it, it did not 
introduce a social insurance system. Contributions to the Fund and benefits paid 
were not linked – the Australian Constitution prevents earmarking of taxation funds 
for specific purposes. Indeed, for the first few years of the National Welfare Fund, 
receipts exceeded benefits paid out.397 Appropriations of social services contributions 
were made from consolidated revenue each year to finance the National Welfare 
Fund.398 Figure 2 shows the operation of the Fund between 1945 and 1950. 
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Figure 2: National Welfare Fund 
 
 
 
The Social Services contribution was in place until 1950, when the Menzies 
government merged it with income tax. Further changes in 1952 provided that the 
appropriation from consolidated revenue “should be equal in amount to the money 
paid out of the National Welfare Fund,” and “with this move…the Fund ceased to 
have any direct relationship with tax collections.”399 It was eventually repealed by the 
Hawke government in 1985 so that all social service payments were made from 
consolidated revenue. Ronald Mendelsohn is right to note that the National Welfare 
Fund had “never been entirely independent of general Treasury finance,” and there 
was never “a direct tie between contributions and benefit.”400 
These developments suggest that Mendelsohn is rather too emphatic in arguing that 
the Social Services Contribution and the National Welfare Fund marked the 
beginning of “a major policy departure” which brought the ALP “much closer to the 
advocates of a contributory social insurance scheme.”401 Instead, the post-war 
welfare state measures brought in by Chifley were nearly all financed by general 
revenue and based on need. As Castles writes, the Labor government of the 1940s 
brought in the “standard range of social security schemes – child, unemployment, 
sickness and widows’ benefits – all, bar the child benefit, were in the traditional 
selective, ungenerous and flat-rate mould of 1908 and represented an extension of 
the wage earners’ welfare state, not its supercession.”402 With the National Welfare 
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Fund, the effect was to impose taxation on low income earners “as though they were 
paying social insurance.”403   
The rhetorical shift by the Labor Party should not, however, be underestimated. With 
the National Welfare Fund, the seeds had been sown for the ALP to move towards a 
contributory framing for social security policy. In 1947, under the Prime Ministership 
of Chifley, the parliamentary Labor Party was looking at a proposal to introduce a 
national superannuation scheme. Different models were considered, including 
overseas forms of superannuation and partial or comprehensive schemes to replace 
the Age Pension.404 Chifley spoke about the high level of private incomes and the 
scarcity of supplies such as housing, which were considerations that combined to 
“present a problem of potential inflation.”405 Kewley notes that with the “recent 
ending of hostilities had come a strong demand for reductions in income taxation, 
the granting of which would have served to accentuate the problem of inflation.”406  
Another reason the Labor caucus examined national superannuation under Chifley 
was because the government was attuned to community calls for liberalisation of the 
pension means test. Since the debates over the Old Age Pension, the conservative 
side of politics had regarded the means test as a disincentive to save, a 
discouragement of thrift in the community. The abolition of the means test was 
therefore in line with the Liberal philosophy of self-reliance.407 This moral preference 
for self-reliance over reliance on the state was driven in no small way by Australian 
liberalism’s Protestant roots, with its emphasis on personal responsibility.408 As 
Whiteford and Stanton recount, the Coalition introduced a “tapered means test” in 
1969, with a 50 per cent rather than 100 per cent withdrawal rate. Then, in 1972, it 
doubled the pension-free areas.  
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Labor members of parliament spoke about the demand for the abolition of the means 
test from people covered by private superannuation, and about the anomalies created 
every time the means test was changed.409 The government was therefore examining 
the question of a national superannuation scheme.  
Abolishing the means test would mean paying age pensions to more people, 
specifically those with higher levels of wealth who were previously excluded under the 
test. Either a government could finance this through higher taxes, a politically difficult 
proposition under any circumstances, or it could look for other avenues of finance. 
Having individuals making personal contributions through a superannuation scheme 
was one of these other avenues, and an attractive one given that the country was facing 
slower levels of growth and high levels of inflation. 
Both the Chifley government and the Liberal opposition under Menzies were working 
out details of national superannuation schemes to take to the electorate in the 1949 
election. Chifley had received “a number of deputations” on the subject, and he took 
pains to explain to the parliament that any superannuation scheme was “not 
intended to interfere with private superannuation schemes” or to “interfere with 
insurance companies.”410 Investigation by an interdepartmental committee 
established by the Chifley Cabinet showed that the cost of financing a scheme which 
would pay pensions to all men and women aged over 65 and 60 years respectively 
would involve an additional tax levy of around 4d in the pound on all incomes.411 The 
total cost of a scheme that abolished the means test on pensions was estimated at an 
additional £40 million per year.412 At the time, the ALP’s platform provided for 
elimination of the means test when it became financially viable, but there was no 
commitment to a national superannuation scheme. 
Changes to the pension means test had commenced under the Chifley Government, 
with increases to the levels of permissible income and property introduced in 1946 and 
1948. The abolition of the pension means test and the consequential introduction of a 
national superannuation scheme continued to be planned by the Menzies Liberal 
government when it resumed office in 1949. In an election speech, Menzies spoke 
about the “unjust operation of the means test” and the “penalty it imposes in many 
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cases upon thrift.” He argued that “[W]ithout an all-round contributory system, there 
are enormous financial barriers to an immediate abolition of the means test.”413 The 
means test was progressively liberalised by the Chifley and Menzies governments.  By 
the middle of the 1950s, around 39 per cent of men over 65 and 42 per cent of women 
aged over 60 were in receipt of an Old Age Pension.414 Gough Whitlam’s former private 
secretary, Race Mathews, recalls that: 
The means test became a very hot political issue in the late ‘50s … it 
remained a contentious item and Gough was very committed to abolition 
altogether (of the means test). The question was in what way we could get 
rid of it without running into this issue of affordability.  
During the long period of Coalition governments up until 1972, the idea of a national 
superannuation scheme received continued advocacy, in particular from William 
Wentworth, who became Minister for Social Services in 1968. In 1969, the Gorton 
government introduced a tapered means test, under which pensioners would have 
their pensions reduced by one-half, instead of the whole, of their means as assessed in 
excess of the limit which permitted a maximum pension payment.415 After the Cabinet 
rejected a national superannuation scheme in 1971, the Treasurer Billy Snedden 
announced in 1972 that if re-elected, the McMahon government would abolish the 
means test over a three-year period and that it would hold an inquiry into national 
superannuation.416 In December 1972, the Whitlam Labor government came to power 
with a commitment to abolishing the pension means test by means of a national 
superannuation scheme.  
However welfare groups were not in favour of abolishing the means test. The 
Brotherhood of St. Laurence favoured its retention and an increased Age Pension 
equivalent to 40 to 45 per cent of average weekly earnings. Rather than financing the 
scheme through employers and employees, the Brotherhood regarded taxation as the 
most equitable form of finance.417 Likewise, the Australian Council of Social Service 
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(ACOSS), established in 1956, favoured retention of the pension means test because of 
a concern with income redistribution.418 While being predisposed to a universal 
superannuation scheme, ACOSS was concerned as to how such a scheme would be 
consistent with meeting adequately the needs of those on the lowest incomes. 
Some observers noted that the abolition of the means test was potentially a move by 
both sides of politics towards the swinging voter. Sydney University economist Hugh 
Pritchard argued that universalism was certainly a move by the Labor Party away 
from paying pensions only to the poorest in society.419 He also observed that the 
prime pressure which led to the Labor Party removing the means test was from 
“retired or about to retire people in the middle classes who are excluded by the 
means test from the pension.”420 A journalist with a keen eye for the politics of 
pension policy wrote in the Canberra Times in 1972: 
The whole question of superannuation and the means test mainly affects the 
middle class and is a ‘natural’ Liberal Party issue. Over the years many Liberal 
back-benchers have taken a strong stand against the means test and tried to 
persuade their own Government to do something about abolishing it…But the 
Labor Party stole the issue a few years ago, and under Mr Whitlam has sought 
middle-class votes from it.421 
Whatever the motives of Whitlam and his government in moving towards welfare 
universalism, in the longer history of the ALP the approach would be an aberration.  
 
The international influences over national superannuation 
 
If the greatest practical impetus toward social insurance after the war was containing 
inflation, the greatest intellectual influence was the social insurance pensions being 
devised overseas. Robin Blackburn writes that by the early 1970s, there seemed to be 
a “movement in all advanced countries towards…programmes that would eventually 
cover all the costs of education, health and retirement.”422 This movement towards 
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social insurance was pronounced in Europe, where “[M]any employer pension 
plans…failed to survive the war and were largely displaced by public social insurance 
pensions or quasi-public arrangements negotiated at the national level by the 
representatives of management and labor and reinforced as a matter of law by the 
state.”423  
This section of the chapter focuses on the post-war influence of progressive 
intellectuals and policymakers on their Australian counterparts, leading to the 
Whitlam government proposing a scheme of national superannuation on its election 
in 1972.424 A range of international influences were at work in the lead-up to the 
Whitlam Government’s Hancock Inquiry, but the influence of the British on Australian 
policymakers at this time was pronounced. The Attlee Labour government, elected in 
1945, legislated the key pillars of national insurance, including the National Health 
Service.  
In 1969 a scheme of national superannuation was proposed by British Labour MP 
Richard Crossman. The scheme was based on the research carried out by a group of 
academics including Richard Titmuss, Brian Abel-Smith and Peter Townsend from the 
London School of Economics.425 Britain had a means-tested public pension system 
that provided only the most basic support to the aged. In the late 1960s, approximately 
30 per cent of British pensioners were reliant on supplementary benefits in addition 
to their basic state pension, a predicament that led to a reconsideration of the pension. 
The objective of the Crossman scheme was income adequacy for pensioners, a break 
from the notion of subsistence in old age.426  
Under the proposed British scheme of national superannuation, all working 
individuals would make an annual contribution of 6.75 per cent of their earnings; 4.75 
per cent would go to national superannuation, and 2 per cent to a national social 
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insurance fund.427 Employers would be required to pay a matching contribution of 6.75 
per cent from their payroll, so that employer and employee contributions would be the 
same. The government would provide around 18 per cent of the combined national 
insurance contributions of employees and employers.428 The scheme also provided for 
pension portability, and superannuation payable to women. Low-income earners 
would not be required to make superannuation contributions but could do so 
voluntarily. 
The level of pensions under the Crossman scheme would equate to approximately 42.5 
per cent of pre-retirement income for individuals and 55 per cent for married couples, 
adjusted for price rises every two years. Not only would the new scheme lift the living 
standards of the aged, it would also provide vertical redistribution across incomes. 
Titmuss acknowledged the socialist criticisms of earnings-related schemes like that in 
Germany because of their potential to “endorse and even enhance the inequalities of 
working life.”429 This objection to the contributory principle also formed part of the 
Australian Labor Party’s historical opposition to such a scheme.   
The Australian economist Richard Downing was a key figure in the transfer of British 
ideas to Australian policymakers, influencing the ALP to adopt its initial commitment 
to national superannuation in 1969.430 In an interview for this thesis, Race Mathews 
cited the influence of the British “two-tier pension system” on the decision to hold a 
public inquiry on national superannuation.431 The chair of the National 
Superannuation Committee of Inquiry, Keith Hancock, observed that it was the 
advocacy of economist Richard Downing, whose positions had been strongly 
influenced by the British, that led to Whitlam adopting superannuation on the ALP’s 
platform, and holding the Hancock Inquiry.432 The observations of Mathews and 
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Hancock are supported in primary archival material, including in the discussions of 
Richard Downing’s superannuation proposals in ALP records.433  
In 1962 the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research (the 
Melbourne Institute) was established by Downing, then professor of economics at the 
University of Melbourne, with Cambridge academic Ronald Henderson as its founding 
director. Downing held various government and academic positions over the course of 
his career, notably the Ritchie research Chair of Economics  at the University of 
Melbourne, from 1954 until his death in 1975. Influenced by the work of John Maynard 
Keynes and later of William Beveridge, Downing was motivated by the redistributive 
possibilities of economics. The “Melbourne Survey” conducted by the Institute was 
Australia’s first major study of poverty, and the Institute led academic work on this 
subject and on welfare in the 1960s and 1970s. Academics at the Melbourne Institute 
would also develop the proposal for a national compulsory health scheme that would 
ultimately become Medibank.434 Downing provided much of the intellectual force 
behind the Whitlam government’s proposal for a national superannuation scheme; 
Henderson led the Whitlam government’s inquiry on poverty, an inquiry that had 
commenced under Liberal Prime Minister, William McMahon.435   
Downing began advocating for higher pensions in Australia in the 1950s. After periods 
working for the International Labour Organization and again in Canberra on post-war 
national income accounting, Downing “revived an earlier phase of social concern” in 
the late 1950s: he “turned first to the position of the elderly, and their right to adequate 
support.”436 Originally Downing argued in favour of higher pensions financed from 
general revenue rather than retirement benefits from contributions. He considered it 
“perfectly possible, especially if benefits are connected to those who prove need under 
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a means test, to pay adequate rates (of pensions) out of consolidated revenue.”437 
Those who wanted a benefit greater than the pension rate should provide for it through 
private superannuation schemes or other private savings. He was opposed to a 
contributory pension system because benefits were proportional to income, rather 
than progressive, and suggested the government levy a “tax for (retirement savings) 
investment.”438  
By the mid-1960s, having spent a year abroad reflecting on the problem of old-age 
poverty, Downing said he accepted he was getting nowhere on increased pensions 
through general taxation financing.439 He “took note of the obvious world-swing to 
impressively generous schemes of national superannuation” and worked on the details 
of a scheme for Australia. The superannuation proposal that Downing put forward in 
a 1968 article in the journal Economic Review was a national superannuation pension, 
consisting of a government pension and an earnings-related contribution – a “two-
pillar” system. Contributions from taxpayers at any one point in time would provide 
the funds for payment of pensions at that time.440 The pension element would be 
adjusted upwards or downwards depending on a person’s past earnings; as past 
earnings increased, the proportion of the total pension represented by the Government 
pension decreased and the proportion represented by the contributory pension 
increased.441  
The total retirement benefits a person could receive would be capped at one-third 
above average earnings. The scheme contemplated an increase to the payment for 
single pensioners and contributions to the scheme would not be required of those 
earning under $25 per week.442 Retirement benefits would be taxed progressively. 
Downing acknowledged that his proposal entailed a higher overall level of taxation 
than the existing 24 per cent of GDP but did not see that higher level as an impediment 
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to growth, having regard to the higher growth rates of more highly taxed countries in 
Scandinavia and Western Europe.443  
Pensions, poverty and post-war prosperity 
 
Downing had evidently detected the anxieties of the Australian middle class and 
increasingly affluent workers about their financial security, during working life and in 
periods when lack of income featured. A supplemented pension would mean that a 
generally comfortable living standard would be obtainable by all.444 In effect, the 
standard of “comfort” was some fraction of the one achieved during working life, a 
significant departure from the Australian idea of pensions being merely protection 
against poverty.  Downing’s biographer, Nicholas Brown, writes: 
The middle class had bulked steadily larger in his thinking throughout the 
1960s: its ‘unhappy’ materialism; its evasiveness when it came to taxation; 
its effectiveness as a pressure group in distorting the allocation of wealth. 
But some kind of truce or reconciliation seemed necessary … Reluctantly, 
in early 1968 he reworked the proposals for a national superannuation 
system he had presented a decade earlier, making a candid shift from the 
‘duty’ of redistribution to the need to sustain relativities of status and 
opportunity into retirement.445  
Downing’s 1968 proposal formed the basis of the Labor Party’s commitment to 
national superannuation in its 1969 policy platform, focusing on maintenance of living 
standards in retirement. This motivation is reflected in Whitlam’s advocacy of 
superannuation at the time. In 1969, as Opposition Leader, Whitlam pointed to 
Britain, New Zealand, Canada, Ireland and Sweden as places where income-related 
pensions meant that citizens were “not faced upon retirement with a traumatic 
reduction in their living standards.”446 This focus on the maintenance of living 
standards would continue through the 1970s, itself a risk during a time of high 
inflation. At a lecture in 1974, Downing said he hoped that as people became richer 
and more secure in their current (working) living standards, they would begin to get 
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“more sophisticated about the advantages of providing adequately against the various 
contingencies which threaten the maintenance of those standards.”447  
Downing conceived of state-based superannuation as a universal right and a matter of 
human dignity, part of a shift in welfare policy towards maintaining quality of life. 
Writing in the Canberra Times in 1971, he argued that “What is wrong with the 
[pension] system is that it confines itself to a target of removing absolute, stark and 
austerely defined poverty. It bothers itself not at all with human dignity.”448 Downing 
did not believe that instituting national superannuation was revolutionary, noting that 
conservative governments in Western Europe had such schemes. It was, however, 
intended to “bring Australian realities a bit nearer to what are now only its myths – its 
myths of equality and the fair go.”449 It became accepted that the Age Pension should 
deliver some standard of living above poverty.450 With their pension payment, people 
should be able to cover the costs of necessities and have some money left over to spend 
on things such as socialising and leisure.  
The 1970s were a time of ferment about Australian living standards and adequacy of 
income, inflamed by economic deterioration. Productivity levels had slowed 
worldwide.451 Inflation levels at home were rising rapidly, from 5 per cent in 1972 to 
15 per cent in 1975, following the oil crisis at the end of 1973.452 Prolonged full 
employment was straining wage restraint. Inflation ate into all incomes but had a 
particularly pernicious effect on those with fixed incomes such as old age pensioners. 
According to a consumer survey in 1977, inflation was “the nation’s number one 
concern.”453 The media in the 1970s was awash with articles about the problem of 
inflation, with headlines such as “Pensions lag in inflation” and ‘‘Canberra steps up 
inflation fight” typical.454 Figure 3 is a cartoon of Gough Whitlam dressed in armour 
and carrying a knife, in front of a two-headed inflation monster, while Bob Hawke, 
head of the ACTU, is seen feeding the monster from a “national wage” bowl.  
                                                             
447 Richard Downing, “Social Reconstruction, Social Welfare and Self-Reliance,” the George Judah 
Cohen Memorial Lecture, 21 November 1974, University of Sydney, Sydney, p.28. 
448 Richard Downing, “National Superannuation and Human Dignity,” Canberra Times, 22 April 1971. 
449 Downing, “National Superannuation,” p.15. 
450 See, for example, B Hughes, “Growing old with dignity,” The Australian, 11 December 1974. 
451 Ian McLean, Why Australia Prospered (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
2014), p.214. 
452 ABS, 70 Years of Inflation in Australia (Canberra: ABS, 2018). 
453 V Caruso, “‘Inflation stays as No 1 problem – survey,” The Australian, 1 June 1977.   
454 Michelle Grattan, “Pensions Lag Inflation,” The Age, 20 July 1974; Michelle Grattan, “Canberra Steps 
Up Inflation Fight,” The Age, 10 February 1976, Noel Butlin Archives N58 Box 2144. 
119 
 
Figure 3: cartoon of Gough Whitlam and Bob Hawke 
 
Source: Pickering 
 
Comprehensive national poverty statistics were not available at the start of the 1970s, 
but one estimate based on a Melbourne Institute survey was that 15.2 per cent of the 
aged were living in poverty.455 Income, housing costs, assets and help received from 
families and other sources were taken into account in making the poverty classification 
for the aged.456 Even with home ownership being taken into account, the same survey 
found just below 9 per cent of the aged were in poverty.  
The Age Pension had been rising in real terms, but there were concerns about it not 
keeping pace with earnings.457  In 1950–51, the single Age Pension was worth 21.6 
per cent of Male Average Weekly Earnings (MAWE); by 1970–71, it was worth 18.4 
per cent of MAWE.458 Key elements of the social security system were coming into 
question, in particular whether it was adequately countering poverty, its effects on 
incentives to work and save, and its exclusion of some groups at risk of hardship.459 
After two decades of relative post-war stability, debate flourished on those who had 
been poorly served by the (male) “wage earners’ welfare state” including, among 
others, the elderly on fixed incomes.460  
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This was a pivotal period for the Australian welfare state. New ideas were emerging 
about the role of welfare and the standard of living that welfare should protect. On the 
one hand, the nation’s “long boom” was coming to an end, with its attendant pressures 
on government to rein in spending. Yet, the boom had created private prosperity. The 
relative wealth of Australians at this time showed that they enjoyed a standard of living 
that was not open to their forebears. This was reflected in high levels of home 
ownership: 52.6 per cent of the population owned a home in 1947; by 1961 some 70.2 
per cent of households were owner-occupiers. Consumer culture was fuelled by home 
ownership, the prospect of having a house full of the latest household appliances, and 
a new car in the driveway.461  
New levels of private wealth created new expectations of how people would age. 
Australia’s highly targeted old age pension system that provided modest benefits 
would mean a significant drop in living standards for the new middle class, if it was 
their sole source of income; that is, unless old age welfare was expanded in some way. 
In 1972, the McMahon government liberalised the pension means test to increase the 
level of exempt income and make superannuation pensions and annuities 
concessional.462 Expectations about standards of living were also among the triggers 
for government to develop a pension system that would provide a standard more akin 
to that which people had grown accustomed to during their working lives.463  
Stuart Macintyre has observed the unfortunate collision of the Whitlam 
Government’s embrace of welfare universalism with the collapse of the economic 
conditions which might have made that role possible. The crisis in the global 
monetary system and slower growth in Australia were factors in the abandonment of 
Keynesianism and the adoption of deflationary measures.464 Race Mathews recalled 
that “the times were more expansive” before the oil shock of 1973.465 The Labor Party 
Spokesman on Health and Welfare, Bill Hayden, remarked in 1971 that “the 
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Australian Labor Party believes that welfare benefits and services go beyond merely 
providing minimal sustenance.”466  
The Whitlam government’s Hancock Inquiry and the question of a 
national superannuation scheme  
 
This section of the chapter examines the Hancock Inquiry and its findings as an 
example of attempted policy change that was ultimately unsuccessful.467 It argues that 
the fact the report of the Hancock Inquiry was handed down under another 
government is only a partial explanation for why national superannuation was not 
introduced, despite this being the most common reason cited in existing literature.468  
The Hancock Inquiry was charged with recommending a model of national 
superannuation to the government. It was to examine and report on overseas and 
Australian proposals for national superannuation; existing overseas schemes; the 
relevance of overseas proposals and existing schemes to Australian needs; the 
implications of these for the Australian setting; and to make recommendations to the 
government on a suitable national superannuation scheme.469 In undertaking its 
inquiry, the Committee was instructed to have regard to the Whitlam government’s 
objective of abolishing the pension means test and increasing the basic rate of the age 
pension to 25 per cent of MAWE.470  
The Hancock Inquiry comprised three men: Keith Hancock as Chair, J.B. Wright, a 
bank official from the Reserve Bank of Australia; and actuary K.J. Hedley. Keith 
Hancock was an economist from Flinders University, Adelaide. Wright resigned from 
the Committee in August 1973, when he realised it was “not really an ‘inquiry’ but only 
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one of many bodies designed to create a grand complex of socialist institutions.”471 He 
resigned as an adviser to the Governor of the Reserve Bank for the same reason. Wright 
was replaced with R.G. McCrossin, general manager of the Australian Development 
Bank. The clear differences of opinion between Wright and the other members of the 
Hancock Inquiry were not remedied by the appointment of Hedley, who ended up 
writing a minority opinion that departed from that of Hancock and McCrossin. Both 
the Hancock Inquiry’s Interim Report and its Final Report contained majority and 
minority recommendations.  
 
In an early discussion paper, Hancock set out certain assumptions for the proposed 
scheme: 
1. The National Superannuation Scheme will contain a contributory element. 
2. Benefits will bear some relation to contributions. 
3. Notwithstanding (2), the Government will subsidize the scheme to ensure a 
minimum benefit of 25 per cent of average weekly earnings for persons who 
retire at 65. 
4. All benefits will be adjusted for movements in average weekly earnings.472 
These assumptions envisaged a typical social insurance model in the European mould, 
especially with respect to benefits, which would bear some relation to contributions 
(points 1 and 2). The proposed scheme had a “progressive character in relation to 
incomes” because contributions would be required only of those people whose income 
from all sources was above 25 per cent of average weekly earnings.473 Individuals 
would pay compulsory contributions at a rate of 5 per cent on the amount earned above 
the threshold.  
Three approaches were considered by the Committee in its 1974 Interim Report: a flat-
rate superannuation benefit; an earnings-related benefit; and a flat-rate benefit with 
an earnings-related supplement. It proposed that a flat-rate scheme and a contributory 
scheme be the two options for further consideration. One of the Committee’s key 
concerns was the way any new superannuation scheme would interact with the 
existing private occupational superannuation schemes.474 A range of government tax 
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concessions and exemptions existed to give employees and employers an incentive to 
participate in occupational schemes. The Committee estimated that occupational 
superannuation was spread among only 35 per cent of the labour force, and within that 
35 per cent “the people who benefit most from the provision of government incentives 
are those with higher incomes.”475 This reflects one of the drivers of the reform effort, 
to make superannuation available to all workers rather than simply the privileged 
minority. 
 
The Hancock Inquiry’s Interim Report considered earlier, unsuccessful, Australian 
proposals for national superannuation, and the reasons they were not implemented. 
The Committee described the first national proposals by the Bruce and Lyons 
Governments, in 1923 and 1938, as having been “overtaken by unfavourable economic 
circumstances – first depression and then war.”476 The Committee also noted that the 
Labor Party criticised the Lyons scheme for its reliance on contributory financing and 
the failure of the scheme to make provision for the self-employed and dependants of 
insured persons.477  
The Final Report of the Hancock Inquiry and its Recommendations 
 
Like the Interim Report, the final report of the Hancock Inquiry had a two-person 
majority and a one-person minority report. It was divided into two parts: the first 
being a report on the question of National Superannuation (1976) and the second on 
the issue of Occupational Superannuation (1977).  
Hancock and McCrossin for the majority recommended a two-tier scheme comprising: 
1. a universal pension, equal to about 25 per cent of MAWE, payable to all 
residents aged 65 and over; and  
2. a purchased superannuation pension based on a person’s contributions.  
The aim was for all people aged over 65 to have a total pension (1. and 2.) equivalent 
to 30 per cent of MAWE. Individuals whose combined pension produced less than 30 
per cent MAWE would have their pensions supplemented by the government. 
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Pensions would be indexed quarterly by a Pensions Adjustment Index proportionate 
to MAWE.  
The proposed scheme was costly, and this was a factor operating against its 
introduction. Cost was a key reason that Hedley cited for his dissenting report.478 The 
national superannuation scheme would be financed by a 5 per cent levy on incomes 
above 30 per cent MAWE, for individuals aged between 19 and 63. However these 
contributions would only finance around 42 per cent of the scheme, declining over 
time.479  
The majority of the Committee noted the difficulty associated with deciding on the 
right level of pension income, arguing that 
any attempt to prescribe a minimum standard must, in the final analysis, reflect 
a subjective judgment of adequacy. We make no pretense that our 
recommendation of a minimum pension equal to about 30 per cent of AWE can 
be supported by reference to objective criteria. In our view, there are no such 
criteria.480  
Hedley’s minority report recommended a non-contributory flat-rate universal 
pension, a means-tested supplement and the encouragement of voluntary savings 
through expanding existing private superannuation schemes. Along with his criticism 
of the additional tax impost in the majority’s proposed scheme, he saw a difficulty in 
integrating national superannuation with existing private schemes. In particular, there 
would be a likelihood that employees would cease to contribute to private schemes. 
This would, Hedley argued, open the way up for schemes to be initiated through 
“trades union settlements,” a prospect “not as attractive as first appears and many 
would regard it as appalling from an overall community point of view.”481  
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National superannuation and occupational superannuation schemes  
 
Occupational pension plans in Australia continued largely uninterrupted during 
World War II, and developed what Steven Sass has called, “a symbiotic relationship 
with government pension programs, tax regimes, and industrial relations 
initiatives.”482 The post-war period saw an expansion in private occupational 
superannuation schemes, as “[s]hortages of labour in the prolonged period of 
economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s, and the need for management staff and 
skilled labour, encouraged employers to provide superannuation as a tax-advantaged 
incentive to attract and retain employees.”483 Lack of pension “portability” between 
jobs, the widespread use of lump-sum payments instead of pensions, and potential 
loss of value of pension payments due to inflation were key issues in the relationship 
between a national superannuation scheme and occupational superannuation.484 
Occupational superannuation coverage continued to be linked with firm size. As 
Nikola Balnave has documented, surveys conducted by the Commonwealth Bureau of 
Census and Statistics in 1955–56 and 1960–61 showed a correlation between business 
size and superannuation.485 They also indicated the growth in popularity of private 
superannuation schemes in the post-War period.486 The ABS survey of 
superannuation conducted for the Hancock Inquiry showed that 72 per cent of public 
servants had superannuation, the highest coverage of any industry. The highest 
coverage by occupation was miners and quarrymen (62 per cent), followed by 
professional and technical (47 per cent) and administrative, executive and managerial 
(47 per cent).487 It is estimated that between 50,000 and 55,000 superannuation 
schemes were in operation in Australia, with the “great majority” being small schemes 
with fewer than ten members.488 Survey work conducted by the Association of 
Superannuation and Provident Funds of Australia (ASPFA), established in 1963, found 
that many employers of small numbers of “blue-collar” staff made little or no provision 
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for their superannuation, whereas it was “more than likely” that they would have made 
provision for their “white-collar” staff.489 In addition, the highly concessional tax on 
superannuation lump sums, unchanged since 1915, meant that lump-sum benefits 
“maintained their popularity compared to pensions.”490 
The Final Report of the Hancock Inquiry contained a second part, dealing with 
occupational superannuation (1977), with majority and minority sections. The 
majority saw that occupational superannuation would continue, but that on the basis 
of there being a national superannuation scheme, limits should be placed on tax-
advantaged occupational funds. An occupational superannuation benefit, which, when 
added to the person’s national superannuation pension, exceeded this standard, would 
be “overprovision.”491 Setting the standard for 75 per cent of a person’s pre-retirement 
wages, the majority of the Committee was “influenced by a desire to avoid any 
reasonable allegation of parsimony.”492 Further, the majority argued that occupational 
super lump sums should be limited to a value of nine times final salary. In his minority 
report, Hedley said that no special action was necessary to integrate the flat-rate non-
contributory age pension and occupational superannuation. If a national 
superannuation scheme was adopted, however, “[t]he severe disturbance to individual 
entitlements and expectations accrued and accruing through occupational 
superannuation may make some statutory intervention essential.”493 
In recommending a national superannuation scheme, the majority noted that most 
submissions the NSCI received favoured a non-contributory national scheme. They 
regarded the “preponderance of support for the non-contributory proposal” as coming 
from groups that had “obvious interests” in maintaining  the status quo, “especially 
occupational superannuation.”494 However the majority argued that a national 
superannuation scheme was needed because it was “unrealistic to suppose that 
voluntary occupational superannuation could ever achieve anything approaching a full 
coverage of the labour force.”495 Occupational superannuation was a benefit that some 
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enjoyed, but a national superannuation scheme was required to ensure a decent level 
of income for all. 
The Hancock Inquiry took a contrasting philosophical approach to welfare to that 
taken by the landmark Henderson Inquiry on poverty. It used an approach of 
contributions-based welfare, so that individuals would receive state support based on 
what they themselves could contribute. The Henderson Inquiry disagreed with this 
approach, and instead used the idea of welfare based on need. Ronald Henderson, the 
prominent chair of the Inquiry, argued that the Hancock Inquiry did not really 
consider needs at all, but was preoccupied with the level of contributions to the 
superannuation scheme.496 He acknowledged, however, that the “outdated 
philosophy” that welfare benefits should be “earned” was imposed on the Committee 
in its terms of reference.497   
Superannuation Coverage and Women 
 
The war and post-war period had seen an increase in female employment and women’s 
coverage by occupational superannuation. Prior to this period, it was the norm for 
women to leave any paid employment upon marriage, sacrificing whatever pension 
entitlements they had accrued. Wartime employment of women had seen large firms 
yield to their demands for superannuation, with the Bank of Australasia the last of the 
banks to provide superannuation for women in 1943.498 In 1965 the Superannuation 
Act 1922 was amended to enable married women who were recruited to the 
Commonwealth Public Service to join the Superannuation Fund or the Provident Fund 
and to permit single women who continued as permanent officers after marriage to 
continue as contributors. 
Concerns about the impact of income-based contributory superannuation on women 
were evident in the Interim and Final reports of the Hancock Inquiry. In its Interim 
Report, the majority went so far as to query whether it would not be simpler to break 
the nexus between national superannuation and employment, given the way that the 
employment nexus disadvantaged the self-employed and women outside the paid 
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workforce.499 The majority observed, correctly, that low female participation rates in 
occupational schemes “have much to do with characteristics of superannuation 
schemes which are not overtly discriminatory but do not fit well with the employment 
experience of a high proportion of the female population.”500 The majority of the 
Committee therefore argued that the impact of national superannuation on women 
“must be among the major considerations to be borne in mind in the construction of a 
scheme.”501  
The misgivings expressed by the Committee regarding gender inequities in social 
insurance schemes had found earlier expression. As discussed in Chapter 3, during 
Australia’s Old Age Pension debates in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. It was acknowledged that contributory pension schemes based on wages 
disadvantaged women, because of the time they spent out of the workforce to have 
children and to perform (unpaid) domestic work. As Julie Smith observes, “the first 
social security payments made in Australia were financed from progressive taxation 
and entitlement was not based on prior financial contributions – the design of 
Australia’s 20th-century social security system thus acknowledged women as 
productive citizens who were contributing to building the country’s capital.”502  
Opposing views were presented in evidence to the Committee by women’s advocacy 
organisations about the best way to combat gender discrimination in 
superannuation. The New South Wales division of the Women’s Electoral Lobby 
(WEL), first established in 1972, favoured a flat-rate pension scheme and opposed a 
contributory one. By way of contrast, the South Australian division of WEL 
supported a partially contributory scheme on the basis that it would create more 
revenue than under a flat-rate scheme using general revenue,503 and that a 
contributory scheme would protect against the effects of inflation. It acknowledged 
that this second issue was not female-specific. The Victorian division of WEL 
substantially agreed with South Australia on the basis that a universal pension plus 
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voluntary contributions was the best system for people with interrupted careers. 
Joan Mullet, from WEL Victoria, went on to argue: 
I think the main problem for women in relation to the present superannuation 
scheme is that if they come back into the workforce – say in their thirties or 
forties – it is just so expensive for them to buy into the type of scheme that is 
available to them, and a lot of them don’t choose to do it or can’t. I know in my 
case as a married woman working in a State Government Department that 
until married women were made permanent I couldn’t take it out, anyway, 
and now it is just too expensive to be considered.504  
In response, the majority agreed with the arguments put by WEL South Australia 
and Victoria, in favour of a contributory scheme. It implored those concerned to 
improve the economic and social status of women not to  
fall victims to the illusion that a non-contributory scheme, because it pays 
identical benefits to men and women, contributes more to equality than does 
the partially contributory scheme recommended in this report. The relative 
treatment of men and women must be judged in the context of a scheme as a 
whole (especially the relation between benefits and contributions).505 
The redistributive nature of the national superannuation scheme proposed by the 
majority of the Committee would have primarily benefited women, they argued. As 
the majority of low-income earners, women stood to gain most from the government 
subsidising those whose pension and superannuation supplement did not reach 30 
per cent of MAWE. The other implication was the cost of a redistributive scheme, 
which the Committee did not resolve. John Hedley, in the minority, argued that 
women with low earnings histories would be disadvantaged because they would 
receive only half the benefit from such contributions as they were compelled to make. 
This was another argument he used in favour of retaining a flat-rate, non-
contributory pension with an additional supplement based on needs.506 
The majority of the Committee also recognised that “the problem of protecting 
superannuation rights is linked to wider questions pertaining to maternity leave and 
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rights of re-employment,” but these were beyond the remit of the inquiry.507 The 
majority recommended against the apportionment of spousal contributions to 
women but did say that employers should be encouraged to preserve the benefits of 
women leaving the workforce who returned to the same employer. It was careful to 
clarify that this did not mean that superannuation should be paid during absences 
from the workforce, like maternity leave.508  
Labour movement views of national superannuation 
  
National superannuation had minimal political or public support in the 1970s. This is 
reflected in the appearances before the Hancock Inquiry, which demonstrate mixed 
sentiments towards a national scheme. While the unions and the labour movement 
were not antagonistic towards superannuation at the time, the idea of 
superannuation was clearly distinguishable from the industrial relations issue it 
would become. The Labor Party first adopted national superannuation on its policy 
platform in 1969,509 and the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) first 
committed to the introduction of national superannuation in 1975.510   
Mees and Brigden note that it was not until the late 1970s that superannuation was a 
significant industrial issue. Some union schemes were created beforehand, such as 
the Stevedoring Employees Retirement Fund (SERF), a co-funded pension founded 
in 1967 by maritime unions and employers.511 Mees observes that some industrial 
pension schemes had been won in the 1950s and 1960s, but they were “limited 
mostly to public-sector workers and the head office staff of the larger private-sector 
employers.”512 In part, this is attributable to superannuation not being an industrial 
issue legally. In the 1952 case of Hamilton Knight, the High Court had ruled that the 
capacity for unions to secure award protection for pensions fell outside of what could 
be defined as an “industrial matter.”513 The majority of the Hancock Committee also 
noted that there were “few schemes conducted by trade unions or associations of 
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employers,”514 and that “in future, trade unions may more commonly than hitherto 
articulate the aspirations of employees for superannuation coverage and may need to 
be involved in the design of schemes.”515  
Evidence given to the Inquiry by the ACTU Secretary, Harold Souter, would appear 
to confirm that the union movement was not mobilised around the issue of national 
superannuation in the 1970s. He told the Inquiry that there was “quite a divergence 
of opinion throughout the movement” about superannuation, and it was a matter 
that had not been the subject of a full debate.516 Souter acknowledged that the 
movement had been “strongly opposed to the compulsory superannuation 
contributory scheme” in 1938, but at the same time reflected that it was “probably 
anomalous that Australia is one of the most forward nations … in industrial relations, 
and the movement has not attempted to come to grips with this matter.”517 
Constrained by the absence of a clear ACTU position on the issue, Souter guessed 
that the union movement would press for superannuation in the form of a universal 
flat-rate benefit payable from general revenue, with optional additional 
superannuation paid for by the workers themselves.518 This was a position closer to 
Hedley’s proposed scheme. 
In what was to prove a prescient observation by Hancock during Souter’s appearance, 
he noted that some unions had criticised the employer control of superannuation 
funds and that the unions themselves could “get into the business of organising 
industry superannuation schemes,” putting pressure on employers to contribute 
industry-wide schemes rather than maintain firm-specific ones.519 One observant life 
insurer noted that it was “interesting” that while in the past Australian unions had 
opposed a scheme of superannuation that involved contributions from employees, this 
objection had not been raised during the Hancock Inquiry.520  
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Employers supported a flat-rate national superannuation scheme but disagreed with 
the ACTU that they should have to make contributions.521 Hancock recalls that unions 
did not have much to say about superannuation, but that the actuaries did. He also 
recalls that those in the life insurance business especially opposed the idea of doing 
anything more than improving the age pension.522 On release of the final report, the 
Life Offices’ Association characterised Hedley’s minority report as most feasible, 
whereas the majority report would “almost certainly” lead to a switch to a non-
contributory basis for most existing superannuation plans.523 In a prescient article 
about future issues in superannuation policy, the Canberra Times called the Hancock 
Inquiry a “serious disappointment” because of its avoidance of the “big issues” such as 
superannuation “portability” – the ability to carry one’s superannuation entitlements 
from job to job.524  
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has examined the development of superannuation policy between 1939 
and 1976. The National Welfare Fund did not introduce contributory social insurance 
financing but it showed the preparedness of the ALP to shift its rhetoric at least in a 
context of high inflation. The same pragmatism would be demonstrated by the Party 
in the late 1970s and 1980s: managing inflation was also the critical force behind the 
government-union Accord and the basis of the universal superannuation scheme 
introduced by the Labor Party, discussed in Chapter Six. Kewley has argued that “the 
change in Labour [sic] Party policy represented by the new financial approach should 
not be exaggerated.”525 In the longer timeframe of this thesis, the change of position 
becomes more significant. The seeds of a Labor national superannuation policy were 
sown during World War II and the decades that followed. 
Globally, the post-war decades saw a movement towards social insurance and pension 
universalism. Currents of thought on pension design flowed between British 
intellectuals and policy makers, and their Australian counterparts. The issue of 
pension adequacy became central, with liberal welfare states such as Britain and 
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Australia seeking to supplement the basic state pension. This chapter has focused on 
the policies and transfer of ideas as they influenced Labor Party policy, leading up to 
the election of the Whitlam government in 1972 with its commitment to introducing a 
national superannuation scheme.  
Finally, the chapter examined the scheme of national superannuation proposed by the 
Hancock Inquiry. On the face of it, the primary reason the scheme was not 
implemented was because the report was handed to another government, one which 
was not committed to national superannuation (see Chapter 5). By the time the 
Hancock Inquiry’s reports were handed down in 1976 and 1977, a new conservative 
government under Malcolm Fraser was in power. The government rejected the 
Hancock Inquiry’s proposals and established its own Commonwealth Task Force on 
Occupational Superannuation to consider the role of occupational superannuation in 
providing for retirement and whether there was a need to revise or impose new 
standards for schemes. As Hedley surmised,  
the completion of … this report may have been made easier had a firm decision 
first been made as to the form of national superannuation to be adopted in 
Australia and were it clear that the decision had such wide support that reversal 
was unlikely after a subsequent Federal election.526 
However, the reasons why the scheme of national superannuation recommended by 
the Hancock Inquiry was not implemented were more complex than a change of 
government alone. There were issues that bedevilled the proposal that went beyond 
party politics. It is questionable that any government would have expended political 
capital to introduce a costly scheme that did not enjoy wide support. Moreover, there 
were various other inquiries and reviews competing for government attention. The 
post-War decades were a period of flux about the role of the state in maintaining 
incomes, as reflected in the “needs based” approach of the Henderson Poverty Inquiry 
and the “contributions” approach of the Hancock Inquiry. Race Mathews recalls that, 
“because of the immense amount of time and energy that went into Medibank (health 
insurance) the national superannuation thing doesn’t really figure very 
prominently…it was universal health care we were really on about, not universal 
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retirement.”527 National superannuation was “one of those grand ideas in the Whitlam 
mould” but without adequate currency to have any real momentum.528  
There was an absence of broader community support for the major change to pension 
policy that superannuation represented. Some unions were successful in winning 
superannuation rights in the post-War decades, but there was ambivalence towards a 
national superannuation scheme. Vested interests in private superannuation among 
actuaries and the insurance sector also acted against a national superannuation 
scheme. By the time of the Hancock Inquiry, the existing system of occupational 
superannuation covered around 30 per cent of the working population.  
By the end of the Whitlam government, Australia had a new health insurance scheme 
but not a national superannuation scheme. Despite a post-War push towards 
increasing pensions and towards the concept of “income maintenance” in retirement, 
the idea was still elusive. The next chapter looks at the treatment of superannuation 
policy during the term of the Fraser Government, 1975 to 1983, arguing that this was 
when superannuation split off from being a social security policy, as it had remained 
during the Whitlam era, and was cemented as an industrial issue.   
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Chapter Five: A new pathway of superannuation policy 
 
The term of the Fraser Government, 1975 to 1983, appears to be a period in which 
Australian superannuation policy stagnated. Prima facie, all that happened was that 
the Hancock Inquiry was handed down and rejected by government. As former Labor 
leader Bill Hayden puts it, “national superannuation fell off the radar during the 
Fraser years.”529 For the purposes of the institutional analysis in this thesis, however, 
the apparent lack of superannuation policy development in the late 1970s and early 
1980s masks the fact that a new pathway began to emerge at this time: occupational 
superannuation instead of national superannuation as the basis for policy 
development. There is evidence of this new pathway in the positions taken by 
government, but the seeds of policy change lay in the institutions outside of it. The 
modern superannuation system established during the critical juncture of the 1980s 
became possible through the rejection of superannuation as a form of contributory 
social insurance and this process commenced in the 1970s. 
A dwindling momentum behind national superannuation led directly to the 
emergence of union campaigns for occupational superannuation as a workplace 
right. Following a dispute over the right to superannuation entitlements in the retail 
industry, the first “industry” superannuation fund was established in 1978, initiating 
a new pathway for superannuation policy to be based on an occupational model. 
There was a clear choice for the unions between national superannuation on the one 
hand, and broader coverage of occupational superannuation on the other. Politics 
had closed off the path of national superannuation, with Labor out of government. 
Union leaders were fortified in their efforts to pursue occupational superannuation 
rights by economic conditions, emergent ideas about how to manage inflation 
through wages policy, and the prospects of an ageing demography. Despite official 
polices still supporting national superannuation, the union movement perceived the 
opportunities in pursing broader occupational superannuation coverage. This would 
be the same model that the Hawke and Keating Governments followed, examined in 
Chapter 6.  
The path of national superannuation not taken also embedded the existing institutions 
of old age welfare. Occupational superannuation would also begin to be reconceived 
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by the labour movement, creating the basis for incremental change to superannuation 
policy, discussed in Chapter 6. Together with the idea of broader coverage, union 
leaders introduced new concepts into occupational superannuation to combat its 
inequities. Superannuation would “vest” in the individual worker. There would be 
“portability” of superannuation between funds, meaning that workers would be able 
keep their superannuation savings when they changed jobs. These new principles of 
occupational superannuation had particular benefit for women, who often left a 
workplace after having children, either not returning to paid work or moving to a 
different workplace afterwards. An old institution was being renewed, crowding out 
the future policy space for national superannuation. A future implication was that 
occupational superannuation also set the pathway for a contributory, private system 
of superannuation with associated risk for individuals.   
The chapter uses three narratives to make its argument. Firstly, it examines the 
rejection of national superannuation proposed by the Hancock Inquiry. It discusses 
why different institutions of government rejected the proposal for national 
superannuation to demonstrate that at the level of government, there was already 
some appetite to pursue occupational superannuation as the basis of national policy.  
Secondly, the chapter examines the industrial activity around occupational 
superannuation, including the dispute between supermarket chain Woolworths and 
the FSPU in 1978.530 The Woolworths dispute is used as an example of how industrial 
disputes elevated superannuation in national policy debates, and specifically the 
model of occupational superannuation. By the start of the 1980s, superannuation 
policy was being recast as an industrial issue.531 Mees and Brigden argue that the 
successes of the industrial campaigns for industry-based superannuation in the 
1970s spread superannuation to new groups of workers, albeit in a fragmented 
way.532 As Stebbing writes, union campaigns for occupational super in the mid-1970s 
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“paved the way for later transformations of occupational superannuation.”533 
Thirdly, it examines the Labor Party’s position on superannuation in Opposition.  
National superannuation: few friends in government 
 
Hancock was more or less friendless by the time it was considered by Cabinet.534 
 
The report of the Hancock Inquiry and other proposals for national superannuation 
were considered in a range of government fora between 1976 and 1983. The 
governmental bodies looking at national superannuation proposals included 
committees, departmental groups and interdepartmental bodies. This section 
analyses the proposals that government considered, revealing that the integration of 
a contributory national superannuation scheme with existing occupational schemes, 
combined with the cost of a national scheme, proved to be insurmountable obstacles. 
The examination of these proposals should not give the impression that this period 
was one of considerable government activity on the question of superannuation. 
Indeed Fred Chaney, Minister for Social Security between 1980 and 1983, recalled in 
his interview for this thesis that superannuation did not figure as an issue during the 
time he was responsible for the social security portfolio.535 Rather, the purpose is to 
show the emphasis of policy was shifting away from national superannuation and 
towards occupational superannuation. 
The official government rejection of the scheme proposed by the majority of the 
Hancock Inquiry was delivered by press statement of Treasurer John Howard on 12 
July 1979. Howard cited cost as the main reason for the government’s decision. The 
scheme of national superannuation would “involve additional tax on personal 
income, imposing a heavy burden on middle- and lower-income workers.”536 The 
government’s rhetoric around avoiding additional tax was not borne out in reality, 
however, with federal taxation receipts increasing during the term of the Fraser 
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Government from 22.5 per cent of GDP in 1975–1976 to 24 per cent in 1982–3.537 
The government had, however, introduced a new unfunded Commonwealth 
Superannuation Scheme in 1976 (CSS) that combined the Pension Scheme and the 
Provident Account set up under the Superannuation Act 1922 together to benefit 
new public service employees.538 Forecast public spending on the new CSS, net of 
employee contributions, was expected to increase from $454 million 1981–2 to $6.7 
billion in 2051–2.539 This demonstrates the continuing policy distinction between 
superannuation “for all” and the costly, defined benefit system enjoyed by the public 
service.  
The government’s decision to continue to pursue occupational superannuation policy 
while dispensing with national superannuation was influenced by the difficulty of 
integrating the institutions. In his dissenting report on the question of national 
superannuation, Hedley pointed to the difficulty of integrating a new government 
scheme with the existing institutions of old age welfare. He argued that there should 
be “reasonable continuity in the basic principles of social security administration,” 
and that it was one thing to propose a national superannuation scheme in isolation, 
but it was “much more difficult to integrate devised schemes, to make them 
compatible and consistent and to form these into a coherent social welfare whole.”540 
National superannuation was rejected, but occupational superannuation was kept on 
the agenda. In 1979 the government established the Commonwealth Task Force on 
Occupational Superannuation. The Task Force ran from 1979 until 1983, handing 
down its final report under the Hawke Labor government. It was charged with 
considering the role of occupational superannuation in providing for retirement and 
to determine whether there was a need to revise or impose new standards for 
superannuation schemes.541 The government also asked the Task Force to examine 
the question of union involvement in superannuation, an issue which grew in public 
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prominence during the 1970s.542 The Task Force proposed full vesting of 
contributions, with benefits capable of being “preserved” in the employer’s original 
fund, a new employer fund or in an “approved deposit fund” (ADF) and disclosure 
through mechanisms like annual reporting.543 These recommendations were closer 
to the approach of the union movement, which was also arguing for superannuation 
savings to belong to workers, and to be portable between jobs rather being tied to the 
fund of a particular employer. Remarking on the 1977 social security chapter of the 
federal Labor platform, Senator Doug Grimes – later Minister for Social Security – 
argued that the great fault of the country was that “too many workers have no access 
to a portable superannuation scheme.”544 
The interdepartmental Income Security Review (ISR) confirmed the Fraser 
Government’s view that the national superannuation scheme should not proceed. 
The implication of the ISR’s decision was that “further action was needed to reform 
occupational superannuation schemes.”545 Former public servant Andrew Podger, 
who worked on the ISR, observed that  
while the Fraser Government was never supportive of a government-run, national 
superannuation scheme, I suspect the work of the ISR and the passage of time 
following the Hancock Report contributed to a bipartisan view that there was 
another, better approach to addressing the objective of income maintenance in 
conjunction with the objective of poverty alleviation.546  
Marriott notes that the Fraser Government also rejected the proposed Hancock 
scheme from a philosophical perspective. The compulsory scheme contradicted the 
Government’s position that individuals should be free to adopt the form of 
retirement savings that best suited them. In addition, the provision of a universal 
benefit was not aligned to the Fraser Government’s view of targeting social assistance 
to those most in need.547  
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The Fraser Government was concerned by union involvement in occupational 
superannuation schemes. There was a perception that unions could be engaged in 
superannuation for ulterior purposes, including “obtaining employer contributions 
as a means of circumventing wage indexation” and “involvement in lucrative 
superannuation schemes for reasons that may not be directed at meeting the genuine 
retirement needs of members.”548 These concerns about union control of capital are 
still evident in present-day debates on superannuation, examined in Chapter 7. 
In fact, the government was more concerned about the cost than the incidence of 
taxation under a national superannuation scheme. The Fraser government had come 
to power with a deficit of $3.6 billion.549 Analysis of national accounts and budgets 
by Scotton and Ferber (1980) shows that total government spending was “almost 
totally immobile” after the increases during the Whitlam years, but that there was 
growth in social security and welfare spending in the early Fraser years.550 There was 
an overall increase in spending on the Age Pension, rising by 0.5 per cent of GDP 
between 1975 and 1983.551 However, because of growing numbers of older people 
claiming the Age Pension, the increase in spending did not reflect a real increase in 
the rate of the Age Pension being paid, which fell slightly in real terms.552 This was 
despite the introduction of automatic increases in the Age Pension in 1977. The value 
of the pension was also reduced by the government’s decision in 1978 to freeze the 
rates of the income test-free pension for those aged over 78, a decision taken when 
high levels of inflation ate away at incomes.553  
Both sides of politics were committed to addressing high levels of inflation through 
wage restraint. Wages had risen 26 per cent in 1974–75 under Whitlam. Under 
Fraser, wages increased by 14 per cent between 1979–1980 and 1981–82, the biggest 
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real wage rises since the Whitlam period.554 The Fraser Government passed new 
industrial laws to restrict “inflationary wage agreements” between unions and 
employers.555 The conservative Institute of Public Affairs warned that “nothing else” 
would save the economy other than a 4 per cent ceiling on wage increases for twelve 
months.556 The ACTU, meanwhile, offered the government a pause in wage claims in 
exchange for tax cuts.557  
With the added element of high inflation eating away at stagnant pension levels, the 
conditions were ripe for occupational superannuation to become the focus of policy – 
the Government and Treasury adopted the approach of “fighting inflation first.”558 As 
Shaw notes, Treasury became “intent upon the control of inflation by reducing 
federal government expenditures and reducing welfare payments.”559 This acted 
against the introduction of a costly government scheme of superannuation and, Shaw 
argues, was “the beginning of a sustained attack by the co-ordinating departments of 
federal bureaucracy, particularly Treasury, to corporatise the retirement income 
system.”560  
Other evidence supports the view that the cost of the proposed superannuation 
scheme was central to its rejection by the government. The Social Welfare Policy 
Secretariat within the Department of Social Service (1978–1986) (SWPS) notes that 
the most prohibitive aspect of the Hancock scheme of superannuation was its cost.561 
SWPS also noted that the proposal would have created a major transfer of resources 
to the aged, militating against the consideration of the needs of other groups such as 
invalids and the unemployed.562 Daryl Dixon, who was head of SWPS, observed in his 
interview for this thesis that there was also a lack of institutional buy-in for national 
                                                             
554 Paul Kelly, The Hawke Ascendancy: A Definitive Account of its Origins and Climax 1975–1983 
(London: Angus & Robertson, 1994), pp.99, 103. 
555 John Jost, Michelle Grattan & Vincent Basile, “Federal Government to Pass Tough New Industrial 
Laws,” The Age, 26 March 1976. 
556 The Herald, “Hold Wage Rises to 4% – IPA,” 23 December 1976.  
557 V Basile, “Plan for a Pay Pact,” The Age, 7 December 1976. 
558 Ian McLean Why Australia Prospered: The Shifting Sources of Economic Growth, (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012), p.217. 
559 Diana Shaw, “Trade Union Participation in Public Policy-Making: the Rise and Demise of 
Australia’s National Retirement Income Regime,” (PhD diss., University of New South Wales, 1992), 
p.114. 
560 Ibid., p.114. 
561 Daryl Dixon & Chris Foster, Social Welfare Policy for a Sustainable Society, Presentation to the 
ANZAAS Congress, Adelaide, 1982, p.31. 
562 Ibid., p.31. 
142 
 
superannuation, particularly from Treasury.563 Likewise, former Labor leader Bill 
Hayden recalls that “Treasury didn’t think much of national superannuation because 
of the cost.”564 
What can’t be won politically can be won industrially 
 
The roots of the union quest to pursue superannuation industrially began with the 
failure of national superannuation as proposed by the Whitlam Government. Simon 
Crean says that it meant developing “a strategy that if we can’t win it [a national 
superannuation scheme] legitimately through the political process we will pursue it 
industrially.”565 Mees and Brigden argue that 
a further challenge was how to fund universal superannuation. The employers 
were opposed to it being funded out of profits and workers were equally opposed 
to it being funded by wage cuts. Governments were opposed to it being funded 
out of government revenue, and there were concerns about economy-wide effects. 
This created a context in which it was only the union and labour movement that 
could collectively deliver universal coverage.566  
Union leaders were increasingly “frustrated by the ongoing inadequacy of existing 
funds and limited coverage.” 567 There was significant variability of coverage between 
industries. Further, the superannuation coverage statistics masked the lower 
effective coverage of the workforce – withdrawal from employment for reasons other 
than retirement or invalidity resulted in a significant loss of entitlements.568 When 
these issues were not addressed through the creation of a system of national 
superannuation, there was a vacuum and the industrial movement filled it.569 The 
Hawke and Keating governments followed the pathway created during this period.  
The first union superannuation funds emerged at this time. Mees and Brigden argue 
that unions such as the Federated Storemen and Packers’ Union (FSPU), the Pulp 
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and Paper Workers’ Federation, and the Australasian Meat Industry Employees 
Union (AMIEU) effectively “reset the superannuation agenda” by setting up union-
controlled funds independently of employers.570 The Labour Union Co-operative 
Retirement Fund (LUCRF) was established in Victoria in 1978 by the FSPU. The 
state secretary of the FSPU and later a Victorian government minister, Bill 
Landeryou, believed that the unions concentrated their efforts on improving workers’ 
take-home pay and conditions because of a “pre-occupation with the problems of 
today rather than planning for the future.” Further, “anyone who doesn’t believe the 
industrial issue to dominate the next decade will be the question of benefits which 
should accrue to workers on retirement is stark raving bonkers.”571   
Several industrial disputes in Victoria made occupational superannuation rights a 
public issue. These campaigns included the waterside workers, the pulp and paper 
workers and the skin and hide workers.572 The most high-profile example of these 
campaigns was the 1978 dispute between the FSPU and Woolworths over the FSPU’s 
superannuation scheme, LUCRF. Union leader Greg Sword reflected that the dispute 
brought national focus and attention to the issue of occupational superannuation, 
recalling that “journalists started taking an interest, the commentariat started to 
think about super…Woolworths were issuing pamphlets warning of socialism by the 
back door.”573 In her comparative study of Australian and New Zealand retirement 
tax policy, Marriott draws attention to the FSPU-Woolworths dispute as the event 
which permanently raised the profile of occupational superannuation in Australia.574 
Woolworths was concerned about the prospective employer payouts for a scheme 
which would cover over 50,000 workers. Some 600 members of the Victorian branch 
of the FSPU went on strike over the right to join LUCRF. It appears that Woolworths 
conceded the FSPU’s claims, while giving it a positive gloss, arguing that the 
company “provides security for people making the company their career.”575  
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The FSPU received criticism from various quarters about its motives for entering the 
superannuation debate. Views on superannuation differed greatly between, and 
within, the unions. Mary Easson, in her study of superannuation, notes that “many 
union leaders” had reservations about the pursuit of super in the late 1970s and early 
1980s.576 Some union leaders preferred wage increases over superannuation 
entitlements as a deferred wage. To these unions and their leaders, superannuation 
was a way that the union movement would be sucked further into the capitalist 
system.577  
The trade magazine, Superfunds, questioned the FSPU’s motives: on the one hand, 
the union may have truly believed that it would do a better job of retirement 
provision than employers; on the other, employer contributions and the concept of 
deferred pay may have been “no more than a device for increasing the pressures 
brought to bear on employers to extract improved benefits and conditions for union 
members.”578 Consultants Campbell and Cook believed that the objective of the 
union movement’s leadership was 
to gain control over the investment of vast sums of money. From their 
members’ point of view they also aim to make superannuation a definite form 
of deferred pay for all their members.579  
For its part, the FSPU argued for superannuation through an industrial rights 
framework. Landeryou argued that there was “nothing very complex” about the 
union attitude to superannuation, being based on “certain elementary principles of 
human justice, the first among them that superannuation contributions were 
deferred pay.”580 He appeared on ABC Television urging that the private workplace 
schemes which ripped off individual members should be allowed to “fail and fade by 
the side.”581  
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Evidence from the 1970s and early 1980s shows that a scheme of national 
superannuation was still the stated priority for the union movement overall. 
Landeryou explicitly stated in an interview that  
my preference would be for a Government scheme, a national scheme that was 
operated in the interests of all citizens. Clearly that is, for me, the best way for 
it to be done. But in the absence of Government action then I think there will 
be a proliferation of trade union schemes.582 
The perspectives of other groups in society and the national media demonstrate that 
union involvement in superannuation had become a national issue. A 1978 workforce 
survey commissioned by insurer Sentry Holdings Ltd showed that retirement plans 
were regarded by 78 per cent of workers as the most important employee fringe 
benefit, but only 56 per cent of workers surveyed were covered. Sixty-eight per cent 
of workers supported union activity in superannuation.583 
The model of occupational superannuation that unions were advocating took control 
away from employers and placed it with employees through the interrelated concepts 
of vesting and portability. According to Crean, employer organisations did not object 
to or criticise the union objective of portability. What they did “oppose violently,” 
however, was the concept that the structure of occupational superannuation 
demanded the “total vesting of employer contributions in the employee which would 
make portability a reality.”584 One insurer, who had been interviewed on television 
with Landeryou in 1979, described the FSPU’s proposed superannuation scheme as 
“a thinly disguised back door entry to socialism.”585 Another actuarial firm noted that 
many employers believed that  
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by contributing to a union superannuation fund (on behalf of their employees) 
they will derive few of the usual advantages, since the bond being 
strengthened will be that between the employees and the union.586  
The media seized on the far-reaching implications of union involvement in 
occupational superannuation schemes. The Australian Financial Review reported 
that the FSPU saw superannuation as a very important industrial issue, “wrenched 
out of the ordered precincts of actuarial offices and into the volatile arenas of both 
politics and industrial relations.”587 An editorial from the same newspaper went 
further, arguing that superannuation offered a loophole to wage indexation which 
could be “exploited by unions and employers to buck wages policy.”588 The National 
Times described superannuation as the “new battleground for Australian capitalism,” 
with employers seeking to encourage employee loyalty, discourage mobility and 
reward length of service, while the unions regarded existing superannuation schemes 
as mechanisms for firms to enforce servitude.589  
In 1978 the ACTU established a committee to look at superannuation policy. The 
committee was set up “under the prodding” of Peter Redlich, labour lawyer and 
former State ALP President, and its members included Charlie Fitzgibbon of the 
Waterside Workers’ Federation, ACTU Vice President Peter Nolan and Assistant 
National Secretary Bill Kelty.590 In advice from Redlich to Kelty in August 1978, 
Redlich assessed that there was no foreseeable implementation of a national 
superannuation scheme by the Fraser Government in the medium or long term. In 
the absence of a national scheme it should, Redlich argued,  
be an objective of the labour movement in Australia to ensure that as many 
trade union members were participating in blue-collar superannuation 
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schemes with the objective that in time, employee or union representation 
would have equal say on the way the superannuation funds operated.591   
He also noted that Australia lagged behind other Western nations in the acceptance 
and implementation of blue-collar superannuation schemes.  
In 1979 the ACTU Congress then went on to adopt Redlich’s proposed approach, 
making the primary objective the adoption of a national superannuation scheme. If 
such a scheme were not created, the Congress recommended that unions should 
either collectively or individually develop superannuation schemes with full 
portability and vesting.592 The ACTU executive developed a trust deed for a national 
ACTU superannuation scheme and an industrial strategy to initiate a campaign to 
promote superannuation among employees and employers.593 In 1979, the ACTU 
executive announced that it intended to establish its own national superannuation 
scheme, based on the plan negotiated with the Associated Pulp and Paper Mills 
Ltd.594  
Minutes of the 1979 ACTU Congress record that it supported  
a national superannuation scheme which is portable...if a national scheme is 
not created, Congress believes that unions should either collectively or 
individually develop superannuation and labour market insurance for their 
members.595  
Any scheme of superannuation needed to be portable and to protect against inflation. 
By 1981 the ACTU Congress still supported a portable national superannuation 
scheme, but one which was “non-discriminatory,” and it condemned the “existing 
occupational structure.”596 Between 1979 and 1981 the wording of the Congress 
minutes had changed from developing superannuation schemes if a national scheme 
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was not created, to “co-ordinate and assist unions attempting such schemes.” Early 
industrial agreements concerning superannuation therefore contained a clause that 
in the event of a national scheme, (private occupational superannuation) 
contributions would be transferred to it.597  
In 1981 the ACTU Congress passed a motion to support the introduction of a national 
superannuation scheme and to condemn the existing occupational superannuation 
structure. Further, the motion said that the newly-established ACTU Committee on 
Superannuation should “develop superannuation policy, co-ordinate and assist 
unions in attempting to implement such schemes, and co-ordinate a campaign 
amongst union membership on the issue of superannuation.”598 Simon Crean, Bill 
Kelty, Greg Sword and Charlie Fitzgibbon were members of the committee, and 
would all play central roles in the development of union superannuation and national 
superannuation policy in the 1980s.599 A scheme of government superannuation was 
still the aim, but industrial activity around superannuation to protect award-based 
schemes was being encouraged by the union leadership. Up until 1984, the Federal 
ALP Platform contained a commitment to national superannuation. This position 
was, Easson argues, “still rooted in the majority position of the Hancock report – 
national superannuation through taxation.”600 
The intellectual, demographic and economic backdrop to the rise of 
occupational superannuation 
 
As well as the political inertia around national superannuation that industrial 
disputes responded to, there were other reasons acting in favour of a different 
approach to pensions. Stagflation, and the forecast of higher numbers of older 
Australians in the population on the Age Pension, were reasons to consider another 
approach to pension policy. Labour leaders were influenced by new intellectual 
approaches concerning the use of wage policy to manage inflation. The cumulative 
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effect was the development of labour thinking on occupational superannuation 
policy. 
During the late 1970s the “demographic threat” of an ageing population emerged as a 
policy issue. Government was increasingly concerned with how to respond to the 
forecast increasing proportion of the “aged” in the population.601 Between 1971 and 
1980 the population aged 65 and over grew by 28 per cent, with the most rapid rate 
of increase among the “old-old” aged 85 and over.602 Simply having more people on 
the government-funded age pension was not financially feasible. Former Branch 
Manager of the Seniors and Means Test Branch at the Department of Social Security, 
Alanna Foster, recalls that it was “a difficult period post-Whitlam. Ageing of the 
population became recognized. The idea emerged of a ‘wicked problem’ that we had 
to do something about to be able to afford it.”603 Former Labor Senator Susan Ryan 
recalls that in shadow cabinet discussions there was a common view that a 
contributory state pension scheme along the lines of Germany or France was not 
viable. She attributes this to emerging evidence about the cost of those schemes 
within the context of an ageing society.604 Marie Coleman, former head of the 
National Social Welfare Commission 1972 to 75, observes that the need for 
government to deal with the “demographic time bomb” and the unions saying “do I 
have a scheme for you!” was a “marriage made in heaven.”605  
The 1970s saw the beginnings of a changing role for the unions in Australian policy 
debate, defined by an openness to working with the traditional adversaries of unions: 
business. This was a force playing into union acceptance of occupational 
superannuation as an alternative to national superannuation. As one National Times 
article observed, there was the emergence of a “new breed of unionist – well-
educated, research-oriented and above all pragmatically searching for growth 
areas…more interested in the opportunities the capitalist system offers than in 
blasting its inequities.”606 The ACTU, under Hawke’s leadership, was also getting 
involved in business itself, for example going into partnership with a group of 
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independent operators to sell discount retail petrol through the Solo chain of service 
stations.607 
Within a context of “consensus politics,” the union movement began to take an 
interest in issues broader than wage protection alone. The strategy of consensus was 
developed by the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) under the presidency 
of future Prime Minister Bob Hawke. Consensus politics saw the unions acting as 
partners in government decision-making rather than assuming an adversarial 
relationship. Hawke told the 1977 ACTU Congress, “[W]e are saying that the 
resources of the union movement are available to the Government for constructive 
meaningful consultation.”608 He argued union activities should not be “restricted to 
the pay in [the] pocket” and instead should be concerned with social welfare.609  
As Nolan argues, social security became a concern of the ACTU during the 1970s. Up 
until this point, superannuation had not been an area of “union ambition,” as distinct 
from some overseas jurisdictions such as the US and Europe where “unions were 
heavily involved in pension funds because of the deferred wage benefits they 
represented.”610 There was a recognisable increase in union involvement in social 
policy debates. ACTU president Bob Hawke admitted that the trade union movement 
had not engaged in meaningful discussions over social welfare before this time.611 By 
the end of the 1970s, in the absence of a national superannuation scheme in 
Australia, occupational schemes flourished, “setting a future pathway that was 
difficult to alter.”612   
Views naturally varied, but as a whole the trade union movement considered that the 
provision of social security or social services benefits was properly the responsibility 
of government or employers.613 It therefore made sense that the default position of 
the labour movement was to support a national scheme. Notwithstanding the union 
movement’s efforts to have government provide adequate social security benefits for 
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working people, by the start of the 1980s the level of provision was, according to 
Crean, less than satisfactory. On account of this situation, the FSPU took the view 
that it was no longer adequate to seek protection for its members by government 
services provided through taxation. Crean argued that “in addition, we must 
intervene in the private system if we are serious as a union in our concern to protect 
the interest of our members.”614  
By intervening in the private system of occupational superannuation, the unions also 
set the pathway for a future policy that was based on a private system of 
superannuation based on defined contributions. This had the effect of placing greater 
financial risk on individuals. The occupational pathway of superannuation policy 
meant that there would be a public Age Pension that formed the basic level of old age 
income (“Pillar One” of the current system), and a second, private layer (“Pillar 
Two”) that transferred responsibility to households for financing additional 
retirement income to supplement the Age Pension by mandating superannuation 
contributions over a working life.615 See Figure 1, Chapter 2. It would also mean that 
Pillar Two of the system was based on an industrial model that excluded groups 
outside of the paid workforce. Ironically, pursuing greater workforce coverage of 
superannuation would also lead to future issues of superannuation coverage across 
the population. 
Union leaders were influenced by economic ideas concerning the way wages policy 
could be used to manage high inflation. As Easson has detailed, union leaders Greg 
Sword, Simon Crean, Garry Weaven and Bill Kelty were all men who would be critical 
to the development of superannuation policy. Crean, Kelty and Sword were recruited 
to the same union, the FSPU, by secretary Landeryou.616 Kelty and Weaven had 
studied under Donald Whitehead, a professor of economics at La Trobe University.617 
In his interview for this thesis, Kelty was explicit about the intellectual influence of 
Whitehead. He was an atypical mentor, having advised the Liberal Party.  
Whitehead advocated the use of wages policy as the primary instrument to combat 
inflation, advocating an institutional agenda that saw wages not in isolation but “as 
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part of a comprehensive policy for improving the position of workers.”618 If the rate 
of growth of average worker earnings could be limited to the rate of growth in 
average national productivity, he reasoned, a stable price level would result.619 
Whitehead also argued that Australian unions had succeeded in being judged on 
their ability to secure increases in money wages rather than rising living standards, 
and a crucial question was what, if any, changes in union attitudes had been going on 
beneath the surface.620  
Whitehead’s influence propelled the idea that remuneration could be delivered by 
means other than wages, which later became part of the Accord. In this way, non-
wage earnings had a direct role in wages policy, and therefore in managing inflation.  
His proposed package would include “comprehensive superannuation arrangements 
geared to the earnings of the employee during his working life,” with unions involved 
in the operation of superannuation schemes.621 His prescription also advocated 
formal and regular consultation between the trade union movement and the 
government of the day, which would be a feature of the Hawke Labor Government.  
The ideas about wages policy had an economic imperative: countering stagflation. 
Along with other industrial countries, Australia was experiencing wage pressures, 
increasing the appeal of wage trade-offs including for pensions. Superannuation 
could be a “deferred wage,” used to purchase labour peace as well as political 
popularity.622 The full-time unemployment rate rose from 1.7 per cent to 5.7 per cent 
between late 1973 and 1978, and female unemployment rates were higher.623 At the 
end of 1976, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
predicted that the rise in Australia’s level of inflation would “slow” to around 10 per 
cent per year.624 During the first year of the Fraser Government in 1976, inflation ran 
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at 13.3 per cent.625 While it would drop to 8.2 per cent in 1978–79, it returned to 11.5 
per cent by the time of the March election in 1983.626 In 1979 the federal ALP 
conference noted that 
The western capitalist world, including Australia, remains gripped in a 
prolonged economic malaise, characterized by stagflation, which constitutes 
the most serious crisis to have faced international capitalism since the Great 
Depression.627  
Within this context, dominant ideas in social welfare policy were drifting away from 
those of the post-war welfare state, with its emphasis on full employment and welfare 
universalism. The “key assumption of mainstream Keynesianism that one could 
trade off inflation for employment and vice versa came painfully unstuck.”628 In 
1983, Graycar observed that “what we are witnessing is a retreat in the legitimacy of 
claims against the state and an attempt to steer more claims in the direction of the 
family, employers, and the local community.”629 The conditions were ripe for 
superannuation to be a campaign issue for Australian unions.  
The Australian Left took a particular interest in the Swedish pension model, where 
trade unions had established wage-earner superannuation funds.630 These would be 
the forerunner to Australia’s “industry” funds, a not-for-profit trust model which 
provided for equal employer and employee representation on trustee boards. A 
number of interviewees spoke about the appeal of contributory insurance models, 
and in particular Sweden. Financial journalist Glenda Korporaal recalls that there 
was “all this talk about the ‘Swedish Model,’ the social democratic one.”631 Don 
Grimes says he was “always rabbiting on about the need for a proper contributory 
superannuation scheme in this country like had been introduced in social democratic 
countries in Europe…I was influenced by the Swedes because of my friendship with 
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(former Swedish Prime Minister) Olof Palme.”632 Feminist scholar Eva Cox 
remembers that there was “excitement about unions controlling super funds and 
doing good things with them…looking at Swedish unions.”633 In the late 1970s, union 
leader Greg Sword went on a study tour to Western Europe and the United States. He 
recalls learning in Sweden about the “cooperative movement” with “no other agenda 
but an industrial partnership between employers and employees.”634  
Australian Labor begins to edge away from national 
superannuation 
 
Australian Labor continued to support national superannuation during this period, 
but a closer examination shows that there was some “policy slippage” away from its 
official position. One reason why the Labor side of politics began to edge away from 
its support for national superannuation was a fear that the scheme would not be 
within its exclusive control. As Bill Hayden explained in the mid-1990s, a 
government superannuation scheme which would boost national savings, fund 
national development projects and return the long-term bond rate on investments 
was “good thinking for a young socialist” but not an ambition he still harboured, 
being “rather more cautious about the political administration of public 
enterprises.”635  
British Labour’s “social contract” had been influential on the Australian labour 
movement, leading to the Accord.636 The Callaghan Government (1976–1979) had 
developed an anti-inflationary wages policy under the social contract, under which the 
unions had accepted a 5 per cent wage increase ceiling in return for social benefits.637 
Travelling to the United Kingdom in the late 1970s, a future Hawke government 
minister had a front row seat to the pressures on the social contract, with massive 
industrial strikes and high levels of inflation. In their interview, this person recalled 
that “whereas theirs failed, we could probably do it better. It didn’t dissuade me from 
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pursuing the course.”638 Then senior ACTU official, Simon Crean, also went on a study 
trip to the UK, in 1979. He recounts that  
 [O]ur unions were aligned to those unions in the United Kingdom. It was 
 interesting to see how fragile those events could be…finding the nuances that 
 would effectively balance wages policy with the needs of the country.639  
Superannuation therefore began as “a by-product of Australia’s (former) highly 
centralized system of wage-fixing and…reflected the common international experience 
at the time of utilizing corporatist social contracts for redesigning pension policies.”640  
National superannuation policy continued to be developed by some in the Labor 
Party. In 1982, at the request of leader Bill Hayden, a scheme was developed by 
Labor’s Social Welfare Committee and the Economics Committee of the Federal 
Caucus. Led by Chris Hurford, the proposal was known as the “Hurford Scheme.” 
The Hurford Scheme proposed a two-tier pension system under which the Age 
Pension would be supplemented by an earnings-related benefit and individual 
contributions, using the Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) system. The earnings-related 
supplementary benefit would be equal to 10 per cent of an individual’s updated 
lifetime average weekly earnings calculated from the ages of 20 to 65, and would 
provide a maximum benefit of 13.3 per cent of AWE. According to Hurford, the 
recognition of weaknesses in the existing system, including limited participation, the 
fact that many superannuation beneficiaries could still claim the Age Pension, and 
the lack of portability, were major reasons for advocating a national superannuation 
scheme.641 
The ALP was committed to national superannuation in principle but it was not 
settled policy by the time of the March 1983 election.642 The first iteration of the 
Accord, signed in the same year, recognised the “anomalies” in the availability of 
occupational superannuation benefits and committed to considering “the possible 
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role for a national superannuation scheme.”643 However the idea of another income 
tax levy of 2 per cent besides the already-proposed Medicare levy of one per cent was 
thought to be not electorally attractive at the time.644 The Labor caucus was not 
sufficiently interested in the Hurford scheme for it to be progressed by the federal 
opposition. As one Labor front-bencher commented to the National Times, 
We wouldn’t want to be going to the people with a 3 to 5 per cent tax levy to 
fund such a scheme, as was suggested by Hancock. Labor is also concerned 
not to unduly antagonize the giant private insurance companies which could 
be activated against the party in much the same way as the health insurance 
companies lobbied against Medibank.645 
The impact of the Whitlam Government’s dismissal on the Labor Party and its 
approach to policy cannot be overstated. It produced a wholescale reconsideration of 
the way Labor approached public policy and conceived of its role in politics. Don 
Grimes said that  
when we lost in ’75, which was an absolute slaughter, and then in ’77 when we 
lost again in a big way, we were wondering if we’d get in in our lifetime. By 
1980 we just couldn’t make wild promises to bring utopia to Australia.646 
Speaking at the 1982 federal conference, Hayden argued that “if we cannot handle 
the economy successfully then we will have no credibility, and if we cannot establish 
that credibility before the (1983) election we have got no chance of winning 
government.”647 This approach acted against a continued push for national 
superannuation by the Labor Party, even among its chief supporters like Hayden and 
Grimes. The Party still retained its support for the idea in principle but lost the 
momentum behind it as the 1980s dawned. 
One of the fundamental tenets of historical institutionalism is that close attention to 
the sequence of historical events helps to explain why things turned out the way they 
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did. Previous policies create institutional obstacles and also opportunities.648 
Superannuation could not have taken on the guise it did in the 1980s as a feature of 
the Accords and been characterised legally as an industrial issue without the 
antecedents of the 1970s.649 Rather, it would have been a second order social security 
issue, as it had been for most of its history. Superannuation based on social 
insurance principles was never a top priority.  
During the late 1970s and early 1980s the distinct paths of national superannuation 
and occupational superannuation were cemented. National superannuation was 
again an elusive proposal that had few supporters. The existence of the Age Pension 
and occupational superannuation schemes acted as institutional impediments to the 
introduction of the Hancock scheme. As the Parliamentary Library noted in its 1983 
review of national superannuation,  
One of the major factors inhibiting moves towards a contributory scheme in 
Australia has been the opposition of the existing employer-sponsored 
occupational superannuation schemes. A common view, and one that has a lot 
to be said for it, is the laissez-faire one that as far as possible such schemes 
should be left alone to continue as options for those employers and employees 
who want them, on the ground that the great variety of arrangements they 
offer is necessary if people are to enjoy freedom of choice.650 
It would have been hard for a government to convince most income earners that they 
should pay an additional tax levy or superannuation contributions for something 
which they got “for nothing” in the form of the Age Pension.651  
In combination with governmental opposition to national superannuation, a set of 
other institutional factors operated to ensure a continuity of Australia’s age welfare 
architecture which was not based on principles of social insurance like the proposed 
Hancock scheme. Shaw cites the following factors: the centralised system of wage 
regulation, Australia’s low aged-dependency ratio, high home ownership, the 
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predominance of conservative governments federally and the rigidity of the union 
movement which had become organisationally and ideologically bound by its 
reliance upon gaining improvements in wages and working conditions through the 
arbitration system.652 With demography, economic conditions and economic ideas all 
changing, the union movement would recast its role in superannuation policy.  
There was a noticeable upswing of union involvement in superannuation policy 
development that commenced a process of change where greater occupational 
superannuation coverage was pursued. The idea of national superannuation began to 
wither. Labour leaders were refashioning a very old institution. In a case of 
institutional “layering,” union leaders were imbuing occupational superannuation 
with new values to favour workers – coverage, portability and vesting. The new 
concepts the union movement were attaching to occupational superannuation were 
cases of incremental change, but profound change nonetheless. All three concepts 
were critical to superannuation being a broad-based entitlement, rather than the 
preserve of a select few white-collar workers.  
The institutional layering that began to take place during the Fraser years also had a 
particular gender dimension. In the 1980s, campaigns for superannuation coverage 
included awareness-raising that superannuation was a right belonging to female 
workers too. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. The substantial, basic 
institutional point was that change was beginning to occur, through remodelling an 
old institution. National superannuation never had equivalent institutional roots to 
draw on. 
The insurance and actuarial industries were mobilised against change. These two 
groups were the greatest financial beneficiaries from existing superannuation 
schemes and stood to lose the most from the nationalisation of the superannuation 
system. In 1981 the Life Insurance Federation of Australia (LIFA) proposed a 
different model of public pension and extended occupational superannuation that 
expanded its own role.653 It would be equivalent to 50 per cent of average weekly 
earnings for couples and 30 per cent of average weekly earnings for single recipients. 
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Two-thirds of the payment would be means test free.654 The 1981 proposal was not 
pursued.655 The perception by business was that unions were seeking to control a 
pool of “workers’ capital,” a theme taken up again in Chapter 7. 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has mapped out the series of moving parts during 1975 to 1983 that 
established occupational superannuation as the institutional basis for future 
superannuation policy. These included turbulent economic conditions, changing 
ideas about the Australian welfare state, the agenda of the Fraser Government, the 
difficulty of integrating a new social insurance scheme with existing occupational 
superannuation schemes, and muted support for national superannuation by 
government institutions. The Fraser years would be the last time that national 
superannuation was seriously considered in national policy fora. This becomes 
evident in the next chapter, covering the term of the Hawke and first Keating 
Governments, when occupational superannuation became embedded as a union 
movement cause and eventually the legislated system. 
The chapter has argued that shifts in attitude by the labour movement in the 1970s 
and early 1980s set in train the pathway, with industrial disputes and the creation of 
“industry” superannuation funds that elevated occupational superannuation on to 
the national policy agenda. This led to a re-categorisation of superannuation policy 
by government in the 1980s from being an issue of social security to an industrial 
entitlement of workers, discussed in Chapter 6. The campaigns for occupational 
superannuation by the unions took place as a direct response to the rejection of a 
national superannuation scheme as proposed by the Hancock Committee. Broad-
based occupational superannuation was a product of a pragmatic response by the 
union movement to national policy stasis.  
From a long-term perspective, the Hancock Inquiry had contained “the potential for 
a radical reorientation of parts of the social security system in ways much more 
attuned to the social insurance model than systems which already existed, especially 
in advocating government involvement in the provisions of earnings or contribution-
                                                             
654 Life Insurance Federation of Australia (LIFA), Submission to the Federal Government on National 
Superannuation, September 1981. 
655 LIFA put forward a different scheme in 1984 involving three tiers: a universal flat rate benefit, a 
tapered means test and a private occupational component. This proposal was not pursued either.  
160 
 
related benefits.”656 The period from 1975 to 1983, however, reaffirmed both the 
existing principles of Australian social security based on general revenue financing 
and the strength of occupational superannuation as an supplementary basis for 
national policy. 
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Chapter Six: Giving up the Ghost 
 
The early months of 1983 were not the 1980s of Australian popular memory, of loose 
money and gross displays of it. Australia was in deep recession. The Fraser 
government had set an election for 5 March, with inflation at 11.5 per cent, 
unemployment at 10.3 per cent, and youth unemployment at 19.1 per cent.657 Paul 
Keating reflected that in 1983 there was no obvious place to look for an answer to 
Australia’s problems. There was an “unattractive choice” that seemed to lie between 
Reaganism and Thatcherism on the one hand, and a failed model of European 
Socialism on the other.658 The Hawke Labor Government that came to power 
experimented with a very different economic agenda to Labor governments past. In 
July 1992, by which time Paul Keating had taken over the Prime Ministership, 
Australia would have a “universal” system of government-mandated, private 
occupational superannuation (the “Superannuation Guarantee”). As Adam Creighton 
notes, that a Labor government introduced a private system of compulsory savings 
while conservative governments had tried and failed to introduce a publicly funded 
scheme is a great irony of Australian history.659 
In the years leading up to the introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee there 
were three key drivers of change. The first was a reaction by the new Labor government 
to the policies of the Whitlam Government, a case of “path reaction.” Secondly, there 
was a set of “permissive conditions”660 that allowed a critical juncture to occur in 
retirement income policy, comprising economic conditions, changing demography 
and the pragmatism of key policymakers. Thirdly, at the instigation of the union 
movement the very concept and operation of occupational superannuation was being 
refashioned, exemplifying the profound consequences of policy “layering” and 
“displacement.” In this regard, the chapter confirms recent theoretical contributions 
which show that “policy layering may also be observed in cases of comprehensive, 
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system-wide policy change as well as incremental change, which traditionally fall into 
the category of ‘transformative’ change.”661 Methodologically, this chapter and the last 
has drawn upon on interviews more than preceding chapters. This is because more of 
the key actors from this period are alive, and the material was also more recent in 
people’s memories than that of the 1970s.662 The danger is therefore of a well-
rehearsed, self-serving narrative that the chapter responds to with the use of other 
primary and secondary material. 
Australia’s system of superannuation was also the result of institutional continuity. 
The institutional basis for policy change was the occupational pension, dramatically 
re-characterised from being a form of employer benevolence to select groups, to an 
industrial right. As outlined in Chapters 4 and 5, some unions had won the right to 
superannuation in the 1950s and 1960s but it was in the 1970s that industrial activity 
around superannuation noticeably increased and began to garner national attention. 
By way of contrast, each proposal for a national superannuation scheme was 
contemplated as a new government social insurance scheme, an attempt to create a 
new institution. This is a narrative of the relative strength of occupational 
superannuation as a policy proposition by virtue of it being an existing institution, and 
a growing one at that. British historian Hugh Pemberton has written that the British 
superannuation system was a case of “working with what works;”663 the Australian 
superannuation system can be considered a case of “working with what was there.”   
In making the arguments about policy change set out above, this chapter refutes some 
aspects of existing literature on the history of Australian superannuation. No doubt, 
there were individuals and relationships during this period without which the 
Australian system of superannuation would not have been formed. The campaigns of 
Australian unions for superannuation coverage were significant. Likewise, the era of 
change under the Hawke and Keating Labor governments should not be discounted. 
But these explanations are only partial, discounting the institutional basis for 
superannuation policy change and the highly pragmatic nature of decisions made. 
                                                             
661 Gemma Carey, Adrian Kay & Ann Nevile, “Institutional Legacies and “Sticky Layers”: What 
Happens in Cases of Transformative Policy Change?” Administration and Society 51, no.3 (2017): 
p.15.  
662 Former Prime Minister John Howard declined to be interviewed about superannuation policy 
during his period as Treasurer in the late 1970s and early 1980s, given the significant time that had 
elapsed. 
663 Hugh Pemberton, “’What Matters is What Works:’ Labour’s Journey from ‘National 
Superannuation’ to ‘Personal Accounts,’” British Politics 5 (2010): pp.41-64. 
163 
 
Existing explanations have also contributed to a misapprehension that Australian 
superannuation was the creation of a few key architects, operating with a fully formed 
vision about retirement income policy, a vision that did not exist in 1983 or for most 
of the 1980s. Rather, the introduction of the modern system was the result of a set of 
conditions producing a significant institutional change, and an industrial campaign to 
refashion the institution of occupational superannuation.  
Given the substantial literature on the Hawke and Keating governments, it is worth 
stating at the outset what this chapter is not. This is not an examination of labour 
history or of labour power dynamics. Easson, Mees and Brigden have written histories 
of superannuation during the period from industrial and Labor government 
perspectives. Olsberg has examined the processes of political choices, the new 
structures and dynamic relations which developed between the union movement and 
institutionalised political authority during the Hawke and Keating governments, as 
they relate to retirement income policy.664 Like Mees and Brigden, Olsberg is 
ultimately most interested in the role of the unions in retirement income policy. This 
thesis is distinguishable. It is a study of the reasons why a national system of 
occupational superannuation was a successful reform and a system of national 
superannuation was not, using institutional theory to aid in that explanation. 
Path reaction: a push away from Whitlam-era superannuation 
 
The push against the policies of the Whitlam Government by the Hawke Government 
produced a case of path reaction, where policy came to be defined against Labor’s 
immediate past. The Labor government came to office in 1983 with an urge to be 
defined against the economic policies of the Whitlam era. The perceived economic 
mismanagement of the Whitlam government loomed over Labor leaders, with some 
government ministers like Keating and Hayden having lived through the 1975 
dismissal as members of the Whitlam government. Morris has observed that 
“[A]lthough there were moments when the introduction of a publicly-administered 
scheme seemed possible, the political process proved incapable of implementing one”, 
and this reflects, among other things, the “tendency for successive governments to 
reject policies by their political opponents.”665 In the case of Labor in the 1980s, it also 
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reflects a rejection of their own political past. Greg Smith, a public servant at the time, 
recalls that Labor in the 1980s “had a real fear of Whitlam’s economy policy record. 
They were still keen to pursue a social agenda, but sensibly.”666 Brian Toohey, then a 
Fairfax journalist, recalls that “anything to do with Whitlam they thought was 
death.”667 Similarly, economics journalist Ross Gittins has reflected, “the last thing you 
were going to do was have a big government institution.”668 The historian Frank 
Bongiorno has observed that the 1980s saw a new way of thinking for Labor, “to 
question the market was now to risk being ‘branded a fossil of the Whitlam era.’”669  
The Hawke Government was elected with an official policy of national superannuation 
based on principles of national insurance, the same as that proposed by the Hancock 
Inquiry. The transcript of the 1982 federal conference of the ALP shows that there were 
no amendments to the existing superannuation policy proposed, despite various 
speakers making remarks on superannuation.670 The policy adopted in respect of 
superannuation was  
national superannuation which does not discriminate on the basis of sex or 
marital status, providing flat rate benefits for all retired persons, with further 
provision for the purchase of additional benefits through government regulated 
or sponsored schemes. Ensure that all persons have access to portable 
superannuation.671  
Ending the recession of 1982–3 was the new government’s primary goal.672 A former 
Hawke Government minister puts it thus: 
[W]e had no real clear vision about what to do about super, although there was 
an ambition to do something over time. But it wasn’t the immediate concern, 
the concern we had was to get the economy going again.673  
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The government sought to achieve this primary goal by microeconomic reform to 
increase productivity and opening up the economy to international markets.674 The 
union leadership adopted the government line of “putting wealth creation ahead of 
wealth distribution.”675 The Expenditure Review Committee, comprising the Prime 
Minister and Senior Economic Ministers, “epitomised the discipline of the new 
government, and its determination not to be seen as reprising the spendthrift ways of 
the Whitlam era.”676 The Government Actuary was warning about the potential size 
and risk of a fully-funded national superannuation scheme based on contributions.677  
With national superannuation again rejected in 1979, the thread of occupational 
superannuation had been taken up by the Fraser government’s Taskforce on 
Occupational Superannuation. However “Occupational Taskforce proposals from 
employer and employee organisations” prompted the Hawke government to establish 
its own working party on superannuation.678 It had representatives from the ACTU, 
the major Australian employer group, the Confederation of Australian Industry (CAI) 
and officials from Treasury and Finance. The final report of the Working Party in June 
1983 focused on improving operational standards of existing occupational 
superannuation schemes, including portability, vesting, preservation and security of 
benefits. But any collaboration between the ACTU and the CAI was to be short-lived, 
with the CAI mobilising to oppose the ACTU’s claim for award-based superannuation 
in 1985,679 discussed later in this chapter. Occupational superannuation would be 
subsumed by the Accord. 
A national superannuation scheme was considered neither a priority nor a live option 
by any of the key political actors in the 1980s. Keating today describes the Hancock 
Inquiry’s proposal as “not relevant to my approach.”680 Speaking at a Life Insurance 
Federation of Australia (LIFA) conference in May 1984, Keating noted that the 
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government was investigating national superannuation but that “the issue is one 
which I believe must be approached with great caution.” He went on to say that “[I]n 
the meantime, the government will be pressing on with its program of reform of 
existing retirement income arrangements.”681 Nor was there was much interest in a 
scheme of national superannuation from the union movement. Kelty describes the 
Hancock Report as being “a sort of Whitlam grand scheme, unfunded…at best, it’s a 
minor show. It’s just a social service fund, but unfunded.”682 The unions feared 
supporting a new national scheme that would be akin to setting up a new version of 
Medicare, necessitating a new tax, so that “people are going to say government is on 
our back.”683 As examined in the previous chapter, Treasury did not support national 
superannuation, with Deputy Secretary Ted Evans suspicious of a public scheme “at 
the beck and call of politicians, for their own purposes.”684 
The role of these key actors is important, and Labor politics mattered very much in the 
institutional direction superannuation policy took. With Labor in government, the 
momentum behind occupational superannuation could be built upon politically. As St 
Anne writes, “[T]he Keating/Kelty relationship played a dominant role in the 1980s 
during the renegotiations of the Accord agreement between the Labor government and 
the ACTU.”685 It was at the April 1983 economic summit, for example, that Kelty says 
he came to a “private agreement” with Keating, and so despite the contrary advice by 
Treasury and the Department of Industrial Relations, Keating agreed with Kelty that 
the productivity claim of 3 per cent should be converted into superannuation. She 
writes that “[T]he commitment from Keating gave Kelty further firepower to influence 
the building industry over converting their pay increase into superannuation.”686 
Garry Weaven, Assistant Secretary of the ACTU during the 1980s, was also 
fundamental to the Accord negotiations that brought occupational superannuation 
onto the national stage. A long list of other critical actors in the union movement was 
central to superannuation becoming an industrial concern at a national level.687  
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As Bill Kelty, former ACTU Secretary, says, “there’s a whole lot of people, you take 
them out, and you don’t get superannuation.”688 This thesis focuses on institutional 
development, and as such it sees the actions of policy reformers within the context of 
those institutions. But in doing so, the intention is not to discount that there were some 
critical relationships. The basic argument, though, is that the institution these actors 
were working with – namely occupational superannuation – has been ignored in the 
existing literature. The vision of an Australian superannuation system was not 
crystallised at the start of the Hawke Government. One of the political legacies of the 
Labor governments in the 1980s and early 1990s has been a wistfulness among the 
Australian political class for the scale and pace of economic reform during this period, 
and superannuation is caught up in this tussle.689  
These responses to the question of national superannuation reflect Labor’s embrace of 
market-based policies in the 1980s. Just as Labor had a “contributory turn” towards 
the rhetoric of contributory pensions in the post-war period, as explained in Chapter 
4, it was experiencing a “market turn” in the 1980s. Michael Pusey has observed the 
Hawke government’s “increasingly exclusive commitment to an economic rationalism 
at odds with the broad thrust of the Australian Labor Party’s policies.”690 Olsberg has 
argued that the choice to pursue a private system of superannuation reflected the 
Hawke government’s general trend in public policy towards “orthodox monetarism 
and fiscal restraint, an increasing reliance on market forces, and the acceptance of 
economically liberal approaches to macroeconomic management.”691 She also notes 
that this approach infiltrated the retirement incomes policies of key federal agencies, 
including Treasury, with “the integration of social policies regarding retirement 
income into economic planning” exemplifying the dominance of economic 
                                                             
closely on the Accord. The first union campaigns for industrial superannuation were led by 
Fitzgibbon, Pat Geraghty for the Seamen’s Union, Wally Curran for the Australasian Meat Industry 
Employees Union (AMIEU) and Chris Northover for the Pulp and Paper Workers’ Federation. Kelty 
describes them as the “pioneers,” with himself, Greg Sword, Bill Landeryou, Simon Crean and himself 
as “one step removed,” the next stage of the process. 
688 Interview, Bill Kelty, Melbourne, 29 October 2017. 
689 See, for example, Rhonda Sharp, “The Super Revolution,” in Gerry Bloustein, Barbara Comber and 
Alison MacKinnon, eds. The Hawke Legacy (Adelaide: Wakefield Press, 2009), pp.198-211; Wayne 
Swan, “The Hawke-Keating Agenda was Laborism, not Neoliberalism, and it is Still a Guiding Light,” 
The Guardian, 14 May 2017 (Swan was Australian Treasurer between 2007 and 2013); Michael 
Stutchbury, “Australia must Rediscover the Spirit of the Hawke, Keating Reforms,” Financial Review, 
23 February 2018.  
690 Michael Pusey, Economic Rationalism in Canberra: a Nation Building State Changes its Mind 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.7. 
691 Olsberg, Trade Union Participation in Public Policy-Making, p.169. 
168 
 
considerations.692 The ACTU’s leaders, having embraced the idea of managing 
inflation through wages policy, as discussed in Chapter 5, were also depicted as market 
converts. Figure 4 is a  cartoon that shows Simon Crean and Bill Kelty in an office, 
wearing suits, with a computer and an “econometrics” book, while also beholden to 
union members with their high demands and poor work ethic. 
Figure 4: cartoon of Simon Crean, Bill Kelty and the unions 
 
 
Source: Pryor. 
 
Another closely related area of policy that manifested the government’s reaction 
against Whitlam era retirement income policy was pension targeting. This cut against 
the grain of pension universalism which had characterised the Labor government 
under Whitlam. In 1983 the government reintroduced income testing for those aged 
70, and in 1985 they reintroduced the assets test.693 Counterbalancing the 
reintroduction of tighter pension targeting, the government also raised the single Age 
Pension rate from 22.7 per cent of (male) average weekly earnings (MAWE) in 1983 to 
25 per cent in 1991. The move to increase the rate of the single Age Pension rate was 
“made easier by restraint in real wages under the Accord.”694 In February 1984, Hawke 
declined to commit publicly to a national superannuation scheme.695 He did, however, 
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make it clear that superannuation was something the government would “continue to 
pursue the examination of…within our overall macro-economic policy approach in the 
area of social security.”696 
Permissive conditions for change 
 
A new pathway of superannuation policy was initiated during the 1980s. The politics 
of consensus that Hawke had championed at the ACTU would become central to the 
development of economic policy during this period. On 11 April 1983, four weeks to 
the day after the election, the new Prime Minister Bob Hawke rose in the House of 
Representatives chamber of Parliament House to convene a meeting of government, 
business, unions and community groups, the landmark Economic Summit. The 
Summit embodied the politics of consensus during a time of economic and industrial 
restructuring. Hawke had argued on the election trail that the economic crisis called 
“not only for a change of policy, but for a change of attitudes – a change of community 
attitudes, a change of government attitudes and a change of business attitudes – a 
change from confrontation to co-operation; a change from the politics of division to 
the politics of reconciliation.”697 Former Social Security Minister Brian Howe recalls 
that under Hawke, there was a sense of the ALP being “open to possibilities not 
previously open under Whitlam.”698  
Embodied in the eight versions of the government-union “Accord,” between 1983 and 
1996, was the idea of the social wage. Wage restraint was what the unions did for the 
government; the social wage was what the government did for the unions.699 Speaking 
on Labor’s economic platform in 1982 as shadow minister, Willis outlined four 
objectives: “full employment; strong but balanced economic growth; minimisation of 
inflation, and equitable redistribution of income, wealth and economic power.”700 He 
went on to say that it was  
clear that we need control of inflation by means other than creating 
unemployment. We need development of new policy techniques, rather than 
relying solely on monetary and fiscal policy. In particular we need; development 
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of a prices and incomes policy … a closer liaison with the trade union movement 
in developing economic policy.701  
Industrially, the recession left an imprint on union leaders such as Laurie Carmichael, 
who would become Assistant Secretary of the ACTU. With workers being laid off with 
only weeks of pay left, Kelty recalls that there was a sense that “never again can you 
leave workers in the position where they’ve got nothing.”702 Kelty would later locate 
the origins of the Accord in “the failure of the (Whitlam) Labor Government to survive 
beyond 3 years and the legacy of unfulfilled expectation the period delivered. The 
union movement was not sufficiently mature to co-exist with Labor Government.”703 
Within the context of high inflation, the Accord was a circuit breaker. Inflation trended 
downwards during the 1980s, but it was still high by historical standards and in 
comparative perspective.704 The Consumer Price Index (CPI) was on average 10.1 per 
cent in the 1970s; 8.3 per cent in the 1980s and 2.3 per cent in the 1990s after the 
adoption of inflation targeting by the Reserve Bank.705 The “social wage” that 
underpinned the Accord was based on the concept that improvements in living 
standards could be delivered by government services or benefits or by employers 
outside of wages, in order to contain inflation.  
The Accord was a pragmatic response by the government and the unions to economic 
and demographic conditions which acted, in the theoretical lexicon, as “permissive 
conditions” for a critical juncture in superannuation policy. The emergence of the 
superannuation system during the period was as much about solving perceived 
political and economic problems as it was about an idea of improving retirement 
incomes for the workers. The government and the union leadership “came to 
superannuation more or less by accident.”706 Andrew Podger, a senior executive in the 
Department of Finance at the time, reflects that “[B]y the 1980s the window for 
Hancock (national superannuation) had passed. The Accord offered a different way of 
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solving the same issue.”707 Creighton is correct in his observation that a path was paved 
for superannuation through a combination of historical accident, political pragmatism 
and Australia’s unique industrial relations system. However, his claim that the 
superannuation system was not produced by any deliberate agitation by social 
reformers misses the significant incremental changes to superannuation that were, by 
design, refashioning the institution of occupational superannuation.708 These changes, 
and their limits, are discussed later in this chapter.  
The Accord was based on the unions accepting some difficult propositions, most 
significantly wage containment. In so doing, the unions were aiming to be, and to be 
seen to be, partners with the Labor government to ensure ongoing union relevance 
during a period when union density had already started to decline. It had fallen from 
51.1 per cent in 1976 to 48.3 per cent in 1982, and the rate of decline would increase 
throughout the 1980s.709  The Accord secured a broad consensus over wages policy 
and made the ACTU a “vital partner with the government in establishing the structure 
of economic policy in general.”710 Simon Crean, ACTU President and the son of the 
Whitlam Government’s Treasurer, Frank Crean, spoke of the way that the Accord 
enabled the union movement to position itself for relevance by “ensuring legitimacy as 
a genuine partner in social and economic reform.”711 The opportunity had been 
presented to become involved in matters which “not only impact on the equitable 
distribution of growth but those that determine the nature, direction and extent of 
growth.”712 However  the ACTU’s strategy had mixed results, with the ACTU at various 
points claiming that the government had sidelined its demands. 
The Accord had its detractors, part of a much deeper tension within the labour 
movement about the “modernising” of the Labor Party. During the terms of the Hawke 
and Keating governments there was a particularly vigorous debate both within the 
Labor Party and among academics about whether the government’s agenda was in line 
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with Labor tradition.713 In some quarters of the Left and the Right, the Accord was seen 
as a “blueprint for socialism and de facto government by the trade unions.”714 
Following an initial diagnosis of the likely fiscal impact of ageing in the 1970s, the issue 
continued to occupy the minds of public servants and politicians alike in the 1980s. 
Marie Coleman, the special adviser to the Social Welfare Policy Secretariat (SWPS), 
recalls that in the early years of the Hawke government “[t]he panic had started about 
the ageing of the population,” and the notion of supplementing the public Age Pension 
with private savings was about “managing the budget” in the face of changing 
demography.715 Alanna Foster, former Branch Manager of the Seniors and Means Test 
Branch at the Department of Social Security, recalls that there was “a feeling that there 
was this big ageing issue and there was going to be a crisis. That idea of a ‘wicked 
problem’ coming at us, and we had to be able to do something to afford it.”716  
The implication of more people living further into advanced old age was a projected 
decrease in the number of working-age Australians, who generated income tax, 
relative to the numbers of Australians in retirement, who would be reliant on public 
social assistance. In 1901, 4 per cent of the population was aged over 65; by 1980 9.6 
per cent were, and it was projected that in 2011 16.4 per cent of the population would 
be.717 Women were living longer than men, with increasing numbers of women living 
to advanced ages of 85 and over.718 The concern was shared internationally, with the 
United Nations holding its first World Assembly on Ageing in 1982. The Vienna 
International Plan of Action on Ageing, the first international instrument on ageing, 
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was endorsed by the UN General Assembly the same year.719 In September 1983 
Acting Treasurer Chris Hurford issued a press release noting that Commonwealth tax 
expenditure on occupational superannuation was around $2 billion annually, and 
that the issue 
must be faced, and quickly, by the community, as our ageing population will 
continue to impose increasing financial burdens on future generations if they 
are to support today’s workers in their retirement.720 
Olsberg observes that when the Hawke government was elected in March 1983, 
revisions to the retirement income system were on the agenda, in part due to ageing 
population projections.721 The government’s Social Security Review of 1988 later cited 
the ageing population as “the fact which has been most influential in shaping public 
interest in retirement income policy.”722 Higher levels of private retirement savings 
would, in theory, decrease reliance on the Age Pension over time.723 In 1993 the World 
Bank released its report, Averting the Old Age Crisis. Released in the year after the 
Superannuation Guarantee was introduced, the Labor government seized on the 
report to say “yes, that’s what we are doing.”724 
  
                                                             
719 United Nations, Vienna International Plan of Action, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
available from https://www.un.org/development/desa/ageing/resources/vienna-international-plan-
of-action.html.  
720 Chris Hurford, Acting Treasurer and Minister for Housing and Construction, Superannuation for 
Australians, Media Release, 26 September 1983. 
721 Olsberg, “Trade Union Participation in Public Policy-Making: the Rise and Demise of Australia’s 
National Retirement Income Regime,” p. 137. 
722 Chris Foster, Towards a National Retirement Incomes Policy: an Overview, Social Security 
Review, Issues Paper No.6 (Canberra: Social Security Review, 1988), p.51.   
723 A high proportion of people aged over 67, the current eligibility age for the Age Pension, remain 
reliant on some level of Age Pension payments, despite the Superannuation Guarantee having been 
legislated for nearly 30 years. The Superannuation Guarantee is however, forecast to reduce reliance 
on the Age Pension: Rice Warner, The Age Pension in the 21st Century, Paper Prepared for the 
Financial Services Forum (Sydney: Rice Warner, 2018).  
724 Interview, Phil Gallagher, Melbourne, 15 June 2017.  
174 
 
Occupational superannuation: an old dog, with some new tricks 
 
The ACTU had been considering trading off wage increases in return for employer 
contributions to a national superannuation scheme,725 and this was given impetus by 
the development of industrial superannuation schemes in the mid-1980s. In 1984 the 
Building Workers’ Industrial Union (BWIU) and the Builders Labourers Federation 
(BLF) had jointly negotiated the Building Industry Recovery Procedures (BIRP) with 
building industry employers. Among other things, the BIRP provided for a $7 per week 
special allowance, which the Full Bench of the Arbitration Commission determined 
was in breach of the 1983 wage indexation guidelines in force at the time.726 In that 
case, the ACTU had emphasised the role of superannuation as a wage alternative, 
arguing that  
[t]he ALP and the ACTU recognise the inherent limits to improvements in the 
existing welfare system, and the need to develop new alternatives less subject 
to the vagaries of the annual budget process and conservative cost-cutting. An 
immediate priority will be consideration of the possible role for a national 
superannuation scheme.727 
Some “innovative thinking” took place within the union leadership as to how to 
respond, with Kelty proposing to the two unions that the amount of the wage increase 
under BIRP above the wage indexation level be put into superannuation.728 The BLF 
initially resisted the ACTU’s agreement to a cut in automatic wage adjustments in 
exchange for tax cuts.729 The idea of trading off wages for superannuation was 
contentious for unions like the BLF whose industries were cyclical in nature, so that 
workers would rely on boom years to make “a killing for a house deposit and a 
retirement nest egg,” rather than saving regular amounts over time.730 Subject to 
lengthy negotiations, the BWIU and the BLF agreed to the proposal, with the 
consequence that the building unions and the ACTU were propelled to devise two 
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funds in 1984: the Building Unions’ Superannuation Fund (BUS) and the Allied 
Unions Superannuation Trust (AUST). 731  
By the mid-1980s, therefore, it was already quite entrenched that superannuation 
would be an “industry level system”732 as opposed to something achieved workplace-
by-workplace. Olsberg argues that the formation of “industry” funds reflected new 
patterns of relations between unions and government.733 Within this context, LUCRF, 
BUS and AUST provided the model for ACTU and government superannuation 
policies, acting as “prototypes for the extension of occupational superannuation.”734 
The ACTU Assistant Secretary, Garry Weaven, claimed that  
there is no longer any prospect of dissipating the tide of demand for more and 
better-quality superannuation…that proportion has now passed through a 
critical level below which it may have been possible to contain superannuation 
as a luxury of the privileged few.735  
The renegotiated terms of the Accord in 1985 transformed occupational 
superannuation from being an industrial concern of the union movement to 
government policy. “Accord Mark II,” as it came to be known, gave a policy basis to 
superannuation as a wage trade-off. This was a critical juncture in superannuation 
policy, changing its nature and eventually leading to the Superannuation Guarantee.  
It was used as one of the means to make the Hawke government’s economic policy 
measures more palatable – especially to working-class voters.736 The government was 
supported by Treasury in its approach, “making the incomes policy, including 
superannuation…something significant in getting inflation under control.”737  
Accord Mark II provided for a 2 per cent discount of wage increases from the CPI index 
increase, as a response to an emerging balance of payments crisis.738 The wage 
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discount, or partial indexation, would apply in the next annual wage case under which 
wages were set. In return for the wage discount, Accord Mark II provided for tax cuts 
and a 3 per cent wage increase, payable to workers “not through wages but as 
occupational superannuation benefits during the 1986–88 period.”739 In practical 
terms, wages would be paid by a person’s employer to the superannuation fund 
stipulated in their award so that all workers covered by an award would be paid 
superannuation. This was made possible through a system of centralised wages. Bill 
Kelty observes that “the day you got national superannuation is the day we won 
that.”740 Occupational superannuation coverage had lifted from 29 per cent of 
employed persons in 1974 to 53 per cent in 1982.741 Leader of the Opposition, John 
Howard, said that 3 per cent award superannuation gave union leaders the potential 
to become the “effective economic czars of Australia controlling wealth they never 
would have dreamed of.”742  
On the business side, the director of the Confederation of Australian Industry (CAI), 
David Nolan, wrote that the situation had “changed dramatically in the past two 
years,” with  superannuation having become “an industrial relations issue inextricably 
bound up with the other substantive industrial relations issues.”743 The CAI and the 
Business Council of Australia (BCA) called for the abandonment of negotiations on 
superannuation in mid-December 1985.744 CAI expressed its alarm at unions using the 
financial leverage of industry superannuation to further their political and industrial 
goals, to create a union  “slush fund.”745 By contrast, Professor Fred Gruen from the 
Australian National University pointed out that some employer-based superannuation 
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funds were used to benefit firms rather than employees, with superannuation being 
used as a steady source of funds by some in management.746 
The deal that underpinned Accord Mark II was not uncontroversial: some unions 
wanted super and a pay rise.”747 Echoing past concerns of the Labor Party, the Socialist 
Party noted that workers already paid for the Age Pension through their taxes and 
would be forced to pay for superannuation in addition to taxes.748 By 1986 the effect 
of the discount on wage indexation was clear, with a 2 per cent cap on wage increases 
but a 4 per cent CPI increase.749   
By 1988, 62 per cent of employed persons were covered by superannuation. 
Notwithstanding this, both coverage and average balances of women remained lower 
(Figure 4). With the coverage of occupational superannuation growing, it became all 
the more unlikely that a government scheme of superannuation would be adopted as 
policy. The Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs released a report in 
which it declared that “any attempt to introduce a system of national superannuation 
would be divisive and needlessly disruptive of existing arrangements.”750 This is why 
the Hawke government did not “come along with this shiny new national 
superannuation scheme we had worked out,” imposing it from above. Instead, 
“because the building scheme worked well then the thinking was why don’t we extend 
this across the board and take any real wage increase and put it into super.”751  
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Figure 4: superannuation coverage among employees 
 
 
Source: ABS, Swoboda.752 
A union study trip in 1986 helped to further cement the idea of superannuation as a 
wage trade-off and the need for industry-wide funds. A small group of trade unionists 
travelled to Western European and Scandinavian countries to look at their treatment 
of trade and economic issues. The work was led by Carmichael, who advocated the 
Swedish “tripartite” model that sought to bring together unions, business and 
government.753 The resulting report published in 1987, Australia Reconstructed, 
argued strongly in favour of the Swedish approach. Echoing Crean’s comments about 
the Accord process ensuring union legitimacy, Australia Reconstructed observed that 
the involvement of unions in tripartite economic processes had led to better outcomes 
in terms of the overall economy and the welfare of trade union members.754 Australia 
Reconstructed advocated that money wages should not be assessed in isolation but in 
the context of a broader social wage, taxation, superannuation, the labour market and 
other economic and social policies.755 The report argued that the ACTU’s 
superannuation campaign should continue in its present form, and that 
superannuation contributions should “preferably be paid into multi-employer or 
industry-wide superannuation funds” because these funds encouraged uniformity, 
                                                             
752 ABS, Survey of Income and Housing, cat.no.6553.0; ABS, Survey of Superannuation, Reference 
no.42, February 1975; ABS, Year Book Australia 1974, cat. no.1301.0; Kai Swoboda, “Major 
Superannuation and Retirement Income Changes in Australia: a Chronology” (Canberra: 
Parliamentary Library, 2014), available from 
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pu
bs/rp/rp1314/SuperChron#_Toc382309882. 
753 Frank Bongiorno, The Eighties, p.286; Transcript, ABC PM Program, 29 July 1987, Butlin 
Archives, Series Z700, Box 41. Carmichael notes in his interview with PM that the Swedish refer to 
their tripartite model as “the third way.” 
754 ACTU/TDC, Australia Reconstructed, p.9. 
755 Ibid., p.52. 
0
20
40
60
80
100
1974 1982 1988 1991 1993 1999 2007 2012 2015
All Male Female
179 
 
portability and vesting, and allowed more efficient management on a bulk basis of 
administration, investment and insurance.756 
Australia Reconstructed was a step along the road to broader union acceptance of 
superannuation as part of the social wage. The mission members, from unions of the 
left and right, coalesced around the idea of tripartite politics, and of most relevance for 
superannuation policy, consensus around the social wage. As Garry Weaven puts it, 
Australia Reconstructed was “part of how you look beyond money wages…how the 
union movement could move away from wages alone.”757 The Shadow Minister for 
Trade, Ray Braithwaite, was cruder, arguing that the mission “could only be construed 
as an attempt to buy off union leaders over wage discounting.”758 Employer groups 
such as the Business Council of Australia criticised the mission and proposals for 
greater union involvement in policy-making.759 
Finally, a key legal ruling and a balance of payments crisis saw occupational 
superannuation further cemented as government policy. In 1986 the High Court ruled 
that superannuation was an industrial matter. A productivity claim, paid through 
superannuation, had been heard by the Australian Industrial Court (AIC). The 
employer groups, led by CAI, appealed to the High Court on the AIC’s jurisdiction to 
hear the claim. The employer groups were opposed to the idea of any additional 
productivity being distributed to wage earners.760  On appeal, the High Court decided 
unanimously that it was within the AIC’s jurisdiction, superannuation being an 
industrial matter. This moment was when superannuation policy “came to some sort 
of coherent whole,” according to former senior Treasury executive, Greg Smith. Mees 
and Brigden observe that the legal reclassification of superannuation as an industrial 
matter was one important part of a “series of intersecting industrial and political 
developments that supported union efforts to win superannuation.”761 
Australia’s balance of payments became a topic of alarm in 1986 following the mini 
economic crisis that year, specifically the balance on the trade “current account” that 
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records the difference between the value of exports and imports. It was the reason 
behind Keating’s declaration on radio on 14 May that Australia was at risk of becoming 
a “banana republic.” With the collapse of the exchange rate, there was a “general 
understanding” by the unions that there had to be some “rebalancing,” a shift back to 
profits over wage increases.762 Ross Gittins, the financial journalist, recalls that the 
issue of superannuation dovetailed with the concern over the current account deficit, 
so that one of the ways to increase savings was through superannuation.763 Former 
Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Mike Keating, recalls that 
there was an “obsession” with the current account deficit, so a program that increased 
national saving “made a lot of sense.”764 Having a pool of retirement funds was also a 
means of boosting Australia’s private savings in the context of a perceived balance of 
payments problem in the mid-1980s.765 As the Australia Reconstructed document had 
laid out, strong growth in the national economy induced an increase in imports, with 
the balance of payments deficit growing from 1.7 per cent of GDP in 1979/80 to 5.9 per 
cent of GDP in 1985/86.766 
 
It might have been a new approach, but the wage trade-off was made possible through 
a very old institution: occupational superannuation. Keith Hancock was correct when 
he observed in 1984 that  
 
[t]he gradual spread of occupational superannuation will establish a 
constituency for the view that national (government) provision should be 
tailored around it. The contention that the reverse relation should apply, with 
occupational schemes complementing a national scheme as in many other 
countries, will have a decreasing chance of acceptance.767 
It is perhaps on account of the amount of change in superannuation during the 1980s 
and 1990s that insufficient attention is paid to the institutional continuities. The 
momentum away from a policy of national superannuation gathered because of the 
industrial pathway the policy had already taken in the late 1970s. Accordingly, the 
1980s saw both “path reaction” against the Whitlam years, and elements of continuity 
                                                             
762 Interview, Don Russell, Sydney, 17 December 2018. 
763 Interview, Ross Gittins, Sydney, 28 September 2017.  
764 Interview, Mike Keating, Canberra, 20 October 2017. 
765 Interview, Phil Gallagher, Canberra, 15 June 2017. 
766 ACTU/TDC, Australia Reconstructed, p.xi. 
767 Quoted in Kate Legge, “An 80-Year Debate Drones on…and on,” Age, 27 April 1984. 
181 
 
from the Fraser era. This was not a case of the government explicitly positing an 
industrial model of superannuation against a national superannuation scheme, but 
instead of an anti-inflationary strategy through the use of an existing institution, 
occupational superannuation as deferred wages.768 Substantial change was occurring 
through the mechanism of long-standing institutions. Mees and Brigden’s argument 
that this period represented “a significant break from past practice, rather than 
incremental change”769 is a characterisation that focuses too much on change at the 
expense of the fundamental importance of old institutions, mentalities and practices. 
The modern superannuation system contains some of its particular features because 
policy makers reconceived an existing model, recalibrating it and evolving it. A scheme 
like that proposed by the Hancock Inquiry would have been based on social insurance 
principles, foreign to the existing landscape of old age welfare in Australia. Modern 
superannuation therefore has elements of large-scale change, but also has 
“considerable continuity through and in spite of the historical break point.”770 
The wage-superannuation trade-off helped entrench a contributory occupational 
superannuation system from which a number of concepts flowed. In the nomenclature 
used in the theoretical literature on institutional change, what occurred to 
occupational superannuation during the period was a “layering” of new features on to 
occupational superannuation.771 These changes would radically alter the coverage and 
operation of the institution. 
Easson argues that the 1980s was a period of policy development happening “on the 
run”, and when “widely-held grievances combined with the right circumstances and 
interactions among policy actors led to the forging of new policy.”772 She describes this 
as a “drift and stab” model, where “issues meander along with the policy players, where 
some are more interested than others, and where they have a stab at a solution and re-
set the discussion for everyone else.” To the extent that Easson is describing the 
pragmatism of key actors, she is right. It was not as if the labour movement or the 
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Labor Party started out with a template of policy development for retirement incomes. 
But it was also quite clear that concepts like “portability” and “vesting” which had been 
the subject of industrial campaigns since at least the 1960s were being purposefully 
affixed to the even older institution of occupational superannuation within a broader 
setting of superannuation as an economic right. 
Policy layering tends to be considered separately from other forms of change. Yet the 
significant changes to superannuation combined with incremental change in the 1980s 
to produce “complementary approaches to institutional change.”773 The net result was 
a new retirement income system. Mahoney and Thelen note that in “transformative, 
system-wide change,” as in the case of superannuation during the 1980s, “we would 
expect to see displacement – ‘the removal of existing rules and the introduction of new 
ones.’”774 In the way that superannuation became an industrial matter through the 
Accord, we see this radical change. This chapter confirms Carey, Kay and Neville’s 
study that displacement and layering are not mutually exclusive: displacement can be 
accompanied by layering.775 The incremental change mechanisms complemented the 
policy turning point.776 
Looking further afield, layering had occurred in Europe with the addition of 
voluntary supplemental pensions alongside the public system. As Mahoney and 
Thelen point out, Social Democrats prevented conservatives dismantling public 
pension schemes, but did not stop the addition of voluntary supplemental 
schemes.777 This is an instructive point of comparison to Australia, where it was 
Labor as the social democratic party that introduced the supplemental scheme, and a 
private, compulsory one. It lends weight to the idea that the Party was acting 
pragmatically in the face of economic conditions, and within the context of an overall 
shift towards market policies. The Party was also influenced by the unions which 
were centrally involved in occupational superannuation through industry funds – the 
building unions, the storemen and packers  – reflecting their institutional clout and 
ideological preferences. 
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Changes to superannuation taxation during the 1980s represent an example of 
incremental policy change. Between 1915 and 1983, only 5 per cent of superannuation 
lump sums on termination of employment were taxed.778 In his first major economic 
statement in 1983, Keating announced that the full superannuation lump sum was to  
be included.779 For lump sums taken at age 55 or later, the first $50,000 was taxed at 
15 per cent and the remainder at 30 per cent.  Lump sums taken below age 55 were 
taxed at 30 per cent.780 In order to “encourage retirees to use lump sum benefits to 
secure an income in retirement,” payments were made exempt from tax “if converted 
into a pension or annuity.”781 Figure 5 shows the changes to superannuation pre and 
post-1983. 
Figure 5: history of changes to superannuation taxation 
 
Source: Treasury, Australia’s Future Tax System, Retirement Income Consultation Paper, Appendix B: 
A History of Superannuation (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2008). 
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New operational standards for superannuation schemes were introduced in 1985, 
including full and immediate vesting and mandatory portability.782 The ability to 
choose between a company fund or the chosen industry fund of the employee was, 
Olsberg argues, “the beginning of the attribution of particular public status to the 
funds, along the lines proposed by the unions.”783 These were all examples of how 
superannuation policy was becoming an entitlement of workers, managed by private 
entities, but shaped and regulated by government. 
Major changes to superannuation taxation in 1988 laid the institutional basis for 
continuing equity concerns. The first measure was the introduction of “Reasonable 
Benefit Limits” (RBLs). A concessional rate of 15 per cent tax would apply on fund 
contributions, earnings and withdrawals (payouts) of over $135,390 up to the RBL. 
Withdrawals of under $135,390 were tax free. Again, grandfathering of the new rules 
applied and the transition rules were complex. By way of contrast, in many other 
countries in which occupational superannuation provided an additional component of 
the retirement income system, access to favourable tax treatment was conditional 
upon benefits being paid in pension form.784 ACOSS proposed in 1991 that 
superannuation tax concessions should be replaced with a rebate, with employer 
contributions and fund earnings taxed as part of an individual’s income. The rebate 
would be based on a flat amount which could be offset against taxes paid by members 
on contributions and fund earnings.785 None of these proposals were adopted. 
The 1988 tax changes also created an incentive for superannuation funds to invest in 
Australian equities. This is one part of the story of financialisation of superannuation 
which is further discussed in Chapter 7. Being taxable entities from 1988, 
superannuation funds became eligible for dividend imputation for Australian 
companies and shareholders that the government had introduced in 1987.786 The 
system of dividend imputation was created to avoid double taxation of profit (or 
“taxable income”) in the hands of the company, and then of the shareholder receiving 
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a dividend. For shareholders with a lower tax rate than the company, the tax credit 
would be the amount of tax on the dividend income, which could be offset against other 
income of the shareholder. This was an especially beneficial tax reform for 
superannuation funds, with the rate of company tax being 30 per cent, and the rate of 
superannuation fund earnings and most withdrawals set at 15 per cent. 
Superannuation funds that invested in Australian shares therefore received excess 
imputation credits that could be paid to the fund. Keating himself cites dividend 
imputation as being a central part of the story of superannuation policy development 
because of its effect of lowering the cost of Australian capital.787  
Superannuation as deferred wages cemented a defined contribution system instead of 
a defined benefit model used in the first occupational pension schemes, examined in 
Chapter 3. Superannuation schemes would be based on contributions calculated as a 
percentage of wages, a “defined contribution.” A person would accumulate funds over 
their working life, producing a lump sum from which they could draw a pension during 
retirement. Under existing occupational schemes, the employer would pay a specified 
level of pension (a “defined benefit”) for each year of a person’s retirement so that they 
were effectively guaranteed a pension for life. In the context of an ageing demography, 
the government did not want to take on the liability of paying a defined benefit for life, 
to growing numbers of retirees. This was a continuity with the scheme of 
superannuation proposed by the Hancock Inquiry. 
Employers did not want to assume more risk either. Membership of defined benefit 
schemes, where employers bore the risk of paying a pension to workers for life, 
declined for a number of reasons. Employers were unwilling to bear the investment 
risk of defined benefit schemes;788 employees wanted to become members of 
accumulation funds to benefit from upswings in the share market, and they wanted 
the flexibility of an accumulation scheme when they changed jobs.789 Total workforce 
coverage of superannuation increased to 54.5 per cent of employees by 1988.790 In 
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1982/83, 82 per cent of members were in defined benefit funds; by 2009 only 2 per 
cent of members of large funds were purely defined benefit.  
However, a private defined contribution model also meant that the risk of losing 
savings was borne by the individual. The combined effect of the gradual changes to 
occupational superannuation outlined in this chapter also had the effect of placing 
greater risk onto individual workers. A private defined contributions scheme meant 
that individuals were more open to investment risk and to “longevity risk” because 
they might run out of superannuation savings before they died.791 As Blackburn notes, 
however, the defined benefit “promise” under former company pension schemes was 
only ever as strong as the company offering it.792  
In public superannuation schemes, shortfalls could be made up by willing 
governments, as was contemplated by the majority proposal of the Hancock Inquiry. 
A research paper by the Parliamentary Library noted that the “defined contributions” 
system was widely used overseas, but that inflation, unemployment, the ageing of the 
population and early retirement meant that governments increasingly had to draw 
from general revenue to bail out pension schemes.793 The vast majority of defined 
benefit funds are now closed to new members.794 
Superannuation would be “portable,” so that a person could move their 
superannuation savings between funds, especially when they changed jobs. Portability 
sprang from the idea that superannuation belonged to the worker, and that payment 
should not be contingent on the discretion of an employer.  The concept of portability 
was critical because of changes to the labour market which were already evident in the 
1980s. These related to increasingly broken work patterns, on account of growing 
levels of part-time and casual work. From the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, the 
proportion of casual employees increased from 13 to 24 per cent of all employees.795 
As Crean argued in an address to the NSW Labor Council in 1986, portability was 
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“essential given the structural change facing us.”796 The 1988 ALP Platform sought 
“enhanced flexibility of the workforce by improved vesting and portability of employee 
entitlements, including by encouraging industry-based superannuation.”797 In 
addition, the Platform stated that superannuation was important for women’s 
economic independence.  
Interrelated with portability was the concept of “vesting,” that superannuation 
belonged to an individual employee. The idea was that superannuation savings should 
be accessible to workers when they retired, rather than being contingent on the 
discretion of an employer.798 In other words, superannuation “vested” in the individual 
worker: it was a pot of money much like a bank account but which could not be drawn 
until retirement age.  
Incremental changes to ALP policy on superannuation 
 
Incremental change was occurring in the development of the ALP’s policy on 
superannuation between 1983 and 1992. The Social Security section of the 1982 ALP 
Platform provided that Labor would introduce a “self-supporting, portable national 
superannuation scheme providing entitlements to cover all persons and which could 
be integrated equitably with existing superannuation schemes.”799 By 1984, the 
Industrial Relations section of the ALP platform, until now silent on superannuation, 
included the right to join superannuation schemes as a term of employment.800 The 
right to join a superannuation fund was to apply to all workers without discrimination, 
including without gender discrimination.801 In 1986 superannuation became part of 
the Employment section of the platform too, committing to the distribution of 
“national productivity increases in a manner consistent with increasing employment 
opportunities.”802  
By 1988 the Industrial Relations section of the platform included a new section 
resolving to “support the spread of superannuation entitlements for all workers 
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through non-discriminatory employment-based superannuation schemes.”803 At this 
point still only 61.2 per cent of men and 36.5 per cent of women (or 51.3 per cent of 
those employed) were covered by occupational superannuation.804 Given the 
patchiness of coverage of some groups of workers, the ACTU believed the priority of 
policy should be to “gain at least a basic level of cover for all workers and the 
Government should examine the means by which its commitment to universal 
coverage will be developed.”805 The Social Security section provided that “[T]he 
financial responsibility for social security should be shared with occupational 
superannuation, accident and workers compensation, child support and reciprocal 
agreements. This will ensure that costs are shared more equitably by the community, 
employers, parents and between countries where applicable.” It also sought to ensure 
that “the combined effect of pensions and tax concessions for occupational 
superannuation is fair and progressive, and provides a genuine system of retirement 
income support.”  
A new retirement income policy was launched by the government in 1989, Better 
Incomes: Retirement Policy into the Next Century. It was a landmark document, 
setting out the government’s approach to retirement income policy for the medium 
term. Keating’s adviser Don Russell recalls that the Cabinet received Better Incomes 
well in the sense that it was looking beyond the day-to-day macroeconomic issues 
people had been preoccupied with.806 The document set out a package of measures to 
encourage enhanced saving for retirement through superannuation, to 
“provide…income as a supplement rather than a substitute for the pension.”807  
Better Incomes cited the key policy challenges as maintaining the higher standards of 
living that people enjoyed during their working lives, and managing the cost of an 
ageing population.808 It presented a similar logic for superannuation as Whitlam 
had, that the post-war “baby boom” generation would expect a higher living standard 
in retirement than generations before. This was also reflected in the press release for 
                                                             
803 ALP, 1988 Platform, Constitutions and Rules, National Library of Australia, Series MS ACC05.091. 
804 ABS, Cat. No. 4102.0, Australian Social Trends, 1995. 
805 Minutes of ACTU Executive Meeting, 23 February 1988, p.5, Noel Butlin Archives, Series Z514, Box 
1. 
806 Interview, Don Russell, Sydney, 17 December 2018. 
807 Statement by the Treasurer, Paul Keating M.P, and the Minister for Social Security, Brian Howe 
M.P., Retirement Income Policy, Press Release, 15 August 1989, p.2. Personal papers of Paul Keating. 
808  Minister for Social Security, Better Incomes: Retirement Income Policy into the Next Century, 
Statement by Brian Howe MP (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989), p.19. 
189 
 
Better Incomes, which argued that “if we are to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of 
future retirees it is imperative that we act now.”809 While taxation revenue would be 
sufficient to support the aged who needed assistance, private savings would be 
needed for “substantially higher retirement incomes.”810 Higher private savings 
would also have the broader economic benefit of funding higher investment levels to 
underpin economic growth. 
Better Incomes guaranteed that the Age Pension would provide a minimum of 25 per 
cent of MAWE and greater superannuation coverage, including for the self-employed 
and women. Other measures included changes to the Age Pension means test, making 
the income test free area tax free, removing income tax on all pensioners from 1995, 
increasing the rate of the Age Pension and Commonwealth Rent Assistance, and tax 
deductions for personal superannuation contributions. These changes were to ensure 
a baseline level of public social support, but also a clear statement about the enlarged 
role of private savings in the overall retirement income system. 
In the increased role it gave to private provision, Better Incomes exemplified the 
Hawke government’s changing position from what Pierson and Castles call a defence 
of the “welfare state” to the active promotion of the “competition state” through greater 
superannuation coverage and a residual role for public welfare.811 They also argue that 
superannuation was classic “third way’ reform,” explicitly designed to reallocate the 
costs of increasing pensions provision to labour market actors, leaving the state to 
guarantee provision for those with low incomes.812 A dual system of private 
superannuation with a majority of people still drawing some level of Age Pension was 
a way of lifting retirement incomes, while creating a continuing constituency for the 
Age Pension, thereby protecting its existence.813  
A new retirement income system 
 
Ending with the “big bang” of the Superannuation Guarantee in 1992, the period under 
consideration in this chapter saw the most significant change in Australia’s system of 
old age welfare since the introduction of the Age Pension in 1908. It added a new 
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“pillar” to Australia’s retirement income system, comprising the Age Pension, 
superannuation and private savings.814 This last section of the chapter looks at the 
period in which the new system of superannuation was legislated, and critically 
assesses issues of coverage and equity using an institutional framework.  
At the beginning of the 1990s, the institutional basis for superannuation as an 
industrial policy had been set but political momentum around a new broad-based 
system had waned. In the middle of 1990, the proportion of employees receiving a 
superannuation benefit was still only 53 per cent.815 By 1991 the ALP’s Platform 
provided that the terms of employment/wages and conditions should “support the 
spread of superannuation entitlement for all workers through non-discriminatory, 
democratically controlled, employment-based superannuation schemes so that all 
workers will be better able to maintain their living standards on retirement.”816 Eighty-
five per cent of industrial awards included a minimum 3 per cent superannuation 
contribution and overall coverage was 64 per cent at the end of 1990 but, according to 
Keating, this was not enough.  
The Superannuation Guarantee was a direct response by Keating, Kelty and Iain Ross, 
the ACTU’s Assistant Secretary, to circumvent the 1991 wage ruling by the AIRC in 
which it rejected the ACTU’s claim for a further 3 per cent superannuation.817 Ross had 
been with Kelty when the AIRC’s decision was announced, and suggested that the 
government could legislate the superannuation claim, modelling it on an existing 
“training guarantee levy” in which businesses would be levied with a tax in the event 
they failed to make superannuation payments.818  
After an unsuccessful challenge to Hawke in June 1991, Keating argued from his 
position on the backbench that 3 per cent of wages would not buy much 
superannuation. Moreover, an arguably more pressing need in Keating’s view was to 
raise domestic saving to lower the Current Account Deficit.819 He proposed in July 1991 
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a National Retirement Income Scheme based on the Age Pension and a privately 
funded, occupational “National Superannuation Scheme,” that would ultimately see 
superannuation increased from 3 per cent to 12 per cent of wages.820 Keating would 
challenge Hawke again in December 1991, this time successfully. 
In June 1992 the new Keating Government reached agreement on its proposal with 
the Democrats, the centrist minor party that had the balance of power in the Senate. 
Critically, the Democrats abandoned their support of a national superannuation 
scheme and switched to support compulsory occupational superannuation.821 After six 
months of negotiations, the Democrats had extracted a number of concessions, 
including extending the phase-in period for the Superannuation Guarantee to reach 9 
per cent and amending the Industrial Relations Act 1988 to require the AIRC to “take 
into account in arriving at national wage case decisions increased superannuation 
contributions made by employers.”822 Sitting on the Senate Committee on 
Superannuation, established in 1991, the Democrats had recommended that the 
Government “support increased competition by supporting new entrants” in the 
superannuation industry.823 The government, in response, promised to “consider the 
role of bank account superannuation,” discussed further in Chapter 7. Australia had 
given up the ghost of national superannuation.  
The Superannuation Guarantee Administration Act passed the parliament on 1 July 
1992. It imposed the “Superannuation Guarantee Levy” on employers by creating a tax 
penalty where employers failed to make the minimum contributions on behalf of 
employees, starting at 3 per cent of wages. The Coalition opposed the Superannuation 
Guarantee, arguing that it would lead to job losses with employers unable to afford the 
levy.  Opposition Leader John Hewson described the Superannuation Guarantee as 
“just another tax on jobs, just like payroll tax is another tax on jobs.”824 Other groups 
like the CAI and the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry opposed the 
Superannuation Guarantee, and ACOSS pointed to the inability of those in low-paid 
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jobs to afford a deferred pay rise in the form of superannuation.825 The result of the 
“SG” as it is now known, was that by 1993 82.1 per cent of men and 78.2 per cent of 
women who were employed (and 80.5 per cent of the combined workforce) were 
covered by superannuation.826 
Paul Kelly is both right and wrong when he says that the Superannuation Guarantee 
was a “political fix.” He writes that there was “no policy analysis, no Treasury White 
Paper that might be expected of such a sweeping compulsory measure.”827  Indeed 
there was nothing like the National Superannuation Committee of Inquiry in the 
1970s, or the Royal Commission on National Insurance in the 1920s. What Mees and 
Brigden describe as the “legislative phase” of superannuation policy in the 1990s was 
a political response to the limits of an industrial campaign for broader coverage.828 But 
the concept of the Superannuation Guarantee, of compulsory contributions, was again 
built on the institution of occupational superannuation and 3 per cent award 
superannuation, contained in Accord Mark II. What the Superannuation Guarantee 
did was to give legislative effect to occupational superannuation by making it 
compulsory for some workers, and to set out a timetable for increases. This also had 
the effect of excluding some groups in society from the Superannuation Guarantee. 
Women were a key group to be disadvantaged by an occupational superannuation 
model. As they had done in previous debates on national superannuation, women’s 
groups such as the Women’s Electoral Lobby (WEL) argued against superannuation 
and in favour of a universal age pension.829 Women were disadvantaged by a system 
based on wages, on account of their lower average earnings and the time they spent 
out of the paid workforce caring for children. The same issues applied to carers and 
those with broken work patterns, an issue that had been raised during Federation-era 
debates about contributory pensions, discussed in Chapter 3. Between 1990 and 1992, 
only 42 per cent of part-time employees, of whom more than 80 per cent were female, 
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received superannuation benefits.830 The resilience of these problems and concerns 
about gender differences in retirement incomes is a striking example of path 
dependency and continuity in itself. 
Recalling earlier critiques of the (male) wage earners’ welfare state, feminist and 
founding member of WEL, Eva Cox, characterises superannuation as being part of the 
whole ethos of the “working man’s paradise.” The idea, she argues, is that wages are 
most important. She attributes the decision to have not only an occupational scheme 
but a private scheme of superannuation to the rise of neoliberalism, with Keating in 
particular a “very early convert to neoliberalism.”831 Keating as Treasurer, and later 
Prime Minister, was convinced of the merit of a private system. He wanted individual 
workers to have something more than wages alone, an opportunity to access 
markets.832 He told Paul Kelly that  
under my model you preserved national savings by taking them off the budget 
where they would otherwise be spent by ministers. You put them into privately 
managed super funds where they are preserved until age 60. The real wealth in 
the world is made in stock markets and the average person never got into 
them.833  
The disadvantages faced by women in retirement, and especially with respect to 
superannuation, had been raised throughout the 1980s. This was against a broader 
institutional context in which gender consideration became much more embedded in 
policy-making in the 1980s. The practice of gender budgeting commenced in 1983 with 
the federal Women’s Budget Statement, providing government analysis of proposed 
measures through a gender lens. The practice ceased in 2013.834 The Sex 
Discrimination Act was legislated in 1984, but provided carve-outs for superannuation 
funds.835  
There was a divergence of views about the best way to deal with the gender inequities 
in superannuation, with the unions and the Labor Party seeking greater coverage, 
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while other community groups critiqued the institution of occupational 
superannuation itself. Mirroring its position during the Hancock Inquiry in the 1970s, 
WEL opposed occupational superannuation on the basis that it discriminated against 
women on account of their lower average earnings and time outside of the paid 
workforce. However on the basis of the Superannuation Guarantee having been 
legislated, WEL proposed that the government should establish a “Government 
Superannuation Fund” that would “offer intermittent workers and others who 
expected to have multiple employers, to select this fund.”836  The ACTU argued that 
the tax levy was impossible to obtain and that by getting employers to pay for 
superannuation rather than the government, retirees could have a combination of the 
Age Pension and superannuation. In 1984 the ACTU established an “Action Program 
for Women Workers” that included a superannuation component. The focus of the 
ACTU’s work was on raising awareness and correcting misconceptions, including that 
women would only receive superannuation if they belonged to a union.837 
Better Incomes noted that the shorter time which women spent in the labour force, 
together with traditionally limited access to superannuation, created reduced capacity 
to accumulate a significant superannuation benefit.838 In measures to address this, it 
recommended that people working as few as 10 hours per week would be able to 
contribute to superannuation and receive a tax deduction. In addition, people would 
be able to continue to contribute to superannuation for up to two years while outside 
the paid workforce.839 These proposals could not address the fundamental gender 
inequality in a wage-based contributory system where women’s wages were lower and 
their time in the workforce was less. 
The Liberal Party’s view aligned more with feminist groups, driven by its opposition 
to the industrial roots of the Superannuation Guarantee. It proposed that workers be 
able to put savings into an account in the name of their spouse, whether their spouse 
was working or not, a practice known as “contributions splitting.” Opposition 
Superannuation Minister, Senator Richard Alston, argued that “[b]ecause of the 
Government’s narrow industrial focus, until now superannuation has been confined 
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to the workplace. This artificial limitation constitutes a severe discrimination against 
some 2 million women outside the paid workforce.”840 
Through creating a private, defined contribution scheme, the Superannuation 
Guarantee also institutionalised a transferral of risk from government to individuals 
for retirement incomes. In 1990, the government also closed the defined benefit 
CSS.841 Fees and charges also received attention. The Democrats called on the 
Treasurer, John Dawkins, to take action to stop high administration fees from eroding 
superannuation benefits, with Treasury spokesperson, Senator Cheryl Kernot, arguing 
that  
 [i]t is one thing to put in place a system of superannuation for all Australian 
workers and ensure there are proper prudential controls. However, it is also 
equally important that superannuation contributions are not eaten away by 
administration fees and charges.842 
Complaints about private fund fees have been persistent since the introduction of the 
Superannuation Guarantee.843  
Other community groups were outspoken in their concerns about the risks inherent 
in the new system. A collection of papers published in the early 1990s by the ACT 
branch of ACOSS, entitled The Super Tax Rort, contained various critiques of 
superannuation. One paper alleged that the trade union movement and the Federal 
ALP “sold the lower paid workers down the drain” with the spread of 
superannuation, with the schemes simply extending the inequalities of the work 
phase into the post-work phase of people’s lives.844 The same paper warned that 
there was “more than a vague possibility that corrupt people could get hold of money 
which ordinary workers pay in each fortnight to their super schemes.”845 The 
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Superannuation Guarantee forced contributions by employees to private entities that 
have not always managed savings prudently and charge fees of varying levels that 
come directly out of individual savings, discussed further in Chapter 7. The decision 
to have a private system also had the effect of creating new career paths for union 
people in funds management.846 A former member of the government’s Economic 
Planning and Advisory Council, established in 1983,847 says that “[t]he unions knew 
that if they controlled industry superannuation funds they would have a greater role 
in the economy.”848  
The Superannuation Guarantee created its own pathway of policy uncertainty: what 
exactly was superannuation there to do? Treasurer John Kerin suggested that self-
provision should be a foundation of retirement income policy and a key function of the 
Superannuation Guarantee.849 This suggested that superannuation would, one day, 
replace the first-pillar Age Pension. Keating, by way of contrast, would speak about 
superannuation as a “viable complement to the pension.”850 The system which sat 
underneath the Superannuation Guarantee was quite different from national 
superannuation, but it was trying to achieve the same end: preventing a significant 
drop in living standards in retirement. Exactly what level that should be was unclear. 
It remains unclear in 2019. 
Conclusion 
 
The period between 1983 and 1992 saw the emergence of conditions under which a 
new system of Australian superannuation was introduced. Policy reactivity to the 
Whitlam government, wage-driven inflation and recession at the beginning of the 
Hawke government, a novel approach to managing the economy through the Accord 
process, and policy pragmatism all coalesced to change superannuation policy. There 
was a critical juncture through which a new system of retirement savings was 
introduced, but one which occurred together with incremental change. The conditions 
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present during the 1980s and into the early 1990s were unique, and are not 
replicable.851 The claim that this period saw a critical juncture is only fully assessable 
after the expiration of time.852 Consequently, Chapter 7 explores the period after the 
introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee and up until the present day.  
The reforms which were realised, and which ultimately led to the Superannuation 
Guarantee in 1992 were, to a large degree, the result of institutional continuity. The 
new superannuation system was built on the institution of occupational 
superannuation, reconceived. Easson describes this period as “an exit from the 
previous system and the entire recasting of superannuation policy at a national 
level.”853 There was, in fact, no previous system, no national superannuation system. 
Superannuation was recast as an industrial policy, and it was through this recasting 
that substantial policy reform took place. McLean argues that the policy shifts of the 
1980s “represent a point of inflection in a longer historical trajectory rather than a 
major discontinuity,”854 and this applies to superannuation policy as it reformed the 
institution of occupational superannuation. The incremental changes to regulation 
and taxation of superannuation, turning it into a private defined contributions system, 
with portability and vesting, exemplify this story of change and continuity. 
The new system transferred risk to individuals, through the adoption of a defined 
contributions model. Keating describes the defined contributions model as “a grand 
bargain,” with individuals taking on more risk in return for a concessional rate of tax 
on their savings, vesting the accumulation in their name and having the funds 
privately managed.855 Occupational superannuation was a wage-based system, 
delivering higher benefits to higher income groups in both absolute and relative 
terms on account of benefits being linked to wages.856 This would also have been the 
case under a government system of superannuation based on wage contributions, but 
the Hancock Inquiry’s proposed scheme also redistributed benefits to lower income 
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groups. By way of contrast, the taxation of private superannuation was set at a flat 
rate of 15 per cent on contributions and earnings, meaning that higher income 
groups pay proportionately less tax. These consequences of the systemic shift in old 
age welfare will be developed further in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Seven: The Politics of Superannuation Fund Choice  
 
The thesis has been concerned with how Australia’s superannuation system came to 
be. This chapter looks at what it has become. Chapter 6 showed that national 
superannuation was decisively rejected by 1992 when a privatised system of 
mandatory, defined contributions was introduced. In keeping with the focus of the 
thesis on the introduction of a private superannuation system, this chapter examines 
one of its consequences: how members choose a superannuation fund. Changes to the 
Superannuation Guarantee since 1992 have led to a continuing debate that ultimately 
concerns who controls members’ retirement savings. The debate over “choice of fund” 
is a proxy for the struggle between union-backed industry superannuation funds and 
other financial institutions for control over the $2.9 trillion savings pool. 
Building on the incremental changes to superannuation discussed in Chapters 5 and 
6, an institutional theoretical framework is again used to examine the incremental 
changes made to the superannuation system by introducing choice of fund. The 
chapter examines the choice of fund legislation (“Choice of Fund”), first introduced 
into the parliament in 1997 and finally passed in 2005 by the Howard Coalition 
Government. Choice of Fund is used as a case study of policy “displacement” and 
“layering.” The chapter then looks at the Rudd-Gillard Labor Government’s 
“MySuper” regime, introduced in 2013 as a response to Choice of Fund. MySuper is 
treated as an example of policy layering.  
In examining the incremental changes effected by Choice of Fund and MySuper, the 
chapter focuses on the legal changes and also the ideas informing them. This is because 
the point of analysing incremental change is to explain and evaluate the changes that 
occurred, rather than simply describing them. It is relatively easy to look at an example 
of incremental change and to categorise it as one form of incrementalism or another, 
but this does little to advance our understanding of how we arrived at the policy 
settings we have today. Béland has called for a focus on ideas to try and resolve this 
tension, and this focus is taken up in this chapter.857 He argues that the relationship 
between ideas and legislative revision is the most straightforward because “the formal 
enactment or transformation of public policies typically requires the formulation of 
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new policy ideas and a construction of the ‘need to reform.’”858 He refers to the 
example of conservatives in the United States during the Reagan administration, who 
developed a consistent ideological vision that guided the growing marketisation of 
their public health insurance system, Medicare, through the process of layering.859  
The chapter contains five sections. Firstly, it establishes the theoretical basis for 
considering Choice of Fund and MySuper as examples of incremental change. The 
second section sets out the political context for the Choice of Fund legislation in the 
period after the Superannuation Guarantee was introduced. Next, the chapter analyses 
Choice of Fund legislation introduced in 2005 and the debates leading up to it, 
considering how policy displacement and layering explain the changes introduced. The 
fourth section of the chapter examines the MySuper legislation, introduced in 2013, 
drawing out key examples of the policy layering it contained. Finally, the chapter 
highlights the present-day debates over Choice of Fund, arguing that they reflect the 
ongoing power struggle between union-backed industry superannuation and bank-
owned retail superannuation that arose from a compulsory system of privatised 
occupational superannuation. The persistent issues of risk and incomplete coverage in 
the modern superannuation system are highlighted. 
Understanding policy change since the Superannuation Guarantee 
 
The Superannuation Guarantee legislation created an institution of compulsory 
private superannuation from which the choice of fund debate sprang.  Before the 
Superannuation Guarantee, around 80 per cent of employees were covered by 
privately managed superannuation, but after its implementation, this was extended to 
all employees (Figure 4). In so doing, the Superannuation Guarantee created its own 
institutional legacy, setting the terms of the debate over the process of allocating 
Australia’s retirement income savings. As Hacker observes, actors who wish to change 
popular embedded institutions in political environments that militate against 
authoritative reform may seek to shift the institutions’ ground level operations or build 
new institutions on top of them, among other things.860 The Coalition perceived that 
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changing the way the Superannuation Guarantee operated was politically more 
feasible than abolishing it altogether. In this way, the Superannuation Guarantee 
framed the political debates about superannuation policy – the debates covered in this 
chapter are within the context of the Superannuation Guarantee.  
Theories of incremental change assist in explaining the changes brought in under the 
Choice of Fund and MySuper regimes. Chapter 2 of this thesis set out the theory on 
incremental change and Chapter 6 argued that the introduction of the modern 
superannuation system was attributable to new concepts being “layered” on to the 
existing institution of occupational superannuation. Policy “displacement” is another 
form of incremental change that refers to the removal of existing rules and the 
introduction of new ones. This chapter examines how the institution of compulsory 
superannuation has changed because of displacement and layering. The chapter looks 
at incremental change within the private pension pillar of Australia’s threepillar 
retirement income system comprising the Age Pension, superannuation and other 
private savings. 
Since the 1980s, award-based superannuation had seen most workers defaulted into 
an industry superannuation fund. Roughly two-thirds of superannuation members do 
not choose their fund, and are placed into a default one.861 Choice of Fund legislation 
weakened the nexus between a person’s occupation and fund choice, opening the 
private market for superannuation. Choice of Fund is a clear example of the way that 
incremental policy change was a consequence of the original decision in the 1980s to 
establish a state-mandated, private superannuation system. The incremental changes 
have been partisan, with the Liberal-National Coalition advocating an open market of 
member choice, and the subsequent Labor government arguing for a form of 
moderated choice in order to protect the industrial system. 
Choice of Fund was a response to the existing web of occupational superannuation 
schemes and regulations governing them. In a case of path dependency, this limited 
the set of options available to the Coalition in seeking to change the system along its 
own ideological lines. In his 1995 pre-election policy speech to the Association of 
Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA), Shadow Treasurer Peter Costello picked 
up on this theme. He said that “if we were designing a system from scratch we could 
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design it better…the Government’s superannuation policy…has grown out of industrial 
and political compromises.”862 He went on to assert that occupational superannuation 
may have started out as an industrial demand, but when the Keating government 
decided to spread superannuation more broadly863 it constructed its scheme “on top 
of the rickety base.”864  
As this thesis has shown, occupational superannuation did not originally start out as 
an “industrial demand.” Costello is right about the modern system being based on 
existing private occupational schemes with their own rules and operational costs. The 
consequence was that people who changed jobs would change superannuation funds, 
often leading to multiple accounts and associated duplication of fees. As a result, 
Costello argued, the occupational base of superannuation also disadvantaged women, 
who moved in and out of paid work more over their lifetimes. The only viable option 
was to take the system that was in place and improve it – a harbinger of the 
incremental approach to policy change that would take place.865 
The method of fund allocation determines where compulsory savings are directed and, 
therefore, who has power in the superannuation system. By the time the 
Superannuation Guarantee was introduced in 1992, superannuation assets were 
estimated to be $148 billion. The legislation contained a timetable for increasing 
employer contributions to 9 per cent by 2002–03.866 This would see progressively 
more and more funds channelled to superannuation fund managers.  The battle for a 
slice of superannuation between the union-backed industry funds and other financial 
institutions intensified during the lead up to the 2005 legislation, with a mirroring 
political battle between the Labor and the Liberal-National Coalition. 
The debates about Choice of Fund and MySuper are partly about managing risk for 
members. Since the introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee the consequences 
of a defined contribution, privatised system have become clear. The recent Royal 
Commission on Financial Services uncovered systemic problems with retail 
superannuation, as well as areas of clear misconduct such as charging members of 
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funds fees for which no service was provided (“fees for no service”).867 MySuper has 
attempted to apply checks and balances to funds to which members are defaulted if 
they do not choose their own superannuation fund. But MySuper works alongside the 
Choice of Fund regime. Around 40 per cent of superannuation assets are in the “choice 
segment” of the market today.868 
One of the recurring themes in this thesis has been the groups of people who are 
covered or excluded by national superannuation policy at any point in time. Choice of 
Fund and MySuper apply to Superannuation Guarantee payments only. The default 
fund into which members are placed if they do not choose a fund is also bound by the 
Superannuation Guarantee. The self-employed, those with low incomes and people 
outside of the paid workforce, mostly women, are not covered by compulsory 
superannuation and therefore not the subject of Choice of Fund or MySuper debates. 
This is a demonstration of the path dependency of exclusion created by the 
Superannuation Guarantee.  
Political context for Choice of Fund 
 
To understand how Choice of Fund altered the superannuation system it is necessary 
to explain briefly how it worked before. The Superannuation Guarantee 
(Administration Act) 1992 (Cth) (the “SG Act”) required that employers pay 
superannuation to a “complying superannuation fund” on behalf of their employees. 
For defined contribution funds, the amount of the Superannuation Guarantee Charge 
payable would be proportionate to the employee’s earnings for any year.869 For defined 
benefit funds, the employer’s level of support was that implicit in the benefits available 
to employees in the fund.870 
In practice, the superannuation fund to which the employer paid the employee’s 
superannuation was determined under the relevant industrial award governing the 
person’s employment. In the case of there being no applicable award, the employer 
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chose the superannuation fund named in a workplace agreement.871 This process had 
displaced the old system of defined benefit pensions, where a worker’s savings would 
be allocated to the company fund. Many industrial awards already offered limited 
choice of fund, while some allowed an employer and employee to agree on a fund.872 
In addition, many public offer and industry funds already gave members choice over 
their investments, but few members took up the option.873 
Even before the Superannuation Guarantee legislation came into effect in July 1992, 
there had been rumblings of opposition over the way that members’ savings were 
allocated to funds. As discussed in Chapter 6, the conservative side of politics was 
philosophically against the idea of compulsory superannuation, regarding it as an 
impost on the right of individuals to have control over their earnings. The Coalition 
was also deeply suspicious of superannuation being intimately bound up with the 
industrial award system. The growth of “industry” superannuation funds with their 
ties to the union movement led to concerns about union control of capital.  
In a speech to the Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA) in 1991, 
opposition spokesman for superannuation Senator Richard Alston set out the 
Coalition’s views on the Superannuation Guarantee and allocation of funds. The 1986 
wage case which gave effect to 3 per cent compulsory superannuation had instituted a 
system where employers were to pay into “approved” funds that were typically union-
sponsored. The union movement, said Alston, had “mounted a fierce campaign with a 
view to promoting the rapid development of industry funds at the expense of 
traditional company funds.”874 It was therefore difficult, he argued, to understand why 
a national compulsory superannuation scheme did not simply supersede the award-
                                                             
871 The SG Act refers to an “occupational superannuation arrangement,” an “industrial award,” and a 
“superannuation scheme.” Superannuation paid under such an arrangement, award or scheme 
determined the employee’s earnings base on which a person’s Superannuation Guarantee was 
calculated: SG Act ss6(1) and 15. 
872 Senate Select Committee on Superannuation, Provisions of the Superannuation Legislation 
Amendment (Choice of Superannuation Funds) Bill 2002 (Commonwealth of Australia: Canberra, 
2002), p.9. The funds listed in awards were decided by the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission (AIRC). In 2009 the AIRC became the Fair Work Commission (FWC). The process for 
listing funds in awards has been subject to criticism and resulted in a declaration by the Federal Court 
in June 2014 that an expert panel of the FWC that chose the funds was not properly constituted under 
the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). As a result, the process for listing new funds in awards has effectively 
stopped: Productivity Commission (PC), Superannuation: Assessing Efficiency and Competitiveness, 
Inquiry Report, No.91 (Commonwealth of Australia: Canberra, 2018), p.529. 
873 Senate Select Committee on Superannuation, Choice of Fund, 28th Report of the Senate Select 
Committee on Superannuation (Commonwealth of Australia: Canberra, 1998), n.p. 
874 Senator Richard Alston, Security, Dignity and Independence in Retirement – Are we Getting 
Close?, Address to the ASFA 1991 National Superannuation Conference, 31 October 1991, p.4. 
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based system.875 Alston also noted that the concept of “complying fund” undermined 
the necessity of retaining an award-based system, but 
this apparent concession is likely to be meaningless while the Government 
continues to insist that in practice employers will not have any such choice but 
will be required to adhere to all existing and future award obligations.876 
The Coalition proposed that superannuation members rather than employers select 
the fund of their choice. It also proposed that it would be illegal for industrial awards 
to require contributions to be compulsorily placed in union-sponsored industry 
funds.877 Alston argued that choice of fund legislation would “put a stop to the current 
practice whereby the Superannuation Guarantee and award contributions are 
compulsorily put into a union sponsored industry fund, giving it an effective monopoly 
on workers’ contributions.”878  
Choice of Fund: policy displacement and layering  
 
The Coalition’s proposal for member choice derived from a faith in the principle of 
rational and informed consumer decision-making, as evidenced in the Financial 
System Inquiry (the “Wallis Inquiry”). The Wallis Inquiry was initiated in the early 
period of the Howard Government (1996–2007) and its report was handed down in 
March 1997. Treasurer Peter Costello described the Wallis Inquiry as the “daughter of 
Campbell,” referring the Campbell Inquiry’s report of 1981 which had recommended 
lifting banking regulation.879 The Howard Government commissioned the Wallis 
Inquiry to do a “stocktake of financial deregulation.”880 With respect to 
superannuation, the Wallis Inquiry focused on the merits of promoting competition 
between superannuation, with choice of fund by employees one way of injecting 
competition into the funds market. Another means was the creation of SMSFs, 
discussed below. 
                                                             
875 Ibid., p.4. 
876 Ibid., p.5. 
877 Liberal Party of Australia, Superannuation Made Simple: a Handbook on How Your Super Will 
Work under Fightback!, September 1992, p.3. 
878 Alston, Security, Dignity and Independence in Retirement, p.18. 
879 Peter Costello, Shadow Treasurer,  “The Federal Coalition’s Approach to Superannuation,” Address 
to the Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia, Melbourne, 2 November 1995, p.11; Bryan 
Fitzgibbon and Marianne Gizycki, A History of Last-Resort Lending and other Support for Troubled 
Financial Institutions in Australia, Reserve Bank of Australia Research Discussion Paper, October 
2001, p.60. 
880 Costello, “The Federal Coalition’s Approach to Superannuation,” p.11.  
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The Wallis Inquiry recommended that superannuation fund members should have 
greater choice of funds in the name of promoting increased efficiency in the market. 
The idea was that maximised choice would increase competition in the sector, with a 
positive impact on fund performance and fees.881 Employees would have both choice 
of fund and the right to transfer their superannuation to any complying fund. Transfer 
costs incurred in members leaving their existing fund should be “transparent and 
reasonable.”882 The safeguards that would ensure choice were increased competition, 
member education and consumer protection measures. Member education would 
cover issues like the rights of members, life cycle needs, and the costs and benefits of 
exercising choice.883 Consumer protection referred to matters such as good disclosure 
by funds, regulation of the sales and advice process that included licensing of 
investment advisers, and proper dispute resolution procedures.884  
The Coalition’s approach to choice was governed by a belief that there was both a 
“philosophical justification and a practical need to wind back the more intense forms 
of prudential regulation and to shift the focus of regulation more to conduct by market 
participants and disclosure of information.”885 Private industry and regulators had the 
responsibility to ensure that consumers were educated and well-informed.886 Choice 
of fund was also intended to reduce the administrative burden on employers.887 In 
fleshing out the way that Choice of Fund would work, the opposition was almost 
certainly cognisant of the pitfalls associated with the assumption of consumer 
education. In written advice to Alston before the Superannuation Guarantee came into 
effect, actuary Michael Rice had recommended collection of contributions by the ATO 
be through the payroll system. The ATO would have a list of approved industry funds 
so that members could be given a choice. Rice suggested that funds issue a prospectus 
so that members could have “informed choice about the investments of their fund” but 
conceded that “in practice a majority of the population is financially naïve and will be 
confused by a prospectus.”888 
                                                             
881 Financial System Inquiry, Final Report (Commonwealth of Australia: Canberra, 1997), p.28. 
882 Ibid., Recommendation 88. 
883 Ibid., p.488. 
884 Ibid., p.488. 
885 Ibid., p.16. 
886 Ibid., p.16. 
887 Senate Select Committee on Superannuation, Choice of Fund, n.p. 
888 Michael Rice, “Superannuation Industry Funds: Collection of Contributions,” written advice to 
Senator Richard Alston, 13 May 1991, private papers of Michael Rice. 
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In 1997, five years after the introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee, the 
Howard Government introduced a new form of “Retirement Savings Account” (RSAs) 
as an alternative to superannuation funds.889 RSAs were offered by financial 
institutions such as banks and based on similar defined contribution pension products 
offered in the United States.890 RSAs are low-risk and therefore low-return products 
that have had minimal take-up, comprising $1.7 billion of the $2.9 trillion system in 
2019.891 The government argued that the introduction of RSAs would provide freedom 
of choice for members between company funds and industry funds.892 Some smaller 
financial institutions still offer RSAs but none of the four major banks do.893 
Also in 1997, the government announced legislation to give effect to the choice of fund 
recommendations of the Wallis Inquiry. The proposed legislation stipulated that 
employers be required to give all new staff a choice of fund from a list of five or more 
complying superannuation funds or RSAs nominated by the employer. That list of five 
funds had to include one RSA, one public offer fund, an industry fund or funds, an RSA 
provided by the financial institution receiving the employee’s pay, and an in-house 
superannuation fund. Where the new employee did not nominate a fund or RSA within 
28 days, contributions would be made to the fund or RSA chosen by the employer.894 
Costello argued that, combined with the introduction of RSAs, facilitating greater 
choice of funds for Superannuation Guarantee and award contributions would 
increase competition between different savings vehicles, leading to “improved returns 
and placing downward pressure on fund administration charges.”895 
The proposed changes to superannuation fund allocation represented an example of 
policy layering with potentially profound effects. If legislated, choice of fund would 
                                                             
889 Retirement Savings Account Act 1997 (Cth). 
890 These are known as “401(k)’s,” a reference to section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code 1986 
that permits employees to defer income tax on a portion of their retirement savings. 
891 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), Quarterly Superannuation Performance 
Statistics, June 2019. 
892 Senator Richard Alston, fax to Michael Rice, Draft Liberal Party Policy, 13 August 1992, p.4, private 
papers of Michael Rice. RSAs are accounts held with a financial institution, and so are not strictly 
“funds” as Alston describes. 
893 APRA, List of Institutions Providing Retirement Savings Accounts, 11 April 2016, available from 
https://www.apra.gov.au/list-institutions-offering-retirement-savings-accounts. 
894 Joint Ministerial Statement by Hon. Peter Costello, Treasurer and Hon. Jocelyn Newman, Minister 
for Social Security, Savings: Choice and Incentive, 13 May 1997, p.4. Following parliamentary and 
community negotiations, the bill that the government introduced in November 1997 differed from the 
original proposal announced in May by decreasing the choice options from five funds to four, and 
including a new “unlimited choice” option. 
895 Ibid., p.4. 
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effectively remove the industrial basis of occupational superannuation and open 
business for the banks and other financial institutions. In what was a concession to the 
idea of choice, the ALP responded by proposing that members not have choice of fund 
but that they have a number of choices of investments within funds. This was, the ALP 
argued, the “safest way to progress the issue,” without placing additional 
administrative burden on employers.896  
Labor drew on international experience to express its concerns about the implications 
of expanded choice. In the United Kingdom, workers were induced by private advisers 
giving poor advice, to leave the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) and 
transfer to new pension plans that were to their disadvantage.897 Between 1988 and 
1994, over five million personal pension plans were sold.898 The British Financial 
Services Authority estimated that the cost to people who were mis-sold pensions was 
over £11 billion.899 In Chile, choice of fund had led to individuals being “persuaded to 
change from fund to fund…with what amounted to bribes, gifts of various kinds – 
inducements, in order to change the fund to which they belonged.”900 The government 
responded to these international comparisons by noting the different regulatory 
contexts between those countries and Australia, and pointing to the “key feature 
statement which will require full disclosure of fees and charges” which would “allow 
employees to become aware of any circumstances of the adviser in terms of selling the 
product.”901 Neither Labor nor the Coalition resolved the issue of how educated in 
financial matters one could expect a fund member to be.  
                                                             
896 Kelvin Thomson MP, Shadow Assistant Treasurer, Threatening Investment Because of OHS is 
Fair, Speech to the Australian Workers Union Conference, Sydney, 18 November 1999.  
897 The UK’s earnings-based public pension scheme introduced in 1978 to top up the government age 
pension. It is distinguishable from private workplace or occupational schemes. 
898 Select Committee on Treasury, The Mis-Selling of Personal Pensions, Ninth Report, 17 November 
1998, available from 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmtreasy/712/71203.htm.  
899 Ibid. The figure was later updated to £13 billion. In 2018, the United Kingdom dealt with another 
example of pension mis-selling where around 8,000 members of the British Steel retirement fund 
gave up their guaranteed pensions for cash lump sums on the advice of private advisers. The FSA’s 
successor, the Financial Conduct Authority, intervened to halt the advice activities of the private 
advisers: see, for example, Josephine Cumbo, “British Steel Pension Probe Reveals Key Role of 
Advisers,” Financial Times, 12 October 2018. 
900 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Choice of 
Superannuation Funds) Bill 1998, Second Reading, Kelvin Thomson MP, CPD 16 February 1999, 
p.2855. 
901 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Choice of 
Superannuation Funds) Bill 1998, Second Reading, Julie Bishop, 16 February 1999, p.2865. Labor 
noted that the Thatcher government in Britain had also endorsed fund choice as being safe, lowering 
costs and having appropriate safeguards.  
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The choice of fund regime was introduced during a period in which there was a broader 
shift towards superannuation as an investment rather than a source of retirement 
savings alone. This is demonstrated by the creation of new types of superannuation 
savings vehicles, following the election of the Liberal-National government in 1996. In 
1999 a new category of small superannuation fund was established, the “Self-Managed 
Superannuation Fund” (SMSFs).902 These funds would be owned and controlled by 
individuals or spouse “mum and dad” investors, or small business owners with their 
own capital to secure and invest. SMSFs would be regulated by the Australian Taxation 
Office (ATO) rather than the prudential regulator, the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA).903 This is because prudential responsibility for SMSFs 
rests with the member-trustees themselves. 
The number of SMSFs has grown rapidly. There are now over 1.1 million SMSF 
members, up from 950,000 in 2013.904 The average assets of an SMSF is just over $1.2 
million, an increase of 27 per cent in five years.905 The SMSF sector has the most assets 
by fund type, despite only representing a small proportion of accounts (Figures 6 and 
7). There are concerns that SMSFs are being used for wealth management purposes 
rather than for retirement income saving, and concerns about their exposure to risk.906 
SMSFs are permitted to engage in activities that other, larger funds are not. This 
includes “limited recourse borrowing arrangements” (LRBAs) where the SMSF trustee 
takes out a loan from a third party, any returns from which go to the trustee. This has 
led to an emergence of tax minimisation practices to take advantage of tax-free funds 
held in the SMSF.907 The member-trustees of SMSFs are responsible for the 
                                                             
902 The Superannuation Legislation Amendment Act (No.3) 1999 (Cth) amended the Superannuation 
Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) to create a new category of small funds with fewer than five 
members, SMSFs. 
903 The different regulators and forms of data capture between funds has led to challenges in 
comparing data between SMSFs and other types of superannuation funds. See, for example, the 
discussion in the PC’s “Fees and Costs,” Technical Supplement 5 to Superannuation: Assessing 
Efficiency and Competitiveness, p.10.  
904 Australian Taxation Office (ATO), Self-Managed Super Funds: Statistical Overview 2016–17 
(Latest), available from https://www.ato.gov.au/Super/Self-managed-super-funds/In-
detail/Statistics/Annual-reports/Self-managed-super-funds--A-statistical-overview-2016-2017/. 
905 Ibid.  
906 Joanna Mather, “ATO Worried About $12 billion in SMSF Loans,” Financial Review, 19 January 
2019. 
907 Miranda Stewart, André Moore, Peter Whiteford and R. Quentin Grafton, A Stocktake of the Tax 
System and Directions for Reform: Five Years after the Henry Review, Tax and Transfer Policy 
Institute Paper, February 2015, p.49.  
210 
 
investment strategy of the fund which, in practice, has meant that SMSFs have been a 
boon for the financial advice industry, with mixed results for the funds involved.908  
Figure 6: SMSFs have the most assets of any fund type… 
 
Figure 7: …despite only representing a small proportion of 
superannuation entities 
 
Source: APRA (2019).909 
People have been able to amass these large pools of savings in SMSFs due to taxation 
and regulatory settings. ATO figures show that nearly 10 per cent of SMSFs have 
between $1 and $2 million in assets.910 The average SMSF account  balance is 
$645,000, while the average account balance across non-SMSF funds is $66,000.911 
However there is a wide distribution of balances within age cohorts – average balances 
rising significantly with age.912 Changes to superannuation taxation in 2007 made 
withdrawals of superannuation savings by retirees tax-free, and also introduced a 
                                                             
908 See, for example, Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), 18-19MR SMSF 
Advice Needs Significant Improvement, Media Release, 28 June 2018 and underlying report, Report 
575 SMSFs: Improving the Quality of Advice and Member Experiences and Report 576 Member 
Experiences with Superannuation Funds, available from https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-
centre/find-a-media-release/2018-releases/18-192mr-smsf-advice-needs-significant-improvement/.   
909 APRA, Quarterly Superannuation Statistics, June 2019, available from 
https://www.apra.gov.au/publications/quarterly-superannuation-statistics. 
910 ATO, Self-Managed Super Funds: Statistical Overview 2016–17. 
911 APRA, Annual Superannuation Bulletin, June 2017 (Published June 2018). 
912 PC, Superannuation: Assessing Efficiency and Competitiveness, p.83. 
211 
 
“transition to retirement” option that permitted workers to continue to contribute to 
superannuation after the fund was in the tax-free “pension mode.” The combined 
effect of these changes was that individuals were able to make contributions to their 
fund on which they paid no tax, rather than the ordinary 15 per cent on contributions. 
Further, until 2016 people could contribute unlimited amounts to superannuation.913  
The Senate Select Committee on Superannuation 
 
Institutionally, an important feature of the policy landscape during which choice of 
fund was debated was the existence of the bipartisan Senate Select Committee on 
Superannuation and Financial Services. It held inquiries, heard submissions and 
presented reports on a broad range of matters concerning superannuation, including 
choice of fund. The role of the moderate minor party, the Australian Democrats, was 
significant in the Committee, with the Democrats initiating its formation in 1991.914 
The Senate Committee produced a report on the implications of choice of fund in 1998, 
with Labor and Democrat members of the Committee opposing the passage of the 
legislation. In respect of the rationale behind choice of fund, the Committee heard 
evidence that there was already “a great deal of competition within the industry, 
particularly between fund administrators and investment managers, driven by the 
demand of well-informed trustees.”915  
The report by the Labor Senators noted that removal of superannuation from awards 
was “in essence, removing an established procedure for determining which default 
fund should apply and also removes the independent arbitrator, the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC).”916 Labor was not opposed to the principle 
of choice. The Hawke government had publicly expressed its view that employees 
should have choice of fund.917 But Labor believed that employees should not be forced 
to choose, that they had to be able to make an “informed choice,” and that choice of 
fund should not override industrial awards.918 The Minister for Revenue and Assistant 
                                                             
913 Under the 2016 federal budget changes, this was capped at $1.6 million over a person’s lifetime. 
914 The Senate Select Committee on Superannuation existed until 2003: Wayne Hooper, “The Senate 
Select Committee on Superannuation, 1991–2003,” Australian Parliamentary Library, Papers on 
Parliament No.45, August 2006. 
915 Senate Select Committee on Superannuation, Choice of Fund, n.p. 
916 Ibid. 
917 “Commonwealth position with regard to Superannuation Issues Raised by the Confederation of 
Australian Industry in its 1 September Letter to the Arbitration Commission,” Series A9488, 1986/137 
Part 6. 
918 Report, p.90. 
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Treasurer, Mal Brough, described Labor’s terms of choice as “not letting the workers 
of Australia choose.” Instead, choice for Labor was really a choice “determined by a 
union and an industry fund.”919 
The Democrats were concerned to ensure that workers were not being made worse off 
as a result of choice of fund legislation, and that the legislation not be used to 
undermine industry superannuation funds or to provide unfair advantage for larger 
financial institutions with their bigger advertising and marketing budgets.920 Labor 
and the Democrats made very similar observations about the impact of the proposal, 
with Labor calling it the “the most potentially damaging change to superannuation 
since the Superannuation Guarantee was introduced.”921 The Democrats observed that 
choice of fund legislation was “the most significant change to superannuation since the 
Superannuation Guarantee” because it sought to “end the characterisation of 
superannuation as an industrial matter by removing award superannuation clauses 
and by establishing superannuation arrangements directly between employers and 
individual employees rather than by collective determination.”922 The Democrats also 
noted, however, that there were problems with the award funds system, including 
multiple accounts and areas of underperformance.923  
Revised choice of fund legislation was introduced in November 1998 and passed the 
House of Representatives in 1999, but was defeated in the Senate in 2001. Legislation 
was again introduced in 2002 and was eventually passed with the support of the 
Australian Democrats in 2004. The Choice of Fund regime commenced in 2005. The 
legislation which was introduced in the new parliament in 2002 differed from the 
original bill in a number of ways, including by providing unlimited choice of fund for 
employees; a standard “choice of fund” form; the default fund to be selected by 
reference to an employee’s current fund and for new employees by reference to the 
                                                             
919 Minister Mal Brough, CPD, House of Representatives, 8 December 2005, p.86. 
920 Senator Lyn Allison, Australian Democrats, Supplementary Report, Choice of Fund, 28th Report of 
the Senate Select Committee on Superannuation, 1997, pp.98-99. 
921 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Choice of 
Superannuation Funds) Bill 1998, Second Reading, Kelvin Thomson, 16 February 1999, p.2856. 
922 Ibid., p.98. 
923 Senator Meg Lees, Leader of the Australian Democrats, Emerging Issues in Financial Services, 
Speech to IFSA, Sydney, 21 September 1999. During this speech, Lees also said to the funds 
assembled: “If you want a choice regime to take effect, then prove to us that workers will be better off, 
that costs can be contained, that the high returns of the industry fund trustee’s investment decisions 
will be replicated by workers in their decisions, and that Australia’s retirement savings pool will not be 
eroded.” 
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Commonwealth or Territory award; and by prescribing minimum levels of 
insurance.924  
The legislation established a new process to be followed for choosing a superannuation 
fund in the SG Act, and in so doing, is an example of institutional “displacement.” The 
legislation also “layered” other elements into the legislation, including by establishing 
the “default fund” that an employee would be placed in, should they not exercise a 
choice. The default fund would be that set out in the relevant Commonwealth or 
Territory award; in the absence of such a fund, the “majority fund;”925 and in the 
absence of both, any eligible fund chosen by the employer.926 If the relevant award 
provided for more than one superannuation fund, the employer had the responsibility 
of choosing the fund.927  
There was evidence at the time the legislation was introduced that contradicted the 
underlying ideas about individual decision-making. For decades, economic research 
had shown that individuals did not always make rational choices.928 Even after 
undertaking education programs such as the one promised by the government, 
individuals made less than optimal choices, highlighting the need to “ensure that 
appropriate default options are provided in superannuation funds.”929 In addition, 
research conducted shortly after the introduction of the legislation suggested that 
choice of fund would have minimal take-up, with only 7% of people changing funds, 
and within this group, just 4% changing funds as a conscious act of choice.930 Five 
years after the introduction of Choice of Fund, a 2010 survey by the Association of 
Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA) found that only 3.5% of respondents had 
                                                             
924 Senate Select Committee on Superannuation, Provisions of the Superannuation Legislation 
Amendment (Choice of Superannuation Funds) Bill 2002, Report, November 2002, available from 
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Former_Committees/supera
nnuation/completed_inquiries/2002-04/choice02/report/contents.  
925 The “eligible choice fund” to which the employer contributed on behalf of more employees than any 
other fund: section 32(K)(7), (8), (10). 
926 Section 32L. 
927 Section 32K(2). 
928 See, for example, H.A. Simon, “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, vol. 69, no.1 (1955): pp.99-118.  
929 Kerry Brown, Natalie Gallery & Gerry Gallery, “Superannuation Choice: the Pivotal Role of the 
Default Option,” Journal of Australian Political Economy, Special Issue on Superannuation, No.53 
(2004): p.3. 
930 Ross Clare, “The Introduction of Choice of Superannuation Fund: Results to Date,” Australian 
Accounting Review, vol.16, no.3 (2006): p.9. 
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changed their superannuation fund in the last year, with the main reasons given 
relating to poor returns or to consolidate their superannuation accounts.931  
Analysis of key changes in the Choice of Fund legislation 
 
The key changes to the SG Act made by Choice of Fund are set out below in Table 1.  
The Choice of Fund legislation introduced many changes and neither Table 1 nor the 
discussion that follows attempts to canvass all of them. Instead, the focus is on 
describing the critical changes to the process by which employees’ Superannuation 
Guarantee contributions were allocated to a fund and explaining those changes using 
the concepts of policy layering and displacement. 
Table 1: Key changes to the fund allocation process by the Choice of Fund 
legislation  
 
  
Original law 
 
Change to law  
 
Effect of change  
 
Mode of policy 
change 
 
1.  
 
No specification of 
the process for 
choosing the fund to 
which an employer 
makes contributions 
for the benefit of the 
employee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A contribution to a 
fund by an employer 
for the benefit of an 
employee is made in 
compliance with the 
choice of fund 
requirements if, at 
the time the 
contribution is 
made: 
 
1. there is no 
chosen fund 
for the 
employee; 
and 
 
2. the fund is 
an eligible 
choice fund 
for the 
employer.932 
[Section 
32C, SG 
Act] 
 
  
 
Introduces a new 
process in the 
existing legislation 
for employers to 
make 
contributions to 
funds.  
 
An employee is 
given the 
legislative right to 
choose a 
superannuation 
fund. If the 
employee does not 
exercise that right 
and is covered by 
an award, the 
employer allocates 
the employee’s 
superannuation to 
the default fund.  
 
Layering 
                                                             
931 ASFA, Spotlight on Super: Research into Superannuation Fund Member Attitudes (ASFA: 2010), 
pp.68-69, cited in Kai Swoboda, “Superannuation Legislation Amendment (MySuper Core Provisions) 
Bill 2011, Bills Digest No.119, 2001-12 (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, 2012).  
932 In other words, the employer’s default fund. 
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Original law 
 
Change to law  
 
Effect of change  
 
Mode of policy 
change 
 
2. 
 
A complying 
superannuation fund 
or scheme is a fund 
or scheme which is a 
complying 
superannuation fund 
for income tax 
purposes. [Section 
7, SG Act] 
 
 
A fund is an eligible 
choice fund for an 
employer if it is a 
complying 
superannuation 
fund; a complying 
superannuation 
scheme; a 
Retirement Savings 
Account; or funds 
under which 
contributions by an 
employer are 
presumed under 
ss24 and 25 of the 
SG Act. [Section 
32D] 
 
 
Creates the 
condition of a fund 
being an “eligible 
choice fund.” 
 
Includes 
complying 
superannuation 
funds within the 
list of eligible 
choice funds, and 
expands the types 
of funds to which 
contributions can 
be made to include 
Retirement 
Savings Accounts. 
 
Layering 
 
3.  
 
-  
 
A requirement in a 
Commonwealth 
industrial award or a 
Territory industrial 
award that an 
employer make 
contributions to a 
superannuation fund 
on behalf of an 
employee is not 
enforceable to the 
extent that the 
employer instead 
makes the 
contributions on 
behalf of the 
employee, in 
compliance with this 
Part, to another 
superannuation fund 
that is a chosen 
fund.933 [Section 
32Z] 
 
 
Inserts new section 
overriding 
Commonwealth 
and Territory 
award 
superannuation. 
 
 
Displacement 
 
The choice of fund regime established a new procedure for choice of fund by layering 
a new Part 3A into the SG Act. Until this point, there was no legislated choice of 
superannuation fund at the federal level whereby employees could determine to which 
                                                             
933 Funds contained in State industrial awards were deemed by the Choice of Fund legislation to 
comply with choice of fund requirements: section 32C(8) SG Act. 
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fund their superannuation contributions were made.934 Instead, the focus of the SG 
Act and its accompanying legislation, the Superannuation Guarantee Charge Act 
1992, was to broaden coverage of superannuation in the workforce through imposing 
tax penalties on employers who did not pay superannuation to employees, and up to a 
specified level.  
The new section 32C introduced a method for choosing an employee’s superannuation 
fund. The SG Act as originally drafted was silent on the procedure for choice of fund. 
Contributions could be made to any “complying superannuation fund or scheme.” The 
assumption was that the “complying superannuation fund” to which an employer 
made contributions for the benefit of the employee was established through the 
workplace bargaining context. All new employees would be given a “choice of fund” 
form on which they could nominate their preferred superannuation fund. New 
requirements were introduced around the information that had to be contained in the 
form, the time by which employers had to give employees the form, and which 
employees had to return the form. If the employee did not wish to nominate a fund, 
then on the choice of fund form they could elect to have the employer make 
contributions on their behalf to the employer’s default fund.  
The implication of this element of layering was that the power to choose a fund was 
taken out of the hands of the employer and placed into the hands of the employee. In 
effect, though, most employees did not exercise their right to choose a fund, 
demonstrating the critical importance of the default fund. This was a key concern of 
the MySuper reforms, discussed in the next section.  
The new section 32D introduced the concept of “eligible choice fund” into the SG Act. 
If an employee did not exercise their right to choose a fund then the new section 
required that the employer contribute on behalf of the employee to an eligible choice 
fund. This did not remove the existing concept of “complying superannuation scheme 
or fund” but rather expanded the categories of scheme and fund into which employers 
                                                             
934 Senate Select Committee on Superannuation, Provisions of the Superannuation Legislation 
Amendment (Choice of Superannuation Funds) Bill 2002 (Commonwealth of Australia: Canberra, 
2002), p.4. Industrial awards often gave the employee the right to choose their own fund, leading 
some to make the argument that a legislated choice of fund was unnecessary. Notwithstanding this, 
employee choice was not contained in all industrial awards, meaning that workers could be defaulted 
into funds that they may not wish to be in, or which underperformed. 
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could place an employee’s contributions. Notably, this list included Retirement 
Savings Accounts, which only financial institutions like the banks could offer.  
The third element of incremental change was section 32Z, which permitted employers 
to opt out of paying superannuation to funds nominated in Commonwealth or 
Territory industrial awards. This was a case of institutional displacement. For 
constitutional reasons, the choice of fund legislation did not apply to employees 
working under State awards. Nor did the choice of fund provisions override workplace 
agreements and they would only apply to public sector arrangements to the extent that 
employer Superannuation Guarantee and award contributions were funded.935 This 
was a legislative provision of the SG Act that was drafted to override industrial awards, 
having the effect of placing more power in the hands of employers. From an 
institutional perspective, it also had the effect of displacing the position of industrial 
awards as the default mechanism for allocating employees into superannuation funds. 
Following the introduction of the Choice of Fund regime in 2005, the retail and small 
funds sectors increased their share of funds (Figure 8).936 Practices like “vertical 
integration” were  behind this increase, whereby the banks would offer products to 
employers at a reduced rate, inducing them to choose a default fund from the bank. 
“Bundling” business loans and superannuation was one example of vertical 
integration. The outcome of bundling was that employees were presented with default 
funds that had been selected through a process that was not transparent and which 
often involved commercial benefit to employers and the banks.937 
  
                                                             
935 Liberal and National Parties, Our Future Action Plan, p.4. 
936 APRA, Annual Superannuation Bulletin, June 2008 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 
2009), p.6. 
937 The government has since passed legislation to ban superannuation fund trustees from using goods 
or services to influence employers to nominate a superannuation fund as their default fund: Treasury 
Laws Amendment (Improving Accountability and Member Outcomes in Superannuation Measures 
No 1) Act 2019. 
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Figure 8: The retail and small funds sectors increased their share of 
funds after Choice of Fund was introduced 
 
Assets by fund type 
 
Source: APRA.938 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s each of the major four Australian banks acquired 
wealth management arms,939 with superannuation comprising the largest part of that 
business. By 2002 over 60% of the retail funds management industry came under the 
auspices of four major banks, AMP and AXA.940 The key motivation for acquiring these 
wealth management arms was “the opportunity to cross-sell a broader range of 
financial services to their existing customer base and to gain exposure to the rapidly 
growing superannuation market.”941 Concerns emerged about the fees associated with 
these funds, the lower average returns than to industry funds,942 and practices 
whereby banks would seek to integrate products they offered to businesses in order to 
be a more attractive default option for employers.943 
                                                             
938 APRA, Annual Superannuation Bulletin, June 2013 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2014), 
p.6.  
939 In 2001 National Australia Bank (NAB) acquired MLC and the Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
(CBA) acquired Colonial First State; in 2002, Westpac acquired BT Financial Group; and in 2009, 
ANZ acquired ING’s wealth management, life insurance and advice businesses in Australia and New 
Zealand. 
940 Nicholas Morris, Management and Regulation of Pension Schemes. Australia – A Cautionary 
Tale (Routledge, 2018), p.84. 
941 Theodore Golat, “Banks’ Wealth Management Activities in Australia,” Reserve Bank of Australia 
Bulletin, September 2016, available from 
https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2016/sep/7.html.   
942 Anna Fenech, “Retail Funds Underperform all the Rest in Past Decade: APRA,” The Australian, 27 
July 2007. 
943 This is a practice known as “vertical integration.” The practical manifestation of vertical integration 
is commonly through the interface of an “independent” financial advisor, who is paid a commission by 
a bank or wealth management group for the sale of that entity’s products.   
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The entrance of the banks into the superannuation market also produced a shift in 
mentality amongst industry superannuation funds. The Choice of Fund regime created 
a “choice market.” This market was less about employees choosing a fund and more 
about employers’ power to choose any fund, irrespective of the industrial award. 
Industry superannuation funds responded by increasing their spending on advertising 
and marketing in a bid to “out-compete” the banks.  
Despite the increased competition in the superannuation market, Choice of Fund did 
not produce the outcomes that its proponents gave as justifications for its 
introduction. Account fees remained high in absolute and relative terms, consistently 
3 percentage points higher than the OECD median expense ratio for private pension 
fund fees and expenses between 2001 and 2013.944 Many people continued to have 
multiple superannuation accounts.945 Finally, Choice of Fund did not address the 
issues of coverage in the superannuation system. Increased competition for market 
share in compulsory savings still left the same groups outside of the Superannuation 
Guarantee as the time when it was introduced. In 2009–10, 69.7 per cent of men were 
covered by superannuation and the median account balance across all age groups was 
$38,800. By way of contrast, 62.5 per cent of women were covered by superannuation 
and the median account balance was $22,200.946 
MySuper: layering 
 
Labor’s concerns about the merits of a choice model of fund selection informed the 
subsequent set of reforms by the Rudd-Gillard Government (2007–2013). Labor’s 
rationale was that employees should be free to choose their superannuation fund, but 
that if they did not exercise that choice, they should be defaulted into a fund that had 
certain basic features. Labor initiated a review into the governance, efficiency, 
structure and operation of the superannuation system in 2009 (the “Cooper 
Review”).947 Superannuation contribution levels and taxation of superannuation were 
excluded from the Cooper Review, those matters coming under the purview of the 
                                                             
944 See discussion in Jim Minifie, Tim Cameron and Jim Savage, Super Sting: How to Stop 
Australians Paying Too Much Superannuation (Melbourne: Grattan Institute 2014), p.5. 
945 Even today, four in ten members have multiple superannuation accounts: PC, Superannuation: 
Assessing Efficiency and Competitiveness, p.84.  Holders of multiple accounts pay multiple sets of 
fees and other features that can diminish savings, such as life insurance fees. 
946 ABS, Household Income and Wealth, 2013-14, Cat.No.6523.0. 
947 Treasury, Review into the Governance, Efficiency, Structure and Operation of Australia’s 
Superannuation System (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2009)(the “Cooper Review”). 
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concurrent review into Australia’s Future Tax System (the “Henry Review”).948 In its 
review of Choice of Fund, the Cooper Review assessed the operation of the system for 
members; for instance, whether they were actively engaged in their superannuation or 
were “passive defaulting members.” The assessment would focus on maximising 
member returns, including through minimising costs and conflicts of interest.949  
In introducing the concept of choice architecture, the Cooper Review was refuting the 
underlying assumption of choice, that of the rational and informed investor. The 
Review found that disclosure to members had failed to achieve its objectives, that   
 
whatever the actual level of engagement and literacy among members, a 
regulatory model built around detailed disclosure and member choice has not 
worked for a substantial portion of the member population.950  
 
The reason why the choice model had failed was because superannuation operated 
differently from an open market in which competition would allocate resources 
efficiently, according to classical economic theory. Superannuation was compulsory 
and employees would consequently often fail to choose a fund, typically becoming a 
member of their employer’s default fund.951 Citing ABS evidence, the report found that 
members often had very limited financial literacy.952  
 
Accordingly, the Cooper Review developed the idea that a compulsory superannuation 
system like Australia’s could not depend on all of its participants having the skills 
necessary to comprehend complex financial information or being investment 
experts.953 It proposed the use of “choice architecture,” whereby employees would be 
guided in their choice of fund. The concept was drawn from contemporary behavioural 
economics, and its philosophy was “libertarian paternalism,” the idea that  
 
                                                             
948 Treasury, Australia’s Future Tax System. Report to the Treasurer (Canberra: Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2010)(the “Henry Review”). 
949 Cooper Review, Part One, p.v.   
950 Ibid., p.6  
951 Ibid., p.8. 
952 The Cooper Review referred to ABS data showing that 46 per cent of 15 to 74 year olds, or 
approximately 7 million people, would struggle to understand documentation such as job applications, 
maps and payroll forms: Super System Review, Part One, p.8. 
953 Ibid., p.4. 
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the outcomes experienced by inert or disengaged consumers should have 
inbuilt settings that most closely suit those consumers’ objective needs, as 
assessed by the expert providers of the product or service in question.954  
MySuper is a superannuation product offered by funds that must contain a set of basic 
features designed to maximise member returns and minimise fees. The features of 
MySuper products included a single diversified investment strategy and limits on 
fees.955 Superannuation funds could still offer non-MySuper products, but these were 
for superannuation outside the mandatory Superannuation Guarantee default fund 
environment to which Choice of Fund applied.956 Superannuation trustees have duties 
in respect of MySuper products that do not necessarily apply to other products, 
including minimising costs; increased transparency requirements so members can 
compare funds; provision of intra-fund advice; simpler communications; and a 
pension component for retirement.  
From an institutional perspective, MySuper was a concept layered on to Choice of 
Fund, in turn layered on to the Superannuation Guarantee. It was designed by the 
Cooper Review to “sit within the existing superannuation structures and is based on 
existing widely offered and well understood default investment options.”957 This was 
achieved by legislation passed in July 2013,958 introducing a new Part 2C to the 
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) and amending the SG Act. The 
changes to the existing legislation meant that in order to properly qualify as a default 
superannuation fund that could receive Superannuation Guarantee contributions 
made by an employer, the fund had to offer a MySuper product.959 Employers would 
be liable for an increased Superannuation Guarantee shortfall if they did not pay 
contributions for an employee to a fund that offered a MySuper product.960  
 
 
                                                             
954 Ibid., p.9. 
955 CCH, Guide to MySuper, SuperChoice and SuperStream (CCH: Sydney, 2013), p.16. 
956 Ibid, p.16. 
957 Ibid., p.11. 
958 Superannuation Legislation Amendment (MySuper Core Provisions) Act 2012 (Cth), 
Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Further MySuper and Transparency Measures) Act 2012 
(Cth). 
959 Section 32C(2) SG Act. 
960 Section 29R(4) Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth)(“SIS Act”). 
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Analysis of key changes in the MySuper legislation 
 
Table 2 sets out the changes to the choice of fund regime contained in the SG Act by 
the MySuper legislation. Like the above section on the Choice of Fund legislation, 
Table 2 and its discussion describe the key legislative changes introduced by MySuper 
and explains those as forms of incremental change. The focus is on the way that 
MySuper changed the choice of fund regime introduced in 2005, working with the 
institution of the Superannuation Guarantee to build protections around defaults.  
Table 2: Key changes to the choice of fund regime by the MySuper      
legislation  
 
  
Original law 
 
Change to law  
 
Effect of 
change  
 
Mode of 
policy 
change 
 
1.  
 
A contribution to a fund 
by an employer for the 
benefit of an employee 
is made in compliance 
with the choice of fund 
requirements if, at the 
time the contribution is 
made: 
 
1. there is no 
chosen fund for 
the employee; 
and 
 
2. the fund is an 
eligible choice 
fund for the 
employer;961 
and 
 
3. the fund 
complies with 
the 
requirements 
(if any) set out 
in the 
regulations in 
relation to 
offering 
insurance in 
respect of 
death. 
[Section 32C, 
SG Act] 
 
  
 
A contribution to a fund 
by an employer for the 
benefit of an employee 
is made in compliance 
with the choice of fund 
requirements if, at the 
time the contribution is 
made: 
 
1. there is no 
chosen fund for 
the employee; 
and 
 
2. the fund is an 
eligible choice 
fund for the 
employer; and  
 
3. a class of 
beneficial 
interest in the 
fund is a 
MySuper 
product; and 
 
4. the fund 
complies with the 
requirements (if 
any) set out in 
the regulations in 
relation to 
offering 
insurance in 
respect of death. 
[Section 32C, 
SG Act] 
 
Introduces a new 
provision that a 
MySuper product 
can be 
nominated by an 
employer to 
comply with 
choice of fund 
requirements.  
 
This is in 
addition to 
existing 
requirements.  
 
Layering 
 
                                                             
961 In other words, the employer’s default fund. 
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Original law 
 
Change to law  
 
Effect of 
change  
 
Mode of 
policy 
change 
 
2. 
 
- 
 
Conditions are imposed 
on RSE licensees that 
are authorised to offer a 
class of beneficial 
interest in a regulated 
superannuation fund as 
a MySuper product. 
[Section 29E(6A), 
SIS Act] 
 
Introduces a new 
requirement for 
all RSE licensees 
to ensure that the 
governing rules 
of the 
superannuation 
fund that the 
licensee offers 
comply with the 
characteristics of 
a MySuper 
product. 
 
 
 
Layering 
 
3. 
 
- 
 
A product is a MySuper 
product if, under the 
governing rules of the 
fund, a single, 
diversified investment 
strategy is to be adopted 
in relation to the assets 
of the fund; all fund 
members are entitled to 
access the same options, 
benefits and facilities. 
[Section 29TC, SIS 
Act] 
 
Introduces new 
requirements 
and 
characteristics of 
a MySuper 
product which 
must be satisfied 
before an RSE is 
authorised to 
offer the product. 
 
Layering 
 
The major legislative change introduced by the MySuper legislation provided that 
employers would comply with choice of fund requirements if they nominated a 
MySuper product on behalf of the employee for whom the employer was paying the 
Superannuation Guarantee (change 1). The effect of this section was to require 
employers to have a default superannuation fund that complied with the MySuper 
requirements. If an employee did not choose their own superannuation fund, as most 
did not,962 then there would be a set of baseline standards around the fund that the 
employee was defaulted into. The way that this change was effected was to introduce 
a new subsection963 which operated in addition to the existing parts of section 32C(2). 
In so doing, the new subsection was layered into the existing choice of fund regime, 
becoming another element of it.  
                                                             
962 Hazel Bateman, Retirement Incomes in Australia in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis, 
Discussion Paper 3/10, (Sydney: Centre for Pensions and Superannuation, 2009), pp.10-11.  
963 Section 32C(2)(c). 
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New sections were introduced in the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 
(Cth)(“SIS Act”).964 The rules governing the superannuation fund would have to 
comply with the characteristics of a MySuper product (change 2).965 This was another 
example of policy layering, creating a legal requirement for compliance, introduced as 
a consequence of the MySuper regime. Characteristics of MySuper products were also 
set out in the SISA Act (change 3). This section was layered on to the existing 
provisions of the SIS Act and was a consequence of the introduction of MySuper in the 
SG Act. 
The key institutional implication of MySuper has been to place a safety net for 
members underneath the Choice of Fund regime. It remains the model of fund 
allocation today: members may choose their superannuation fund and in the event 
that they do not exercise that choice, default funds are worked out in the industrial 
context. Many employers are still required to choose a default fund from those listed 
in the modern award or enterprise bargaining agreement.966 The issue over choice of 
fund, and especially defaults, remains in contention, reflecting the persistence of the 
Superannuation Guarantee as the institution that frames the political debates. 
As much as it was intended to be a way of minimising fees and risks for non-engaged 
members, MySuper resides within a compulsory, privatised system in which members 
do ultimately bear investment risk. The 2018 Royal Commission into Misconduct in 
the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry (the “Banking Royal 
Commission”), found evidence of superannuation funds taking longer than the 
required time to transfer “old” default funds into MySuper accounts for business 
reasons.967 The government had already given funds five years for the transition. 
Further, there have been signs that MySuper products themselves are not always 
providing the best outcomes. The Productivity Commission has found that about 1.6 
million member accounts and $57 billion in assets are in MySuper products that 
underperformed against conservative benchmarks in the 11 years to 2018.968 There is 
recent evidence to show that superannuation products classified as “MySuper” have 
                                                             
964 Section 29TC. 
965 Section 29E(6A). 
966 PC, Superannuation: Assessing Efficiency and Competitiveness, p.528. 
967 Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services 
Industry, Final Report Volume 2 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2019), p.69. 
968 PC, Superannuation: Assessing Efficiency and Competitiveness, p.528. 
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areas of underperformance.969 There is also evidence that the introduction of MySuper 
products led to additional compliance, product design and systems costs that were 
passed on through higher fees to members, which partly offset the reduction in asset-
based fees resulting from their simpler investment design.970  
No signs of stopping: the continued debate over choice of fund 
 
The process of fund allocation remains one of the most significant and contested areas 
of superannuation. Attempts have been made by the conservative side of politics to 
wind back MySuper and return to the Choice of Fund regime as it existed in 2005. The 
Coalition Abbott government in 2016 introduced choice of fund legislation, which was 
not passed by the parliament. The government was committed to developing and 
releasing criteria to assess the “efficiency and competitiveness of the superannuation 
system, including the choice and default markets and to develop alternative models 
for allocating default members to products.”971 As a result of a review process that 
commenced under the Abbott government in 2014, the Productivity Commission 
conducted a review into the allocation of members to superannuation funds. The 
report was released in 2019. In a return to the original logic behind Choice of Fund, 
the Productivity Commission was tasked with looking at “alternative models for a 
formal competitive process for allocating default fund members in the 
superannuation system to products and to develop a workable model.”972 It found that 
MySuper was a “strong step in the right direction” but lacked ways of ensuring that the 
default option in defined contribution funds was a good deal.973 
The Productivity Commission proposed that new employees be presented with a list of 
ten highly performing funds from which to choose to place their superannuation 
                                                             
969 In 2018 the Productivity Commission found that there was wide variation in the default fund 
segment, with approximately 1.6 million accounts and $57 billion in assets in MySuper products that 
underperformed conservative benchmarks tailored to each product’s own asset allocation over the 11 
years to 2018. The Productivity Commission said that this finding “suggests that many members are 
currently being defaulted into underperforming products and could be doing better.” 
Superannuation: Assessing Efficiency and Competitiveness (Commonwealth of Australia: Canberra, 
2018), p.52. 
970 OECD, Pensions Outlook 2018 (Paris: OECD Publishing), p.84. 
971 Australian Government, Improving Australia’s Financial System: Government Response to the 
Financial System Inquiry (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2015), p.5.  
972 PC, Superannuation: Assessing Efficiency and Competitiveness, p.viii, emphasis added. 
973 Productivity Commission, “How to Assess the Competitiveness and Efficiency of the 
Superannuation System.” Research Report, (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2016), p.3 cited 
in Geoffrey Kingston and Susan Thorp, “Superannuation in Australia: A Survey of the Literature,” 
Economic Record 95, no.308 (2019): p.154. 
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savings. The “best in show” list would be developed by an independent, expert panel 
appointed by the government of the day. The panel would assess applications from 
funds to be named on the list on the basis of the fund’s likelihood of delivering strong 
long-term outcomes for members. Only MySuper products would be eligible for 
shortlisting.974 The idea behind a “best in show” list was guided by developments in 
behavioural economics: to support member engagement by “nudging” them towards 
good products without forcing them to pick one, producing a modified, “simple choice” 
environment.975 
Were a “best in show” proposal to be introduced, it would introduce a new competitive 
process for the default sector. New employees or those without superannuation funds 
would still be given a choice of fund form, but the form would contain a shortlist of 10 
funds from which to choose. Any member who failed to make a choice within 60 days 
would be defaulted into one of the products on the shortlist, selected via sequential 
allocation.976 The new default system would apply to new employees only, and 
employees would carry the same fund with them from job to job.977 There would also 
be an option for employees to choose any other superannuation fund or to place their 
contributions into an SMSF.  
The Labor Party and the union movement have fiercely opposed the Productivity 
Commission’s proposal.978 Echoing the original misgivings expressed by Labor and 
Democrats during the original Choice of Fund debates, the process of allocating 
members to default funds through “best in show” would decouple fund allocation from 
the industrial award system. Moreover, the Productivity Commission recommended 
that terms in enterprise and workplace agreements that restrict member choice would 
be invalidated.979 Labor’s Treasury spokesperson, Chris Bowen, said that the 
government had “consistently attacked industry funds, despite the fact the 
                                                             
974 Productivity Commission, Superannuation Efficiency, p.32. 
975 The term “nudge” is taken from Thaler and Sunstein’s book of the same name that was responsible 
for popularising behavioural economics: Richard Thaler & Cass Sunstein, Nudge: Improving 
Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness (London: Penguin, 2008); Productivity Commission, 
Superannuation Efficiency, pp.31-32. 
976 Productivity Commission, Superannuation Efficiency, p.65. 
977 Presently, employees must make a choice of fund or be defaulted into one on the commencement of 
each new contract of employment. 
978 See, for example, John Kehoe and Joanna Mather, “Productivity Commission Super Report: Labor 
Slams “Attack” on Union Super,” Financial Review, 10 January 2019; David Marin-Guzman and 
Joanna Mather, “Productivity Commission Super Report: ACTU Accuses PC of ‘ideological 
fanaticism,’” Financial Review, 10 January 2019 
979 Ibid., p.65. 
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Commission’s report confirms that industry funds are, by and large, the best 
performers in the superannuation sector.”980 
The responses to the “best in show” proposal demonstrate that the Superannuation 
Guarantee system has generated more than investment risks for individuals. Informed 
choice through “best in show” seeks to manage risks for members, but in doing so 
underlines the point that it is members who bear ultimate risk under the 
Superannuation Guarantee. To improve transparency, the Productivity Commission 
recommended that the government require funds to publish “simple, single-page 
product dashboards for all superannuation investment options.”981 But the 
Superannuation Guarantee, as an industrial creation, has also generated an ongoing 
issue of political risk, where superannuation policy is subject to layering, displacement 
and continuing change. 
Along with risk, another continuity in the institution of superannuation has been 
ensuring coverage and equity. A contributory system based on wage earnings will 
reflect inequalities in earnings, absent a redistributive element. There are debates 
about the ways of measuring retirement income adequacy, and whether women’s 
personal retirement savings should be assessed in isolation or as part of household 
income and wealth. On an individual level, it is clear that the “superannuation savings 
gap” between women and men continues to reflect the gap in wages. Those on low 
incomes are also outside of the system, with the Superannuation Guarantee only being 
paid to people earning over $450 per month from a single employer. As has been 
argued throughout this thesis, a contributory, occupational model of superannuation 
has also excluded those outside the workforce. 
Conclusion 
 
The debates concerning choice of fund and who has financial control over 
superannuation savings have been analysed in this chapter through an institutional 
lens, focusing on the ideas and politics behind them. The legislative reforms brought 
in through Choice of Fund by the Howard Government displaced some aspects of the 
Superannuation Guarantee and layered new elements on to it. The effect was to create 
                                                             
980 Eryk Bagshaw, “$3.8 billion Super Reforms Face Labor Roadblock,” Sydney Morning Herald, 10 
January 2019. Union-affiliated industry funds have performed better overall, despite some areas of 
underperformance: PC, Superannuation: Assessing Efficiency and Competitiveness, pp.7-8. 
981 Ibid., p.68. 
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a new market of competition amongst private superannuation funds, with funds 
responding through increases in marketing costs. One would expect to have found that 
greater competition drove down fund fees but there remained variability in fees 
charged and the returns on investment. The problems of risk and coverage remain, 
and complexity has been introduced. 
As a response to Choice of Fund, the Rudd-Gillard Labor Government introduced a 
regime to provide “guided choice” of fund. The MySuper legislation built on the 
incremental changes introduced by Choice of Fund, further layering a new product in 
the default section of the legislation that would contain baseline features including 
minimal fees and transparency requirements. The intention of this change was to 
safeguard that proportion of members who still did not exercise their right to choose 
a superannuation fund, so that they were not being defaulted into superannuation 
products with high fees and low returns. MySuper has made some inroads into 
bringing down member fees, but even today, there remains variability in fees charged 
and returns on investment. 
The debates over choice of fund membership are deeply political. On the one hand, the 
Labor Party introduced the Superannuation Guarantee and sees itself as the custodian 
of the industrial system it is based on. The ALP also has close ties with the union-
backed industry funds sector. The Coalition was originally opposed to compulsory 
superannuation but was aware that as time elapsed, with the savings pool significantly 
increasing, it was becoming very difficult to unwind. As a result, the Coalition sought 
to introduce incremental changes designed to foster greater competition amongst 
funds and to loosen the hold that industry funds had over the market.   
Just as occupational superannuation was the institutional basis for the successful 
introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee, it has also been the basis for its 
“marketisation.” Adam Stebbing has observed that the Superannuation Guarantee 
supported the creation of a “super market” in which products are supplied by funds 
competing with each other to maximise investment returns and market share – a 
feature which was absent in the old occupational benefits system.982 Stebbing argues 
                                                             
982 Adam Stebbing, “Privatising Retirement in a Financialising Market: Risk-shifting and Rent-seeking 
in Australian Superannuation Policy,” Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia Workshop on 
Theorising the Dynamics of Social Service Markets, Macquarie University, Sydney, 4th to 6th April 
2018, p.5; Adam Stebbing, “The Devil’s in the Detail: Hidden Costs of Private Retirement Incomes 
229 
 
that the market for superannuation first started to grow with the expansion of industry 
funds in the late 1970s. Moreover, the Superannuation Guarantee created a 
government-supported market through making contributions to funds compulsory. 
The government also supports the private market through tax concessions on fund 
earnings. The occupational basis of the system’s design set up a tension between 
superannuation savings being allocated through industrial awards or through 
individual choice.  
If anything, debate over choice and control will become more acute as the $2.9 trillion 
pool of national savings grows. It is a product of the decision to implement a 
mandatory, defined contributions private savings system in 1992. The debates over 
choice of fund would not occur if Australia had a national superannuation scheme into 
which members were defaulted. No doubt there would still be debates about the 
investment returns and likely outlays of such a fund, given Australia’s ageing 
population. Institutionally, however, the Superannuation Guarantee set a pathway of 
political division between those who supported its creation, and those who acquiesced 
in its existence, but would not be content to allow it to remain within the industrial 
system. 
  
                                                             
Policy,” in G Meagher & S Goodwin, eds. Markets, Rights and Power in Australian Social Policy 
(Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2015), pp.115-151. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
 
This thesis originated with the ambition of understanding why policy change 
happens. Australian superannuation was not just any change, but the introduction of 
a new system of retirement savings and one of the most significant policies to be 
introduced by the Commonwealth Parliament for many years. Across all age groups, 
91.7 per cent of employees are covered by superannuation.983  The pool of savings 
held in superannuation funds is $2.9 trillion, and by 2017 was the fourth largest in 
the OECD as a percentage of GDP.984 The key explanation is that large scale change 
has had long-term institutional roots. Without occupational superannuation, and the 
institutions of Australia’s welfare state that included centralised wages, the private 
system of superannuation would not exist today. But incremental change has been 
central too, and has co-existed with “big bang” change. 
This concluding chapter draws together the historical insights from the thesis. It 
organises the findings around the central thesis question and its three sub-questions: 
Why does Australia have its superannuation system? 
 
1. Why didn’t Australia adopt a national (public) superannuation system? 
2. Why was a private, occupational superannuation system introduced in 1992? 
3. What are the consequences of the decision to introduce a private occupational 
superannuation system? 
The chapter then looks at areas for future research emanating from the study of 
Australian superannuation. Finally, it discusses some recent proposals for 
government-run superannuation in Australia. The idea of national superannuation is 
not yet dead.  
Why does Australia have its system of superannuation? 
Using historical institutionalism as its guiding framework to answer the central 
thesis question meant going back to the origins of the institution of superannuation 
in Australia. This history starts in the mid-19th century, when the first occupational 
superannuation schemes were established. The first debates about contributory 
                                                             
983 ABS, Survey of Income and Housing, 2015–16, Cat.No.6553.0.  
984 OECD 2019, http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/private-pensions/globalpensionstatistics.htm.   
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pension financing occurred in the context of debates about old age pensions in the 
late 19th century. Until the late 1970s, policy debates and legislation on 
superannuation concerned a proposed government-run, social insurance scheme.  
The sequencing of national retirement income policy was critical. By the early 20th 
century,  occupational superannuation schemes had begun to be formed in large 
private firms and the Commonwealth Old Age Pension had been established. These 
forms of occupational and public welfare made the implementation of any 
government scheme of national superannuation that came afterwards more complex.  
Significant changes in political support for superannuation occurred. The Labor 
Party began a rhetorical shift towards contributory pensions in the post-war era, 
softening and then abandoning its prior opposition. This was solidified through the 
Whitlam government’s support for national superannuation in the mid-1970s. The 
institution of occupational superannuation emerged as an option for a national 
scheme following industrial disputes over superannuation as a workplace 
entitlement in the late 1970s. This old institution would serve as the basis for the 
modern superannuation system, superannuation policy having been entirely recast 
by the ALP as an industrial matter. Working with the institution of occupational 
superannuation and adapting it produced Australia’s modern superannuation 
system.  
The major insight about policy change is that refashioning very old institutions can 
produce radical change. Old age welfare settings were entrenched in Australia and 
these were closely related to the (male) wage earners’ welfare state. It was most likely 
that any change which occurred would emerge out of these ways of “doing welfare.” 
In a sense, it would have been more surprising if a social insurance scheme had been 
implemented, whether a comprehensive one or a specific superannuation scheme for 
old age. Other taxpayer-funded schemes have been introduced, in health 
(“Medibank” – now “Medicare” – introduced in 1975 and 1984), and disability (the 
National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS), introduced in 2013). These are not 
schemes of insurance either, but do serve as comparators of successful policy change.   
The thesis also confirms the need for institutional dynamism in order for historical 
institutionalism to provide a general theory of policy change and stasis. Historical 
institutionalism has regarded change as either a “critical juncture” of path-departing 
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change, or incremental change without sufficient consideration of the relationship 
between the two.985 The critical juncture of superannuation policy that occurred in 
the 1980s had its roots in a policy shift that began to take place in the 1970s, driven 
by the failure of national superannuation and the emergence of industry 
superannuation funds. Incremental change also post-dated the critical juncture, with 
changes to the manner in which members are allocated to funds. 
The policy issues anticipated with contributory pension schemes have also exhibited 
their own path dependency. These issues include the financial risk of defined 
contribution pension schemes, coverage and exclusions, and retirement income 
adequacy. From the public debates about pension financing in the 1890s and 1900s, 
to the proposals for superannuation in the 20th century, right through to present-day 
debates, the disadvantage women face under contributory superannuation has been 
raised. Embedding a contributory, industrial model of superannuation means that 
gender equality in retirement savings is predicated on gender equality during 
working life: superannuation reflects wage inequalities, and these are gendered. Even 
in younger age brackets, women have lower superannuation coverage and lower 
account balances.986  
Likewise, some workers accumulate little superannuation because of patchy or 
seasonal work. Some workers do not accumulate superannuation at all, including the 
self-employed and contract workers. Many workers simply do not receive the 
compulsory superannuation payments that they are entitled to – the Australian Tax 
Office has estimated that unpaid superannuation is $2.8 billion each year.987 
 
 
                                                             
985 Stephen Bell and Hui Feng, “Rethinking Critical Juncture Analysis: Institutional Change in Chinese 
Banking and Finance,” Review of International Political Economy (August 2019): pp.1-23. 
986 For example, coverage for women aged 25–34 is 83.3 per cent and for men it is 87.7 per cent. The 
median account balance for women in the same age group is $23,000 and for men it is $26,000: Ibid.  
987 Australian Taxation Office (ATO), Superannuation Guarantee Gap, 29 August 2017, available from 
https://www.ato.gov.au/Media-centre/Media-releases/ATO-releases-Super-Guarantee-gap-
estimate/. Another estimate is that unpaid superannuation is $6 billion per year: Industry Super 
Australia, Super Scandal: Unpaid Super Guarantee in 2016–17 (Melbourne: Industry Super 
Australia, 2017). 
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1. Why didn’t Australia adopt a system of superannuation based on principles of 
national insurance? 
Central to understanding why Australia has the private, occupational superannuation 
system it does was the rejection of a national superannuation scheme. Existing 
institutions of old age welfare provided minimal public support, complemented by 
concessionally taxed private savings. Like the United Kingdom, Australia was a 
“liberal” welfare state with a minimal old age pension, but with additional elements of 
welfare delivered through work – as Castles described it, the “wage earners’ welfare 
state.” This model of welfare would survive the first debates about whether to 
introduce national insurance, and the attempts to implement a system in 1913, 1928 
and 1938. Opposition to these proposals came from doctors, farmers, insurers, 
actuaries, and the Labor Party. The idea of a national superannuation scheme would 
continue to be debated, but not until the 1970s would it be the subject of another 
national inquiry.  
 
This time, however, it would be the Labor Party that proposed a national 
superannuation scheme. By the late 1970s, industrial disputes about the “right” to 
occupational superannuation would set in motion a new pathway for superannuation 
policy to become an industrial matter. The first “industry” superannuation funds were 
established at this time. All of this would set the scene for the 1980s, under which the 
Accord and the “wage trade-off” cemented occupational superannuation as the 
institution through which superannuation coverage would be pursued. The idea of 
national superannuation would become an idea from another time, an “irrelevance” to 
Labor policy makers working pragmatically, and with a preference for market-based 
policies. 
 
A note also needs to be made about the role of historical accident. It is not the case that 
there was outright rejection of national superannuation. Legislation for national 
superannuation was introduced into the parliament in 1928, and separate legislation 
passed in 1938, before being abandoned in 1939. The Whitlam Government also 
planned to introduce a scheme, before its dismissal in November 1975. We can only 
speculate on whether different circumstances would have seen a national 
superannuation scheme implemented, and how successful it would have been. These 
instances lend further weight to the argument that path dependency cannot be applied 
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simplistically: national superannuation was not unsuccessful because it had been 
unsuccessful before. Again, there were unique circumstances that operated against the 
introduction of national superannuation in each instance. 
2. Why was state-mandated, occupational superannuation successfully 
introduced? 
Several drivers of change created the conditions for the modern superannuation 
system to be introduced. In a case of path reaction, the new Hawke Labor Government 
came to office in 1983 with an economic approach defined by its difference from the 
Whitlam era. The idea of a big government scheme was not suited to economic 
conditions or approaches at the time. Sound economic management was the highest 
priority for policy makers: superannuation was made into a bargaining tool in the 
Accord. This was a pragmatic policy response to the high level of inflation, the need to 
reduce real wages and to bring the economy out of recession at the start of the 1980s. 
By the mid-1980s, national savings would come to the fore as a key economic issue 
and again superannuation would be used to answer another economic policy problem 
because growing numbers of people were covered. Providing a retirement income 
system, a decent post-work income for all employees, would emerge in the late 1980s 
as a reason to introduce a broader retirement savings system. Combined, these 
political and economic circumstances acted as “permissive conditions” for a critical 
juncture in superannuation policy to take place. 
 
However, the successful introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee in 1992 
followed long-term and short-term continuities; it was not a simple break from the 
past. The old institution of occupational superannuation which had existed since the 
1840s was assuming central importance in national policy. The reason it did so was 
because industrial campaigns around superannuation had started in the 1970s, 
generating national interest in the issue. These campaigns also gave unions the option 
of pursuing greater superannuation coverage while still having an official commitment 
to a government superannuation scheme. 
 
Finally, the system that was introduced in 1992 was also a new version of occupational 
superannuation. The system introduced compulsory contributions by employers on 
behalf of their employees to private superannuation funds, whereas the old 
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occupational pension schemes saw employers managing the contributions of 
employees and paying them a “defined benefit” for life. Once the move was made away 
from employer pension funds, employees had to choose where to place their 
superannuation investments. Under the new scheme, workers would bear the risk of 
any investment loss. Further, concepts would be “layered” on to occupational 
superannuation to rebalance it in favour of employees, so that the money they 
accumulated would be a pot of savings, capable of being accumulated with 
contributions from different workplaces, and with pauses in contributions if they took 
time out of the paid workforce. 
3. What are the explanations for the way the superannuation system has 
developed since the introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee (SG) in 
1992? 
The introduction of a private, occupational superannuation system created its own 
path dependency and has generated its own political battles. A system of private 
investment required a decision over who would control the funds. The “Choice of 
Fund” regime in 2005 and the subsequent MySuper regime in 2013 centre on the 
degree of control that individual members have over their superannuation savings 
and how they are invested. Choice of Fund was an example of institutional “layering” 
that changed the method of fund allocation. The legislation also “displaced” other 
elements of the existing process, by overriding Commonwealth and Territory award 
superannuation. The MySuper regime, in turn, “layered” a framework of “choice 
architecture” and introduced low-fee, low-risk superannuation products. As 
evidenced most recently in the Productivity Commission’s “best in show” proposal 
for fund allocation, government is trying to manage the risk that individuals face. 
This may be contrasted with the public Age Pension that provides a guaranteed 
minimum income for life, although subject to political vagaries. 
The continuing debates about choice of fund are, as much as anything else, 
ideological and political debates for control over the system. These flow from the 
creation of an industrial superannuation system – the Labor Party regards 
superannuation as its creation and sees itself as the natural custodian of the system. 
By way of contrast, the Coalition has always viewed compulsory superannuation with 
suspicion. Initially antagonistic to its creation, the Coalition has since tried to 
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influence the system through opening it up to wider competition and delaying 
scheduled increases to the Superannuation Guarantee.  
Future research 
 
This thesis has been a detailed historical study of the development of Australian 
superannuation policy. There are many directions that the thesis could have taken 
but which were not possible in order to do justice to a single case study. The 
institutionalist literature is replete with comparative case studies and the history of 
Australian superannuation provides a basis for instructive comparative work. This 
would be a valuable contribution to Australian public policy studies, with its current 
focus on barriers to policy reform.988   
Much comparative work has been done on pensions, and welfare systems more 
broadly. Some of the research is historical but much of it is current empirical 
analysis. There is, accordingly, fertile ground for comparative institutional studies of 
the historical development of pension systems. Marriott has carried out a study of 
the development of comparative retirement taxation systems in Australia and New 
Zealand. Comparative work between Australia and the United Kingdom is another 
obvious direction, given the likeness of the two welfare states and the strong 
influence of the UK on the ideas underpinning Australia’s welfare state.  
A third area for future research is to further to explore recent theoretical debates 
around incremental policy change in the context of the modern superannuation 
system. Stebbing has understood the “financialisation” of superannuation as a 
process of policy layering which commenced in the 1970s,989 and, with Spies-
Butcher, has also located the development of superannuation tax expenditures 
(STEs) in an institutional framework.990 This work could be extended upon, bringing 
it together with other analyses of superannuation fund fees and regulation to assess 
just how different the superannuation system is today from the one created in 1992.    
                                                             
988 Joannah Luetjens, Michael Mintrom & Paul ‘t Hart, eds. Successful Policy Reform: Lessons from 
Australia and New Zealand (Canberra: ANU Press, 2019).   
989 Adam Stebbing, “Privatising Retirement in a Financialising Market: Risk-shifting and Rent-seeking 
in Australian Superannuation Policy,” Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia Workshop on 
Theorising the Dynamics of Social Service Markets, Macquarie University, Sydney, 4th to 6th April 
2018. 
990 Adam Stebbing and Ben Spies-Butcher, “Universal Welfare by ‘Other Means’? Social Tax 
Expenditures and the Australian Dual Welfare State,” Journal of Social Policy 39, no.4 (2010): 
pp.585-606. 
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What goes around comes around: the idea of government 
superannuation  
 
Far from settling superannuation policy, the Superannuation Guarantee established 
a system that has continued to be the subject of fierce debate. The debates over 
Choice of Fund have exemplified this, and they are one example among many. Most 
recently, the Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation 
and Financial Services Sector, handed down in February 2019, provided evidence of 
some of the failings of the superannuation system. The Commission found that there 
was a number of areas in which private superannuation funds were failing members, 
including the creation of multiple accounts, the fees for which whittled away member 
savings. Some funds were found to be spending “not insignificant amounts” to 
establish good relationships with employers in order to entreat them to nominate the 
fund as the employer’s default fund. The Royal Commission recommended legislative 
change to prohibit such “treating of employers.”991 
In light of some of the recent findings about the failings of private superannuation 
funds, discussion again turned to the prospect of a government-run superannuation 
scheme. Peter Costello, the former Treasurer under the Howard Government and 
now the Chairman of Australia’s sovereign wealth fund, the Future Fund,992 
proposed that a public superannuation fund should be created as the default fund for 
Superannuation Guarantee contributions.993 This proposal would entail the creation  
of a contributory government scheme, managed by the Australian Tax Office, where 
compulsory superannuation contributions are managed by a government fund, 
unless individuals choose another. The proposal as envisaged would not cover 
additional private superannuation savings above the Superannuation Guarantee.  
Paul Keating has proposed a further option for a government scheme at various 
times over past decade. The idea is for government “longevity insurance,” to pool the 
retirement income risks of a longer-living society. Superannuation Guarantee 
contributions of 12 per cent, combined with the Age Pension, would, Keating argues, 
                                                             
991 Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services 
Industry, pp.251-252; Recommendation 3.6. 
992 The Future Fund was established in 2006 to help meet the Commonwealth’s unfunded liabilities 
for public service defined benefit pensions. The Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme was closed 
to new members in 1990. 
993 John Kehoe, “Future Fund Chairman Peter Costello wants Government Default Superannuation 
Fund,” Financial Review, 11 February 2019.   
238 
 
provide a decent standard of living up until a person’s mid-80s. Thereafter, 
increasing health and aged care costs begin to eat into income. Keating has therefore 
proposed a 3 per cent “longevity levy,” which would be paid into a government fund, 
to be drawn on by those in the over-85 age group for specific costs.994 He has not 
publicly addressed the issue of why a public fund is preferable for longevity risk, 
when he assumes private funds are better placed to manage superannuation 
contributions for those aged up to 85.  
Neither Keating’s nor Costello’s proposals have garnered much political interest. The 
Liberal Party was openly considering a government default scheme for 
superannuation but distanced itself from the proposal ahead of the 2019 federal 
election. The Labor Party has not demonstrated any appetite for either a government 
default fund or a government longevity fund. It seems that, for now at least, 
Australia’s major political parties are more occupied with superannuation fund 
performance and conduct. They are also set for a debate about the level of wages that 
should be compulsorily paid into private superannuation under the Superannuation 
Guarantee. Nearly 30 years after the introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee, 
the questions of efficiency and equity raised by a private, defined contribution, 
occupational system are many.  
  
                                                             
994 Paul Keating, Interview with Leigh Sales, ABC 7:30, 13 November 2018. 
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